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Summary in Norwegian / Sammendrag  
Globale tema / Lokale problemer: En sammenliknende studie av tyrkiske og norske urbane, toinntektsfamilier 
 
Hovedmålet med studien var å granske dynamikken i familie og kjønnpraksis i to forskjellige 
sosiale kontekster, nemlig storbyliv i Norge og Tyrkia. Forholdene mellom kjønn, familiepraksis og 
politikk er studert gjennom sammenliknende analyser av offisielle dokumenter og statistikk, samt 
intervjuer med 16 tyrkiske og 11 norske høyt utdannede par i to aldersgrupper. Hvordan definerer 
disse parene familie og hvordan evaluerer de endringene i familie og kjønns-relasjoner? Hvordan 
organiserer de husarbeid og barneomsorg? Hva slags strategier har de for å balansere familie 
forpliktelser og fulltidsjobb? Bruker de tiden som de ønsker? Hva slags framtidsplaner har de? 
Hvordan reflekterer de om kjønn: hvordan evaluerer de fordeler og ulemper knyttet til å være 
kvinne eller mann i Norge og Tyrkia? Hva forventer de fra staten i forhold til familie og 
kjønnspraksis? Disse var noen av de spørsmålene studien forsøkte å svare.   
Likhetene mellom de tyrkiske og norske parene danner et grunnlag for å analysere ‘globale tema’ 
som resultat av modernisering. Forskjellene danner grunnlag for å reflektere om ‘lokale problemer’ 
som er spesifikke for de to land. Her følger en oppsummering av prosjektets hovedfunn:  
Definisjon av familie og vurdering av endringer i familie relasjoner  
Å være i familie fører til ulike forpliktelser i Tyrkia og Norge. I Norge viser velferdstaten seg å være 
en sentral aktør i forhold til omsorgstjenester for eldre og barn. I Tyrkia er ikke staten oppfattet 
som en ansvarlig omsorgsaktør. Omsorgsarbeid er betraktet som kvinners viktigste ansvar som 
bør utføres innenfor den private sfæren. Spørsmålet ‘hvem er din familie’ er også mer ideologisk i 
den tyrkiske konteksten. I moderniseringsprosessen ble det å være kjernefamilie assosiert med å 
være moderne, i motsetning til storfamiliene som symboliserte det tradisjonelle. Disse faktorene 
synes å påvirke hvordan informantene definerer familie. Yngre tyrkiske par tegnet skarpere grenser 
mellom deres kjernefamilie og resten av slektningene, mens norske par var mer avslappet med 
hensyn til å inkludere flere i familiegruppen. I følge de tyrkiske parene har de viktigste endringer i 
familier vært en demokratisering av forholdene mellom ektepar, mellom foreldre og barn og en 
større grad av frikobling fra familiebånd. I følge de norske parene har de viktigste endringene vært 
økning i toinntektsfamilier og økt risiko for samlivsbrudd.  
Organisering av husarbeid og barneomsorg 
Den viktigste forskjellen mellom tyrkiske og norske par angående organisering av husarbeid, var at 
alle tyrkiske par hadde betalt hushjelp. Det er vanlig at kvinner som har flyttet til byene fra landet 
jobber som vaskedamer hos middelklasse familier. Dette er en veletablert og relativt billig service 
som gjør at fordeling av husarbeid ikke blir et tema for forhandling for tyrkiske par. Norske par 
hadde for sin del mye å fortelle om hvordan de organiserer husarbeidet. Idealet for dem hadde 
vært å dele likt, men de fleste hadde likevel ‘glidd inn’ i et relativt tradisjonelt mønster etter hvert. 
En likhet mellom de to grupper er at, det er kvinnene som har største ansvar når det gjelder 
organisering av husarbeidet: å sette standarder, bestemme hva skal gjøres og når, og å ta initiativet 
for forhandlinger når arbeidsdelingen føles urettferdig. Tyrkiske kvinner har lavere forventninger 
enn de norske, og husarbeid generelt er et mindre viktig tema for tyrkere enn nordmenn.  
I forhold til organisering av daglig omsorg for barna, er det store forskjeller mellom de to land. 
Statssubsidierte barnehager, som er den mest foretrukket ordning blant norske par, eksisterer ikke 
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som et alternativ for tyrkere. Tyrkiske par må finne private løsninger i mangel av offentlige tilbud. 
De fleste har fulltids dagmamma og noen benytter private barnehager.  
Familie-Jobb balanse  
Å finne en god balanse mellom familie og jobb synes hovedsakelig å være kvinners’ problem blant 
tyrkiske par. Spesielt kvinner med små barn som jobber i det private arbeidsmarkedet opplever 
mye stress og anstrengelser. Blant norske par snakker både mødre og fedre med små barn om 
problemer knyttet til å balansere familie og arbeidsliv. De opplever kravene om å være tilgjengelig 
både hjemme og på jobb som motstridende. Sammenliknet med tyrkiske fedre føler norske fedre 
seg mer ansvarlig for å delta aktivt hjemme og å balansere arbeidet med hensyn til familien. 
Bortsett fra en hadde alle unge norske fedre brukt farspermisjon og opplevd dette som positivt.  
Kjønnsideologier og kjønnede erfaringer 
Kjønn er mer politisert i Norge, hovedsakelig som følge av 70-tallets feminist bevegelse samt 
velferdstatens likestillings politikk. Norske par hadde mer å fortelle om endringer i 
kjønnsrelasjoner og de fleste opplevde større likestilling mellom kjønnene som positivt. Standard 
måten norske informantenes reflekterte om kjønn på kan karakteriseres med setningen: «Vi har 
kommet langt i likestilling i Norge, men…» Denne setningen avsluttes ofte med referanser til 
ulikheter i arbeidslivet og i deling av omsorgsarbeid hjemme.  
De aller fleste av de tyrkiske informantene ser ikke kjønn som viktig. De tror at andre faktorer, 
som klassebakgrunn og utdanning, har mer å si. Mange kvinner reflekterte om kjønn på følgende 
måte: «Jeg, personlig, føler ingen ulemper knyttet til å være kvinne, men…» Denne setningen 
avsluttet de med referanser til problemene ’andre’ kvinner, som ikke har utdannelse eller jobb 
hadde. Striden mellom religion og moderniseringsprosessen er viktig fenomen som påvirker 
dagens kjønnsrelasjoner i Tyrkia. 90 prosent av befolkningen i Tyrkia er muslimer, men offisielt er 
Tyrkia en sekulær stat, uten statsreligion. Kvinners status og kjønnsrelasjoner er påvirket av den 
spesielle moderniseringshistorien. Tyrkia har opplevd en revolusjonær modernisering etter 
frigjøringskrigen hvor modernisering var definert som ‘vestliggjøring ved å beholde tyrkiske 
verdier’. Kvinners status i samfunnet hadde også en viktig symbolsk betydning i 
moderniseringsånden. Spesielt middelklasse kvinner fikk mulighet til å ta høyere utdanning og 
jobbe i profesjoner. Et tvetydig ‘moderne kvinne’ ideal var skapt: en som har høyere utdanning, 
deltar i arbeidsmarkedet, men som prioriterer familien, og som først og fremst er en god mor og 
kone. Dette er fremdeles et sterkt ideal i Tyrkia, som gjør at kvinner ofte velger å slutte i 
arbeidslivet når moderskap kommer i konflikt med å være i arbeid. I tillegg har, som tidligere 
nevnt, alle noe hjelp i huset. Derfor blir ikke tradisjonelle kjønnsroller hjemme omdiskutert, i 
motsetning til situasjonen i Norge fra 1970-tallet. I Norge er likestilling den dominerende 
ideologien, mens komplementær kjønnsrolleideologi er mer akseptert i Tyrkia. Intervjumaterialet 
viser at kjønnsrelasjoner i høyst grad er påvirket av statens kjønnsideologi og politikk. Særlig 
påvirker spesifikk familiepolitikk sosiale forventninger knyttet til foreldreskap og kjønnsroller.    
Familiepolitikk og forventninger fra Staten 
Dette er et område hvor store forskjeller mellom de to sosiale kontekster kommer til syne.  Det 
finnes ikke en velutviklet familiepolitikk i Tyrkia. Hovedgrunnen er at problemer knyttet til 
barneomsorg og eldreomsorg er definert som “private problemer”. Familien er mer “offentlig” i 
Norge: Det finnes en velutviklet familiepolitikk som tar over en del av ansvaret for barne- og 
eldreomsorgen, en hoved karakteristikk av den sosialdemokratiske velferdsstaten. Selv om Norge 
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har vært etternøler i Skandinavisk sammenheng i forhold til investering i barnehager og støtte 
kvinner i lønnet arbeid, har det i løpet av 1990-tallet skjedd en viktig utvikling. Antall 
barnehageplasser har økt og permisjonsperiodene har blitt vesentlig forlenget. Hovedideologien 
bak familiepolitikken i Norge er nå å støtte “to-inntekts” familie modellen og målet er å legge til 
rette for at både fedre og mødre skal delta aktivt i arbeidsmarkedet og dele omsorgsansvaret 
hjemme. Det som er spesielt med Norge er fokus på fedrenes ansvar hjemme gjennom utvikling 
av permisjonsordninger som er forbeholdt fedre.  
I Tyrkia kan familiepolitikken karakteriseres som “familistisk” --omsorg for barn og eldre er sett 
som familiens (dvs. kvinnens) private ansvar som må gjennomføres innenfor familien. Norsk 
familiepolitikk kan betegnes som ‘individualistisk’ siden den hovedsakelig er basert på ideen om at 
både mødre og fedre skal delta i arbeidsmarkedet.  
Når det gjelder forventninger fra staten og forestillinger om staten er det stor forskjell mellom de 
to land. Norske informanter fastslår at de setter stor pris lengre permisjonsperioder og subsidierte 
barnehager. Og parene har store forventninger fra staten, spesielt i forhold til barnehager: de 
ønsker bedre dekning og mer støtte. Tyrkiske par forventer derimot lite fra staten, særlig i forhold 
til det de definerer som deres ‘private problemer’ hjemme.  
Tidsbruk og framtidsplaner 
Både tyrkiske og norske par med små barn føler et stort tidspress. Spesielt tyrkiske mødre som 
jobber i den private sektor føler at de har lite kontroll over sin tid. Både norske mødre og fedre 
ønsker å få mer tid: både til familien og til fritidsaktiviteter. 
Tyrkiske og norske par har også forskjellige framtidsplaner. De fleste norske par snakket om ‘å 
holde sammen som familie’ som en viktig plan. For tyrkiske par var det å sikre framtiden 
økonomisk det viktigste. Velferdsstaten har her trolig stor betydning. Norske par er mer 
“dekommodifiserte” siden velferdsordningene gir en grunnleggende sikkerhet for framtida. 
Økonomiske og politiske faktorer legger større bånd på tyrkiske pars framtidsplaner. Et viktig 
problem som yngre norske par opplever er å takle høye og motstridende forventninger knyttet til å 
være vellykket i mange sfærer samtidig. For tyrkiske par er hovedproblemet å takle motstridende 
forventninger av tradisjonelle og sen-moderne familieforhold og kjønnsrelasjoner.  
Forskjellige moderniteter, forskjellige overganger 
Sosiale forhold i Tyrkia og Norge kan karakteriseres som kontekster av forskjellige moderniteter. 
Blant tyrkiske par en overgang fra en tidlig-moderne til sen-moderne holdning var mer synlig. 
Yngre tyrkiske par var mer individualisert og mindre opptatt av tradisjonelle bånd, sammenliknet 
til de eldre. En liknende holdningsforskjell var mindre synlig blant norske par. En tendens som 
karakteriserer norske par var en holdning som jeg kaller ‘forsiktig moderne.’ Kjennetegn for denne 
innstillingen er en skeptisisme om økende dominans av penger og økende sosiale ulikheter i 
samfunnet. Et felles ønske blant yngre norske par var å redusere daglig travelhet og få mer tid for 
familielivet.  
En likhet mellom tyrkiske og norske par var det faktum at kjønnsforskjeller eksisterer i forhold til 
fordeling av ulønnet arbeid og i forhold til erfaringer i arbeidsmarkedet. Selv blant disse par som 
deltar i lønnsarbeidet under like betingelser, er det kjønnsforskjeller når det gjelder organisering og 
utføring av hus- og omsorgsarbeid. Kvinner både føler seg mer ansvarlig og gjør mer av ulønnede 
arbeid i den private sfæren. Og det er ofte kvinner som velger å prioritere familien når konfliktene 
mellom forventningene hjemme og i jobben blir store.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
“Sociological imagination...is a quality of mind that seems most 
dramatically to promise an understanding of the intimate realities of 
ourselves in connection with larger social realities (Mills 1959: 15).” 
 
The major purpose of this research project is to study the dynamics of gender and family 
practices in two social contexts that are going through different transformations of 
modernity. The complex relationships between gender, family practices, and state policies 
will be investigated through comparative and complementary analyses of historical 
developments, statistical trends, official documents, and face-to-face interviews. Social 
practices of a specific group – dual-earner, professional couples – will form the basis of 
the comparative approach. My objective is to interpret the accounts, experiences, and 
evaluations of this particular group to gain insights on larger dynamics in the two 
societies and to come one step further in the task of analyzing “the major issues for 
publics and the key troubles of private individuals in our time” (Mills 1959: 11). My hope 
is to contribute to a clarification of the ‘global issues’ and ‘local troubles’ crystallizing in 
the lives of these individuals. A major theoretical ambition of this project is to contribute 
to a deeper, critical understanding of the processes of modernization and globalization in 
interaction with specific local, national, and cultural formations. The two national 
contexts that I have chosen for this purpose are Turkey and Norway. The sine qua non of 
this choice is my personal biography.  
 I am a Turkish woman who was born in Istanbul. I studied Business Administration 
as my first undergraduate degree at Boğaziçi University in Istanbul, realized that this was 
not the field where my heart is, and started searching for alternative fields of study. As a 
result of a series of coincidences and conscious choices, I received a scholarship for a 
master’s degree in sociology at the University of Bergen and traveled to Norway for the 
first time in August 1990. Since the day of my arrival, I have been engaged in observing 
and trying to understand the institutional and cultural differences between Turkey and 
Norway. Despite the similarities in urban living arrangements, certain areas were 
strikingly different. For example, almost half of the members of the Norwegian 
Parliament were women and gender issues ranked high on the political agenda. When I 
had to decide the subject of my master’s thesis in sociology, the choice was easy: I would 
study women’s societal positions in Norway and Turkey comparatively. My positioning in 
the two countries as concurrently an insider and an outsider was the essential factor that 
enabled me to mobilize the ‘sociological imagination’ (à la Mills, 1959) to compare the 
dynamics of these two societies. The findings of this initial project (Sümer 1996, 1998) 





1.1 Research Background  
The prior comparative research showed that despite clear differences in terms of their 
gendered experiences, young Turkish and Norwegian women with a university education, 
expected to face similar problems related to the conflicting demands of motherhood and 
employment and to gendered division of domestic and care work. The available solutions 
for these problems, however, were fundamentally different in each country: while the 
public support offered by the welfare state in Norway – in the form of lengthened 
maternity leave and subsidized day care institutions – helped women in combining their 
earning and caring commitments, the traditional family relations and the availability of 
paid household help enabled modern Turkish women to combine employment and 
motherhood without challenging the conventional role patterns within families. At the 
institutional level, the Norwegian welfare state and the Turkish family appeared to play 
significant roles in the lives of these women, in terms of the different opportunities and 
constraints they signified.1 I analyzed the common problem that both Norwegian and 
Turkish women declared as a dilemma – i.e., the clashing demands of the public and 
private spheres – as stemming from an ‘incongruity of the design of modernity’ (Beck 
1992: 82). In the capitalist order, combining family commitments with work outside 
home has been both experienced and defined as a problem and source of conflict for 
women, while this combination has largely been a matter of course for men. My research 
revealed that both Turkish and Norwegian women have worries related to family/work 
and motherhood/career balances. In light of these findings concerning young and 
educated women, I started to contemplate the kinds of relationships men of the same 
backgrounds might have to the spheres of the state and the family. Combined with an 
interest in changing family patterns, gender relations, and the division of tasks inside 
households, these questions led me to formulate the research problems for the current, 
wider-ranging, comparative project. I extended the field of investigation to include 
heterosexual couples from Turkey and Norway in order to study the dynamics of gender 
relations and hear the stories of both men and women regarding their gender, family and 
work practices. 
1.2 Research Design 
The first reaction that this study often causes is a statement that Turkey and Norway are 
too different to be comparable in any way: Norway is among the richest countries in the 
world, due to its North Sea oil revenues, and has one of the most institutionalized welfare 
states, while Turkey is often in major economic crises and suffers political instabilities. 
Different institutional arrangements, religions, and values prevail in the two societies. 
Norway is homogeneous and has a lower social inequality, while Turkey is extremely 
heterogeneous. All these claims are true. Given these basic differences one may ask: Is it 
justifiable to compare the practices and policies of these two societies? I would answer 
                                                     
1 For a more detailed presentation of the main findings of this research see Sümer 1998. 
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“yes,” within a particular research logic and design. The project is not “comparative” in a 
positivistic sense, but the aim is to investigate the social relations and institutions in the 
two societies with an interpretive-comparative approach. The main strategy I employ in 
approaching these dissimilar countries is to base the empirical comparison on highly 
specific and similar social groups. The groups that will form this basis of this inquiry are 
heterosexual couples (married or cohabiting) with children, living in cities, in which both 
the man and the woman have a university education and are (or have been) in full-time 
professional employment, in the age groups 30-45 or 45-65. The focus will be on 
individuals who define themselves as ‘secular’ since the main purpose is to study 
individuals’ reflections on changing gender and family relations by bracketing out the 
religious arguments. There are several theoretical, strategic, and practical reasons behind 
this specification:   
 
Why Couples? Interviewing couples will provide data on their family lives, their problems, 
negotiations, and solutions regarding divisions of domestic tasks, care work and 
combination of employment and family life. Comparisons of attitudes and experiences of 
women and men will provide material for studying the ways gender is constructed and 
gendered patterns are reproduced, as well as potentials and possibilities for change. 
 
Why Parents? Having a child brings up a situation in which women and men face 
increased pressure on their time and priorities. They also need more support from other 
agents, such as the state, close relatives and friends. As parents, individual men and 
women deal with a new aspect of their identities, as well as expectations and difficulties 
related to combining motherhood/fatherhood and professional employment. 
Interviewing parents will provide the means to examine different aspects of parenthood 
and the functioning of support networks in the two countries. 
 
Why an Urban Background, Secular Orientation and University Education? People who live in 
cities and have higher education are often conceptualized as the vanguard in the process 
of reflexive modernization (Beck 1992). To establish a meaningful level of comparability, 
it is important to clarify that though living in different social contexts, the Turkish and 
Norwegian groups share at least a certain amount of similarity concerning life-styles, 
material conditions, and value orientations. Concentrating on individuals who define 
themselves as “secular” and whose attitudes and decisions are not directly influenced by 
their religious orientations will facilitate and strengthen the comparability of the different 
groups. Basing the study on highly modernized groups in the two societies also will offer 
the possibility of studying convergence, and analyzing whether these stem from the 
globalizing influences of modernity. 
 
Why in Full-time Employment? One of the theoretical purposes of this project is to 
contribute to understanding how women's increasing education and employment 
influence the traditional family patterns and gender divisions of labor inside households 
and in the labor market. Interviewing couples who are (or were) both employed outside 
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the home will provide information on what kind of problems this situation brings about, 
how couples handle these problems, and how much help the state and other networks 
provide. 
 
Why both Younger and Older Individuals? Most theories on gender roles and family patterns 
point to changes and transformations that took place, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Comparing the attitudes and experiences of both younger and older people on these 
issues will provide valuable material to examine these changes over time. 
 The task of studying the relationships between state policies, family patterns, and 
gender relations necessitates the complementary use of several types of data. In this 
study, I have sought to keep a broad range for the topics to be studied comparatively. My 
main purpose is to reach an understanding of the main trends in family formations and 
the relationships between women and men, both in the private and public spheres. For 
that purpose I drew on several types of data. To get at general trends in gender relations 
and family practices in Norway and Turkey, I analyzed historical and statistical data and 
official documents.2 To gain a deeper understanding of how a specific group of social 
agents organize their daily lives, manage conflicting demands, and evaluate societal trends, 
I interviewed dual-career couples.  
1.3 Research Questions 
The broad purpose of this study is to provide a comparative analysis of family practices 
and gender relations, and the historical, institutional, and cultural factors influencing 
them. State policies, especially, are conceptualized as having direct and significant effects 
on gender and family practices.  
 The study specifies three major fields – gender relations, family practices, and state 
policies – and aims at analyzing their interactions by focusing on urban, dual-earner 
couples.3 The main dimensions of comparison are the national contexts, gender 
differences, and age groups (30-45 and 45-65).  
 Turkey and Norway are especially interesting arenas for a comparative study of 
changes in gender relations due to the interaction among historical, cultural and 
socioeconomic factors that create different ‘gender regimes’ (Connell 1987) and 
ideologies. In both countries, gender-related issues have been high on the agenda, though 
with a different focus and at different times. The position of women had a symbolic 
importance in the revolutionary modernization processes in Turkey. Radical steps were 
taken in the early years of the Republic to make Turkish women equal to men as citizens, 
which led to this period being labeled a type of ‘state feminism’ (Tekeli 1986, Kandiyoti 
1995). However in daily cultural practices, traditional gender arrangements prevailed. 
                                                     
2 Documents published by family and gender-related Ministries and Directorates, official internet 
pages, and official reports were used.  
3 Detailed definitions of these concepts and the ways their relationships are conceptualized will be 
presented in Chapter 2. 
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There is a real need to examine changing and ambiguous practices of the state concerning 
gender and the influence of official ideologies in daily life since, as Kandiyoti notes, 
“there has been a gradual but definite shift from acknowledging the role and agency of 
the state in shaping gender relations…to marginalizing or ignoring it” (Kandiyoti 1995: 
314).  
 Gender equality has been an ‘official ideology’ in Norway since the 1970s, yet 
inequalities and backlash tendencies remain. Issues related to gender equality in both 
public and private spheres rank high on the political agenda. Positive developments 
towards gender equality have led feminists to argue about the possibilities of a ‘woman-
friendly’ state (Hernes 1987). Women’s (and especially mothers’) labor force participation 
has been constantly increasing in the last two decades, yet the Norwegian labor-market is 
highly gender segregated and the ‘equal pay for equal work’ principle is far from being 
realized. The division of labor between family, market, and state is decisive in analyzing 
gender relations and the distribution of power, and these relationships go through 
constant transformations. This study aims at taking a close look at change and stability in 
gender relations, both in the public and private spheres. 
 A major theoretical insight of this study is that the ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres 
interact in complex ways, and the organization of paid and unpaid labor must be analyzed 
simultaneously to reach an understanding of the ways gender differences are produced 
and reproduced. With that orientation, this study seeks answers to the following 
questions: How do dual-earner couples organize unpaid household labor and childcare? 
What are their strategies for balancing work and family? Are there significant gendered 
differences concerning care responsibilities and priorities? What types of support 
mechanisms are available for dual-earner couples? 
 Some trends in family patterns are similar across industrialized countries: a decline in 
family size, the postponement of marriage and childbirth, a decrease in fertility rates, and 
an increase in divorces. At the same time, there have been important variations among 
countries due to interacting effects of state policy, religious orientation, cultural 
characteristics, and gender ideologies. The convergence theories of evolutionary 
modernists have now largely been criticized and discredited (Mason and Jensen 1995). 
Increasing industrialization and modernization do not lead to uniform changes in family 
patterns in different regions and countries. Local factors, like state policies directed at 
families, strength of feminist movements, and historically rooted gender ideologies are 
some of the factors that interact and influence these trends.  
 This project aims to ‘deconstruct’ (Gittins 1985) many popular myths surrounding 
‘the family’ by raising a number of questions and providing cross-nationally and 
historically sensitive answers. Questions to which I seek to provide answers are: How do 
people define their families? Do family relations imply the same obligations in different 
social contexts? How are families changing? How are divorces evaluated? This process of 
deconstruction will bolster our understanding of families as products of historical, class-
specific, and culturally-specific practices and ideologies. 
 Before embarking on the task of analyzing the relationships between and trends 
within family practices, gender relationships and state policies in Norway and Turkey, 
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focusing on the reflections and practices of  urban dual-earner couples, introductory 
information on the basic institutional and cultural characteristics of the two countries will 
be in order.   
1.4 Key Characteristics of Turkish and Norwegian Societies 
Existing gender relations and family practices are formed through the interacting 
influences of specific cultural and historical factors and modernization processes. A brief 
introduction to the basic institutional and cultural elements of the two societies is 
necessary in order to place the analyses that will be presented in the following chapters in 
a wider context.   
 Turkey and Norway exemplify different modernization routes, social policy systems, 
state organizations, value orientations, and religious and cultural practices. Compared to 
many other European countries, Norway has a lower unemployment rate, a lower 
poverty level, and a higher level of income equality. Norway ranks at second place among 
174 countries according to United Nations’ Human Development Index, while Turkey 
ranks as number 85 (UNDP 2000, also see Table 1). Turkey is a developing country with 
significant urban-rural differences, where a mixture of traditional and modern life-styles 
coexists. It is a country that – despite its predominantly Muslim population – has 
officially declared its devotion to the principles of secularization and democratization. 
However the rise of ‘political Islam’ and the threat of  fundamentalism have been high on 
the agenda in the last decade. The history of the Turkish republic is characterized by a 
revolutionary modernization that created conflicting attitudes towards the ideas of 
Westernization and secularization, and a vicious cycle of military interventions which 
halted its transformation into a civil, democratic society.4 
 Norway has been able to preserve its Social Democratic welfare system without 
major cuts, due to its vast oil revenues that provide the basis for a strong economy. 
Turkey has recently experienced a major economic crisis and is still going through serious 
social turmoil. The exact reason of the crisis is hard to pinpoint, but IMF structural 
adjustment policies (i.e. privatization and deregulation) seem to have played a major role.  
 The formation of the welfare state in Norway and the process of top-down 
modernization in Turkey can be identified as the most significant historical elements 
influencing today’s practices. The developments in the Norwegian welfare state were 
rooted in a broad political consensus, and social policy issues did not cause major 
conflicts between parties. The Labor Party was a leading force in defining new social 
policy tasks, but other parties followed closely behind. A noteworthy feature of 
Norwegian politics was the extent to which the bourgeois parties incorporated social 
democratic policies.  
 
                                                     




Table 1.1 A Comparison of Basic Economic and Social Indicators 
1997-98 Turkey Norway 
Population (Thousands) 63. 745 4.393 
Inhabitants per sq. km. 82 14 
Gross Domestic Product (Bill. US $) 189.9 153.4 
GDP Per Capita 2.979 34.815 
Purchasing Power Parities Per Capita  
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Indicators of Living Standards 
Private consumption per capita 
(Purchasing Power Parities US $) 
Passenger cars (per 1000) 
Telephones (per 1000) 
Doctors (per 1000) 
Personal Computers (per 1000) 

















(Sources OECD 2001, UNDP 2000) 
 
 The Turkish Republic was proclaimed in 1923. Under the leadership of Atatürk and a 
small elite devoted to his ideology – ‘Kemalism’ – the Ottoman Sultanate and Caliphate 
were abolished and the process of top-down reformation was initiated. Kemalist reforms 
aimed to transform all the cultural and symbolic phenomena associated with the Islamic 
way of life: from the modernization of the alphabet and dress code to the status and roles 
of women. However, this new ‘modern’ culture did not have profound effects on society 
at large, especially in rural areas. A gulf was created between the rulers and the ruled, each 
of which had their own distinct cultures: “the Westernized, secular culture of a small but 
influential minority and the indigenous culture of the masses associated with Islam” 
(Ahmad 1993: 92).  
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 The class structures of the two countries differ historically: In Norway, independent 
farmers have played an important role in the country’s history and there has never been a 
large, wealthy class of landed aristocracy. Norway has a recent history of industrially-
based social classes and a longer history of rather egalitarian class relations (Gullestad 
1992). In Turkey, the class relations in the modern sense came into existence only after 
the Kemalist revolutions that initiated a transition to capitalism. Compared to Norway, 
the differences between the classes in terms of economic conditions and life-styles are 
more marked in Turkey, mainly as a result of the unequal income distribution. 
 A great majority of the population in Turkey is Muslim, and in Norway the majority 
is Protestant. The Protestant Church in Norway is organized as a State Church. Around 
85 percent of the population are members of the State Church, which officially regulates 
most of the country's religious activities. Most people baptize their infants and hold 
religious services for marriage and death, though the ratio of the population who 
regularly attends church services is quite low. Institutional religiosity has diminished and 
the role of church in society is no longer dominant, although the Christian party plays a 
more significant role in the political arena in Norway compared to other Scandinavian 
countries. After the last national election (September 2001) a center-right coalition 
government was formed and the leader of the Christian People’s Party became the Prime 
Minister. 
 Religion has always been socially and politically important in Turkey, and is still at the 
center of the political agenda due to the rise in electoral support for conservative parties 
over the last decade. In the early years of the Republic, the state strictly controlled 
religion. Socialized in the ideas of the Enlightenment, positivism, and progress, the 
Kemalists were committed to driving religion out of the public arena and into the sphere 
of individual conscience, a purpose signified by the principle of secularism (Kazancıgil 
1994). In the 1950s religion became an instrument for appealing to the masses in 
elections. Following the 1980 coup, military leaders attempted to find a middle ground 
between religion and the secular state, opening way for a revival in religious 
fundamentalism. 1990s has witnessed a growth of Islamic movements. Islamists are 
especially critical of Western influences on gender relations, the family and social customs  
(Toprak 1994).  
 This note takes us to a glance on Turkish and Norwegian women’s participation 
patterns in the ‘public sphere’ to serve as a background for the following analysis of the 
dynamics of gender relations and family practices.5  
1.4.1 Gender  in the ‘Public Sphere’ 
The legal status of women in the Ottoman Empire was mainly defined by Sharia (Islamic 
Law), which assumed that women were naturally dependent on men and that they 
                                                     
5 See Appendix 2 for more information and statistics on Turkish and Norwegian 




needed the protection of men (Arat 1989). After the proclamation of the Turkish 
Republic, the process of establishing a secular, national, and democratic state had radical 
consequences for women. In 1926, the Turkish Civil Code, modeled after the Swiss 
Code, was adopted. This law abolished polygamy and endorsed compulsory civil mar-
riage, the right of divorce for both partners, and egalitarian inheritance laws.6 In 1934, 
women were given the right to elect – and be elected as – members of the National 
Assembly. Historically, middle class women have been encouraged to participate in the 
process of  “bringing Turkey to the level of developed Western societies” – the 
ideological motto of the modernizing Kemalist regime. This factor had significant effects 
in shaping the status of women and the class relations in the Turkish society. Women 
from elite backgrounds have been encouraged to enter the prestigious professions, 
restricting the options available to men from manual or peasant backgrounds (Öncü 
1981). In that way, the secular ideology, the Westernizing reforms, and the elite 
subculture they defined, strongly encouraged women’s higher education and career 
orientation as part of their modernization mission. The result of this forceful push to 
recruit women into the professions at the same time prevented the sex-typing of  certain 
professions (Acar 1990). However, labor force participation rate of women in urban areas 
in Turkey is extremely low (16 percent in 1998). A great majority of urban women are 
housewives. In 1990, 82 percent of Turkish women defined themselves as housewives 
(Ilkkaracan 1998). The underdeveloped economy of Turkey, the lower education of 
women and the prevalence of traditional attitudes towards working women can be 
mentioned as the most important reasons behind this phenomenon. Only 5 percent of 
urban Turkish women are university graduates. Apart from the professional women with 
higher education, female workers are seen as second class labor in the work market and 
are first to be dismissed when the business is bad.  
 In Norway, women’s education levels and labor force participation rates increased 
dramatically in the last two decades. 22 percent of Norwegian women are university 
graduates. In 1999, 74 percent of women aged 15-64 were in paid employment, 
compared with 53 percent average in the EU countries (SN 2001).  
  A main difference between the two countries is that Norway witnessed a strong 
women’s movement in the 1970s, and the ideal of equality between the sexes is integrated 
in both Norwegian culture and all areas of social policy.  Turkey, on the other hand, has 
only recently seen an increased emphasis on women’s issues, while feminist movements 
have never been strong due to serious differences among women and specific historical 
developments that make gender-solidarity difficult.   
 Political participation is crucial for gaining power to make a difference in the way 
state policies address gender. The political participation of women is high in Norway; 
their representation levels compare favorably with world averages. In 1999, 36 percent of 
the members of Parliament were women. Women also constitute 45 percent of cabinet 
ministers. Norwegian women’s integration into party politics has led to an extensive 
agenda change in politics, mainly as an increased focus on ‘care politics’ (Skjeie 1993). In 
                                                     
6 The gender discriminatory clauses of the Civil Code will be analyzed in detail in Section 6.2. 
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Turkey, on the other hand, politics is both considered and practiced as a predominantly 
male activity and women’s representation has been remarkably low in the last several 
decades (Arat 1989). After the general elections in 1999, there has been an increase from 
8 to 22 women deputies in Parliament, which consists of 550 seats; yet there is not a 
single woman among the 39 ministers of the present coalition government (As of 
February 2002).  
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
Following this introduction on the underlying research questions and design, I will 
proceed with a presentation of my basic theoretical perspective and methodological 
orientation in Chapter Two. Building on a brief biographical narrative, I will first depict 
the contours of my personal development in the field of social theory. I will then proceed 
with a clarification of the major theoretical concepts that have guided the comparative 
analysis, with a specific focus on modernity, individualization and family practices. 
Definitions of the key theoretical concepts applied will be followed by reflections on 
methodology. In this section, I will provide a rather detailed account of the interviewing 
process. I will conclude the chapter by presenting the background characteristics of the 
interviewees and their pseudonyms.   
 Chapter Three is on changes in family practices. I will first provide a brief review of 
the historical and cultural roots of the present family patterns in Turkey and Norway, 
together with comparative statistics on marriage, divorce and fertility rates. This will be 
followed by an analysis of interviewees’ conceptualization of their families in the context 
of differing family ideologies that prevail in the two societies. I will conclude the chapter 
by concentrating on interviewees’ evaluations of the trends in families and intimate 
relationships, with a special focus on divorce as a complex social phenomenon. 
 In Chapter Four, different arrangements for housework and childcare will be the 
subject of comparative scrutiny, with a focus on both changes and stabilities in these 
fields. Brief information on general ways of organizing domestic labor in the two 
countries will be followed by a detailed analysis of interviewees’ own practices. 
  Chapter Five will throw a light on the different ways interviewees are balancing work 
and family obligations. Different types of conflicts throughout the life-course will be 
analyzed together with the strategies used to solve the problems related to the clashing 
demands of  the two spheres.  
 In Chapter Six the focus will shift to an analysis of state policies. Following a brief 
analysis of the social security systems, the gender ideologies and family policies of 
Turkish and Norwegian states will be analyzed to illuminate historical variations and 
ambiguities. Interviewees’ understandings of and expectations from the states will be 
analyzed in this background.   
 Chapter Seven will focus on gendered experiences and ideologies. The ways Turkish 
and Norwegian women and men think about their gendered positions in society and 
conceptualize differences between the sexes will be analyzed. Reflections on ‘being a 
woman/man, in Turkey/Norway’ will be studied comparatively. 
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 In Chapter Eight, I will take up several topics related to different aspects of late-
modern lives –namely time-use, life-planning and different approaches to modernity. 
Analyses of these themes will give way to a specification of  the main wishes and 
struggles of the interviewees, as well as a formulation of the major ‘public issues’ and 
‘private troubles’ for dual-earner, urban couples in the two societies. 
 In the concluding Chapter, I will summarize the findings of the previous chapters 
and explore the connections between them. I will further analyze the gender policy 
regimes that prevail in the two countries in light of existing comparative models and 
frameworks. Reflecting on the ‘global issues’ and ‘local troubles’ identified in light of this 
comparative study, I will end the dissertation by challenging particular national myths in 




Chapter 2 Basic Theoretical Perspective 
and Methods of Inquiry 
“…every act of research is simultaneously empirical (it confronts the 
world of observable phenomena) and theoretical (it necessarily engages 
hypotheses about underlying structure of relations that observations are 
designed to capture). Even the most minute empirical operation – the 
choice of a scale of measurement, a coding decision, the construction of 
an indicator, or the inclusion of an item in the questionnaire – involves 
theoretical choices, conscious or unconscious, while the most abstract 
conceptual puzzle cannot be fully clarified without systematic 
engagement with empirical reality” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992: 35).  
 
In this chapter, I will first give an account of how the theoretical perspective applied in 
this comparative study was formed and define the key concepts that have guided the 
analysis. This will be followed by reflections on methodology and information on the 
methods of inquiry applied in this study. The strategy that I employ in explaining my 
general theoretical perspective will be to present a brief biographical narrative. The field 
of social theory is vast, and the specific perspective each sociologist establishes after years 
of reading, writing, researching, and discussing is always bounded by the interacting 
limitations of diverse factors, such as the imposed restrictions of academic requirements, 
the availability of literature, personal and political taste, and pure chance. The theoretical 
perspective a researcher employs is not a static ‘given.’ Rather it is a dynamic entity always 
being made and remade in relation to the empirical task at hand. As Bourdieu puts it 
aptly: “...theory is not a sort of prophetic or programmatic discourse which originates by 
dissection or by amalgamation of other theories for the sole purpose of confronting 
other such pure ‘theoricist theories’...Rather, scientific theory...emerges as a program of 
perception and of action...which is disclosed only in the empirical work that actualizes it. 
It is a temporary construct which takes shape for and by empirical work” (Bourdieu &Wacquant 
1992: 161, emphasis in original).  
Before starting data gathering and analysis, I did not have fixed hypotheses about how 
certain social factors would ‘determine’ certain outcomes. I had a conception that gender 
relations and family practices would interact with state policies and other institutional and 
cultural elements, yet the specific form of this interaction was exactly what the research 
was designed to learn more about. The theoretical perspective that I chose did not imply 
a hypothesis-testing orientation, but rather exploratory research that is comparative, 
historically informed, and sensitive to individual accounts and difference.  
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A chronological construction of the important turning points in my personal 
development as a sociologist will illustrate how I came to strive for the ‘sociological 
imagination’ (Mills 1959) and depict the theoretical positioning with which I feel at ease. 
2.1 A Biographical Narrative 
I started reading the classics of sociology and following sociological theorizing in a 
continuous manner in 1991. My first paper in the field of sociology was on Erving 
Goffman's celebrated work, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, which introduced me to 
the richness of sociological approaches, the possibility of manifold perspectives, and the 
fun of dealing with ‘real’ human beings. Starting from my undergraduate student years, I 
have been especially interested in social theories that attempt to transcend the well-
established, yet counter-productive dualisms of sociological theory; among others 
structure vs. agency, determinism vs. voluntarism and objectivism vs. subjectivism. My 
first in-depth study in sociological theory was a review of Anthony Giddens’ 
‘Structuration Theory’ and the debates it initiated in the field of social theory (Giddens 
1984, Clark et al.1990). A review of these contrasting perspectives has been a rich source 
of insights on basic subject matters of social theory; e.g. the conceptualization of 
structures, agency and power. Structuration Theory is formed through criticisms of two 
opposing traditions: Functionalism and Structuralism on the one hand and various forms 
of ‘interpretive sociology’ on the other. Its main ambition is to specify the concepts of 
action, meaning, and subjectivity and relate them to notions of structure and constraint. 
Giddens’ meticulous criticisms of one-sided approaches to social life have helped me to 
develop a basic alertness regarding deterministic and evolutionary theories.7 
 Following Giddens (1984), I conceptualize individuals as ‘knowledgable agents’ who 
have the capacity of reflecting on their actions, though this knowledgeability is always 
bounded by the ‘unconscious’ on the one hand, and by ‘unacknowledged conditions’ and 
‘unintended consequences’ of action, on the other (Giddens 1984: 282). This conception 
of agency informs the understanding of ‘structure’ as not something external to 
individuals, but as “the medium and outcome of the reproduction of social practices 
which it recursively organizes” (Giddens 1984: 25). 
 During the first year of my master’s degree studies (1993), I was also introduced to 
the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1990, 1992), who had a similar theoretical aim of 
overcoming the opposition between objectivism and subjectivism by transforming them 
into a dialectical relationship between agency and structure. Even though there are 
important differences between the perspectives of Giddens and Bourdieu with respect to 
the philosophical questions in which they are rooted and their conceptualizations of 
agency and structure (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), I thought the objectives for 
                                                     
7 I have been more critical of his later work, especially Transformation of Intimacy, mainly due to his 
limited attention to gendered inequalities and constraints. In general, I agree with the critics of 
Giddens, who stress his insufficient consideration of the differential distribution of options 
available to individuals (Jamieson 1999, Marshall 1994).  
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formulating  ‘Structuration Theory’ and ‘Constructivist Structuralism’ respectively were 
strikingly similar, and therefore necessitated simultaneous attention. Though I do not 
apply the conceptual framework of Bourdieu [(Habitus x Capital) + Field = Practice] in a 
systematic manner, I have largely benefited from his general ideas concerning sociological 
reflexivity and his arguments, ‘against theoreticism and methodologism’ (Bourdieu 
&Wacquant 1992, Bourdieu 1990) in constructing my sociological perspective.  
 A major turning point in this exploratory journey in the field of social theory was my 
confrontation with C. Wright Mills and his proposal regarding the ‘sociological 
imagination’ (Mills 1959). I took great joy from his treatment of the tendencies of  ‘Grand 
Theory’ and ‘Abstracted Empiricism’ in the field of social theory, and shared 
wholeheartedly his declaration that the political task of the social scientist is, “continually 
to translate personal troubles into public issues, and public issues into the terms of their 
human meaning for a variety of individuals” (Mills 1959: 187).   
 In the same period, I also started to learn more about the internal conflicts and 
diversity of approaches within the field of feminist theory. From my earlier student years 
in Turkey, I had carried the remnants of a skeptical attitude towards feminism, which was 
mainly based on a misunderstanding of the term. I had equated feminism with a 
perspective that reified differences between women and men and suppressed the 
differences among ‘women.’ Even though I was aware and critical of the gendered 
inequalities prevailing at many levels of the society, I was not willing to define myself as a 
‘feminist’ either. However, a recognition of the existence of feminist perspectives that 
were equally critical of biological determinism, essentialism and ahistorical universalism, 
enabled me to identify more comfortably with a feminist position (e.g. Stanley & Wise 
1983, Harding 1986, Fraser & Nicholson 1990). 
  In the fall semester of 1993, I wrote a theoretical examination paper focusing on an 
analysis of the power-gender relationship based on a feminist critique of Foucault's 
theory of power. At this time, I started learning about specific postmodernist theories 
and the basic criticisms they received in the sociological community, which became a 
central area of interest later. 
 My master’s thesis (1994-96) focused mainly on three fields of social theory: 
modernity, identity, and culture. Through a review of several theories of modernity (e.g., 
Kumar 1995, Wagner 1994, Giddens 1990, Berman 1982) I came to realize that a ‘Janus-
faced’ conceptualization of modernity, with a stress on its double-sided effects – 
liberating and disciplining, enabling and constraining, uniting and dividing – would be the 
most fruitful in approaching to the different modernities that prevailed in Norway and 
Turkey. An understanding of modernization as an ambiguous, non-evolutionary, and 
unfinished project also informed my basic critical attitude towards theories of 
postmodernity, and influenced my decision to study the uneasy relationship between 
feminism and postmodernism in the course of my doctoral studies   
 In 1999, I wrote a paper entitled, ‘Postmodernism and Feminism: Seeking a 
Constructive Confrontation’ (Sümer 1999). Reviewing various feminist responses to 
postmodernism, I spotted a convergence in the thinking of several feminists who are 
critical of certain elements of both classical modernist and postmodernist stances. Two 
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feminist projects that I found compelling specified similar goals under different labels: 
Barbara Marshall (1994) named her project ‘critical modernism,’ whereas Nancy Fraser 
and Linda Nicholson (1990) prefer to call theirs ‘postmodern feminism’. Both endorse a 
theory, “…which is post-positivist, critical of the hegemony of Western ‘reason,’ listens 
to ‘local stories,’ rethinks the notion of a coherent pre-existing ‘subject,’ and rejects the 
universalizing impulse of ‘grand narratives’ (Marshall 1994: 159). Revealing this 
convergence, I argued that labels such as postmodernist or modernist appear to be 
almost arbitrary, since these theorists specify similar aspects as the hallmarks of their 
approaches: the importance of a non-positivistic and non-deterministic approach to 
social life, which is explicitly historical and sensitive to local and cultural diversity. I agree 
with Barbara Marshall (1994) when she calls for a ‘critical eclecticism’ as a beneficial 
strategy for approaching the modernism-postmodernism controversies. In this way, the 
legitimacy of social analyses will be assessed on the basis of their explanatory power and 
commitment to social change; not on the basis of a simple identification with modernism 
or postmodernism. Personally, I prefer not to label such an approach postmodern, since 
I do not see a solid basis for political action in the postmodernist worldview.8 
 During the course of my doctoral studies (1997-2001) several new fields opened up 
in relation to the questions aroused by my empirical work. For example, comparative 
analyses of welfare and gender ‘regimes’ became a central field that provided me with 
theoretical tools for approaching the state-family-individual nexus in Turkey and Norway. 
In the next section, I will briefly summarize key proposals of these perspectives. 
 As the short biographical narrative above reveals, during my decade long experience 
in the field of social theory, I have striven to establish a theoretical approach that would 
enable me to practice the basic insight that the main task of sociological thinking should 
be, ‘an articulation of everyday experience to historically situated socioeconomic and 
cultural formations’ (Marshall 1994: 3) through a critical theorization, ‘to reach beyond 
the particular, while remaining sensitive to culture and difference’ (Calhoun 1995: xxv).  
 Having drawn the basic contours of the theoretical perspective applied in this 
comparative study, let me now proceed with a clarification of the major concepts that 
have guided the specific analysis.  
2.2 Key Theoretical Concepts and Constructs  
This study is designed to learn more about the relationships between gender relations, 
family practices and state policies in the age of ‘late-modernity’ in two different cultural 
contexts. How do I conceptualize and analyze these relationships? To answer this 
question, I will first briefly clarify my understanding of culture, modernity, and issues of 
identity in the context of ‘late-’ or ‘reflexive-modernity.’ This will be followed by an 
account of the ways I conceptualize family practices and gender-family-state 
relationships. 
                                                     
8 See, for example, Benhabib 1994 and Walby 1992 for similar arguments on this issue. 
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 It is almost a taken-for-granted assumption that there are cultural differences 
between Turkey and Norway, but what this means is often ambiguous and contentious. 
A striking feature of the concept of culture is the diversity of meanings attributed to the 
word itself. Wallerstein (1990) mentions a fundamental confusion in the use of the 
concept: culture is used, on the one hand,  as a set of characteristics which distinguish 
one group from another, and on the other hand, as a set of phenomena which are 
different from (and “higher” than) some other set of phenomena within the same group. 
The second usage points to a division within the group rather than a unity. This basic 
distinction in the conceptualization of culture can be formulated as a division between 
culture seen as an implicit feature of social life and culture conceived as an explicit social 
construction (Wuthnow and Witten 1988). In the context of  this comparative study, the 
way culture is defined is similar to the alternative approach formulated by Ann Swidler 
(1986). According to Swidler, a cultural explanation based on values, as in the 
voluntaristic theory of action of Parsons, is misleading since it sees culture as affecting 
human action by defining what people want. Culture, however, is not a unified system 
that pushes action in a consistent direction. Action is necessarily integrated into larger 
assemblages, called ‘the strategies of action.’ Strategies of action  denote a general way of 
organizing action. In this framework, culture is more like a “tool kit” or repertoire from 
which actors select differing pieces for constructing lines of action. This approach also 
leads us to expect that people are not passive ‘cultural dopes,’ but rather active, 
sometimes skilled users of culture: “Strategies of action are cultural products; the 
symbolic experiences, mythic lore, and ritual practices of a group or society create moods 
and motivations, ways of organizing experience and evaluating reality, modes of 
regulating conduct, and ways of forming social binds, which provide resources for 
constructing strategies of action” (Swidler 1986: 284). 
 I subscribe to Swidler’s assertion that the challenge for the sociologists is not to try to 
estimate how much culture shapes action, but to search for new analytic perspectives that 
will allow more concrete analyses of how culture is used by actors and how cultural 
elements constrain or facilitate action. The concept of culture is central in approaching 
‘different modernities.’ The insight that modernization interacts with local cultural 
formations of specific societies at hand and produces different modernities, and that 
‘traditional,’ ‘modern’ and ‘late-modern’ characteristics often coexist within the same 
society, has been a key theoretical premise guiding my comparative approach to Turkey 
and Norway. As Gullestad (1992) argues, the social sciences need to conceptualize the 
simultaneous processes of cultural globalization and homogenization, on the one hand, 
and regionalization and diversification of forms of life and claims to identity on the other: 
“While many phenomena are transcultural, cultural ‘traditions’ are at the same time also 
transformed or invented... This may be a question of context of being ‘global’ in some 
contexts and ‘traditional’ in others. It may also be a question of locally reworking 
international impulses. And it may be a question of going through a modernization 
process partly based on local economic and cultural conditions (1992:14).” 
 Before passing to a rather detailed depiction of the concepts of modernity and 
modernization, a note on globalization will be in order. Globalization is a plural 
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phenomenon and at the most basic level, can be perceived as the growing 
interdependence of the people all around the world. In the context of this study, 
globalization is mainly conceptualized as an intensified world-wide competitive 
economics, increasing dominance of market forces and more international contact. It is 
important to focus on both the opportunities and constraints brought about by 
globalization and be aware of the fact that “globalization divides as much as it unites” 
(Bauman 1998: 2). In theory, global markets and global technology can enrich the lives of 
people by expanding their choices. However, the benefits of globalization are not 
distributed evenly. Today’s economic globalization is being driven by market expansion. 
When the market goes too far in dominating social and political outcomes, the 
opportunities and rewards of globalization spread unequally, concentrating power and 
wealth in a selected group of people, nations and corporations, marginalizing the others 
(UNDP 1999).  
 A plural perception of globalization is indispensable while analyzing the cultural 
complexities of both modern Western countries and the modernizing non-Western 
nation-states. As Featherstone (1995) argues it is not possible to conceive global 
processes in terms of the dominance of a single center over the peripheries since this 
image presents an over-simplified view of cultures: 
One of the problems in attempting to formulate a theory of globalization is of 
adopting a totalizing logic and assuming some master process of global integration 
is under way which is making the world more unified and homogeneous 
(Featherstone 1995: 102). 
Globalization does not produce cultural uniformity; rather it makes us aware of new 
levels of diversity. This particular grasp of globalization, which maintains that there is a 
plurality of national responses to modernization that cannot be reduced to the ideas 
generated by Western modernity is related to a specific understanding of the ambiguity of 
modernity.  
2.2.1 Modernization and Modernity 
In the context of this study, modernization is understood as the transition from simple to 
highly differentiated societies. One institutional axis of modernity is industrialism, referring 
to the social relations implied in the widespread use of material power and machinery in 
production. A second dimension is capitalism, referring to a system of commodity 
production, involving both competitive markets and the commodification of labor power 
(Giddens 1991: 15). 
 Modernity is associated with the release of the individual from the bonds of tradition, 
urbanization, rationalization, the differentiation of the various spheres of the life world 
(Marshall 1994). These aspects of modernity are more or less agreed upon by many 
classical and contemporary theorists. What is mostly disputed concerns the ways 
modernity will unfold.  
 A crucial feature of the understanding of modernity applied in this study is the stress 
on its inherent ambiguity: Modernization does not bring about straightforward, linear 
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changes in societies. It is always simultaneously liberating and disciplining, enabling and 
constraining, uniting and dividing. Looking at both gains and losses and ambiguities of 
modernity is crucial in understanding the ‘self-critical’ moment and the ‘counter-
discourse’ inherent in it. Following Krishan Kumar (1995), I find it useful to differentiate 
between ‘modernization’ and ‘modernism’ to elucidate this approach:  
 “Modernity is a comprehensive designation of all the changes – intellectual, social 
and political – that brought into being the modern world, while modernism is a 
cultural movement that occurred in the West at the end of the 19th century, which 
was in some respects a critical reaction against modernity” (Kumar 1995: 67).  
The idea of modernity once established at the end of the 18th century came up against a 
complex reaction to it a century later. This was the cultural movement of modernism. 
Modernism both affirmed modernity and denied it, both continued its principles and 
challenged it at its core (Kumar 1995: 85). This approach makes the ambivalence inherent 
in modernity clear: modernization – the social and economic processes of modernity – 
from the very beginning gave rise to modernism, the cultural critique of modernity. The 
tension and at times divergence between these two concepts puts into sharp relief  the 
dual aspect of modernity and illuminates the parallels between this classical modernism 
and what has come to be labeled as post-modernism in the last decades.9  
 The three ‘founding fathers’ of sociology – namely, Durkheim, Marx and Weber – 
were all preoccupied with interpreting the nature of modernity, by attending questions of 
social order and social change. The growing social division of labor and the shifting 
relationship between the individual and society were common concerns of these classical 
theorists, whereas all three have identified different institutions as the driving engine of 
the modern transformations (Giddens 1990). For Marx, the major transformative force 
shaping the modern world was capitalism. For Durkheim, the central element was 
industrialization and the complex division of labor it brings about, while the key 
component in Weber’s theory of modernization can be identified as rationalization. All 
these classical theorists looked at both gains and losses of modernity.  
 As Marshall Berman (1982) notes, while classical theorists looked at ambiguities of 
modernity, in terms of opportunities and risks it signifies, in contemporary theorizing one 
often confronts unilateral approaches to modernity. A conceptualization of modernity 
underscoring its double-sided effects renders many postmodernist claims questionable. 
Two of the most cited defenders of modernity (as against postmodernity) – Jürgen 
Habermas and Anthony Giddens – also direct attention to the nature of modernity itself 
with its radical and critical potentials which are either unrealized or are about to be 
realized. Craig Calhoun is another critical theorist who is skeptical of postmodernist 
arguments asserting that the social changes that we see do not amount to an epochal 
                                                     
9 Although offering any simple definition for post-modernism is a ‘futile and pointless exercise’ 
(Docherty1993), it can be generally argued that proponents of post-modernism challenge the 
Enlightenment ideals which lie at the root of the project of modernity; such as the autonomy of 
the human individual and the capacity for independent judgement and reason oriented toward the 
pursuit of justice and freedom (Flax 1990). 
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break, but reflect continuing tensions which have characterized the whole modern era 
(Calhoun 1995). The crucial task for sociologists is to investigate how social change has 
shifted the conditions and capacities for human actions. The post-modernist discourse 
obscures this fundamental question by positing an end to subjectivity or rendering it 
universally problematic rather than addressing the ways in which agency and subjectivity 
are constructed in specific historical and cultural situations (Calhoun 1995: 98). This 
insight takes us to a closer look at the relationship between modernity and the 
constructions of individual identity.  
2.2.2 Late-Modernity and Identity: Towards Individualization?  
The ways modernization influences individual consciousness has been a contentious issue 
for sociology for decades. Classical sociological accounts of the effects of modernization 
on personal relations and the experiences of the self  have mostly contrasted the 
communal character of traditional orders with the impersonality of modern social life. 
For example, Peter Berger et al. (1974) have elaborated on the changes that take place in 
the modern consciousness, using the theoretical framework of the sociology of 
knowledge.10 Their basic argument is that, as modernization proceeds, a transformation 
in both the organization of knowledge and in the cognitive styles takes place (ibid.: 131). 
The dichotomization of the public and private sphere in modern life is the precondition 
for the segmentation of the self: individuals in the modern situation typically face sectors 
of everyday life confronting them as different, and sometimes discrepant worlds of 
meaning and experience (Berger, et al. 1974).  
 The way modernity alters the nature of day-to-day life and affects the most personal 
aspects of our experience is a major theme in the works of several contemporary 
theorists of modernity (e.g. Beck 1992, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995 and Giddens 
1991, 1992). Newer theories on modernity focus on a transformation from simple to late- 
or reflexive-modernity. A common argument these theorists put forward is that in the 
contours of late-modernity, social agents tend to become more reflexive and 
individualized, and that new mechanisms of self-identity that are shaped by the 
institutions of modernity emerge. 
 The overriding stress of Anthony Giddens’ book Modernity and Self-identity (1991) is 
upon the emergence of new mechanisms of self-identity that are shaped by – yet also 
shape – the institutions of modernity. His basic observation about the concept of the 
identity is that, in the post-traditional order of modernity it becomes a reflexively 
organized endeavor: “The more tradition loses its hold, and the more daily life is 
reconstituted in terms of the dialectical interplay of the local and the global, the more 
individuals are forced to negotiate life-style choices among a diversity of 
                                                     
10 According to the basic principle of the sociology of knowledge, a comprehensive understanding 
of any social reality must include the dimension of consciousness. In this school of thought, 
society is viewed as a dialectic between objective givenness and subjective meanings, that is, as 
being constituted by the reciprocal interaction of what is experienced as outside reality and what is 
experienced as being within the consciousness of the individual. (cf. Berger, et al. 1974). 
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options...reflexively organized life-planning...becomes a central feature of the structuring 
of self-identity (Giddens 1991: 5)”.   
 A recent theory on the relationship between modernization and individual 
biographies belongs to German sociologist Ulrich Beck. Beck argues that, just as 
modernization dissolved the structure of feudal society and produced the industrial 
society, modernization today is dissolving industrial society and another modernity is 
coming into being. This is a distinction between modernization of tradition and 
modernization of industrial society, or between “classical and reflexive modernization” 
(Beck 1992: 10). According to Beck, as a result of the shifts in the standard of living, sub-
cultural class identities have dissipated, class distinctions based on status have lost their 
traditional support, and processes for the diversification and individualization of life styles 
and ways of life have been set in motion. As a result of this destabilization, the system of 
coordinates in which life and thinking are fastened in industrial modernity “the axes of 
gender, family and occupation, the belief in science and progress” begins to shake, and 
new opportunities and hazards come into existence. These are the contours of the “risk 
society.” According to Beck, there are two main dimensions that constitute the social and 
political dynamic of industrialized society: one is the distributional logic of global 
modernization risks and the other is social, biographical, and cultural risks and 
insecurities. 
 In Beck’s argument, reflexive modernization causes serious transformations on the 
level of primary relations since it ‘dissolves’ class-consciousness, as well as gender and 
family roles. He refers to this major transformation as ‘individualization’ which means 
that individual biographies are removed from the traditional precepts and certainties, 
from external control and general moral laws, becoming open and dependent on 
decision-making, and are assigned as a task for each individual. This process has direct 
effects on the most intimate personal relations. Ulrich Beck and Elizabeth Beck-
Gernsheim elaborate on the effects of individualization on the family and gender roles, in 
The Normal Chaos of Love (1995). Their argument is that it is no longer possible to 
pronounce in some binding way what family, marriage, parenthood, sexuality, or love 
mean; rather these vary in substance, norms, and morality from individual to individual. 
Accordingly, men and women are released from the gender roles prescribed by industrial 
society within the nuclear family. They emphasize that this individualization process is 
taking place in those countries where prosperity and social security have reached a high 
level and  where peace and democratic rights are beginning to be taken for granted. 
 The principal thesis Beck and Beck-Gernsheim put forward is that the prescribed 
gender roles are the basis of industrial society, and not some traditional relic that can 
easily be dispensed with: 
“Without a distinction between male and female roles there would be no nuclear 
family, and without nuclear family there would be no bourgeois society with its 
typical pattern of life and work....On the one hand, a wage-earner presupposes a 
house-worker and production for the market presumes the existence of the 
nuclear family. In that respect industrial society is dependent on the unequal roles 
of men and women. On the other hand, these inequalities contradict modern 
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thinking and give rise to more and more controversy as time goes on.  The more 
equal men and women actually become, the shakier the foundations of the family 
(marriage, parenthood, sexuality) seem (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 1995: 24).” 
A major theoretical ambition of this study is to assess these arguments critically in light of 
data on gender and family practices from two contexts of different modernities. This task 
also requires theoretical tools to approach gender, families, state policies and their 
relationships.   
2.2.3 Theorizing Families: From the Functionally Divided Nuclear Family to Diverse 
Family Practices 
There have been important shifts both in the ways families are organized and in the ways 
they are theorized in the last decades. Nowadays, most theorists tend to acknowledge that 
families are varied and there is a wide gap between the ‘families we live with’ and the 
‘families we live by’ (Gillis 1996). The family model that prevailed in the 1950s, in which 
the woman was the full-time housewife and the man was the breadwinner, has been a 
strong ideological model, and it is still a nostalgic ‘ideal’ for those who miss the ‘stability 
of the good old days.’ However, our time is characterized by an immense variation of 
family types, and there are many people living in step, one-parent, lesbian/gay and other 
types of families as well as in ‘traditional,’ ‘modern,’ or ‘post-modern’ nuclear families. 
 In the 1950s,  the ideal and the basis of analysis was ‘the’ functionally divided nuclear 
family, which was thought to have universal characteristics. In Talcott Parsons’ 
functionalist approach, the family is conceptualized as one of the core elements of the 
social system, providing a crucial link between the individual and the wider social group. 
Parsons’ family is overtly optimistic and peaceful: it provides the physical and emotional 
support that both children and adults need for their roles in society. Women were 
allowed to find purpose in family life, in the expressive roles of mother and wife and the 
man’s emotional needs were to be met in his instrumental role of breadwinner. 
 In late 60s and 70s important changes started to take place in the sociology of the 
family. David Cheal (1991) refers to these transformations as a ‘Big Bang’ in the field.  
The most important forces behind these changes were feminism and Marxism. New 
research showed that there is no one type of  ‘universal family’ and that kinship and 
family structures vary in different cultures and economic systems. Christopher Lasch has 
written Haven in a Heartless World which was an analysis of experts’ intrusion into the 
family. This book caused heated debates in the field and “baffled ideologues of every 
political color” (Lasch 1977: xiii).11 Lasch was criticizing state intervention in the family, 
seeing it as the last stronghold of the realm of the private, while many feminists were 
questioning the very separation of the private and public spheres. In the feminist 
approaches, there was an increasing stress on power relations and different interests 
within families. New family types – dual-earner and dual-career families – became subject 
matters for sociological analysis (e.g. Rapoport & Rapoport 1976).  
                                                     
11 See Barrett and McIntosh (1991) for a cogent critique of Lasch’s views on family and feminism. 
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 1980s and 1990s are characterized by a general acceptance of pluralism. Most 
sociologists gave up the ideal of  producing ‘the’ theory of ‘the Family’. Deconstruction 
of the family concept became the new fashion (Cheal 1991). ‘Rethinking’ approaches 
were abundant (e.g. Thorne (ed.) 1992). Feminists have challenged the ideology of “the 
monolithic family” and the beliefs that any specific family arrangement is natural or 
“functional” in a timeless way (Thorne 1992: 4). The stress shifted to families that vary 
with social class, culture, life-cycle and so on. At the same time, conservative ‘back to 
nuclear family’ arguments continued to exist (e.g. Popenoe 1988). There was also an 
expansion in cross-national research on families (e.g. Mason & Jensen 1995, Ingoldsby & 
Smith 1995, Lewis et al. 1992). Analysis of intimate relationships and family practices 
moved from the margin to the center in the field of social theory and gained a new 
popularity.12  
 In this study ‘family’ is defined in broad terms giving room to include all types of  
relationships that people themselves conceptualize and experience as pertaining to family. 
I avoid to use the term in the definite form as ‘the family’ since this usage often conveys 
the assumption of a certain type of institution, namely “the married, two-parent family 
form, gender-differentiated, stable through time (Harding 1996: xii).” A preference for 
the plural usage ‘families’ and a stress on family lives, relations, and practices are 
deliberate choices to demonstrate this non-traditional and inclusive approach. The 
decision to base the study on dual-earner couples stems from the necessity of 
specification, not from a wish to privilege this family type vis-à-vis others. Following 
David Morgan (1996, 1999b), I prefer to use the term ‘family practices’ since it conveys 
the understanding of family relations as dynamic processes. In this perspective, family 
refers to “sets of practices which deal...with ideas of parenthood, kinship, and marriage 
and the expectations and obligations which are associated with these practices (Morgan 
1996: 11). Family practices refer to the intimate relationships between couples (who may 
be cohabiting, married or divorced), between parents and children (who may or may not 
be living together) and between other persons who see themselves connected as 
belonging to the same ‘family’ (like grandparents, uncles, ex-aunts, step-cousins).   
 The term ‘family practices’ conveys a focus on both everyday activities and 
regularities and it stresses the active rather than the passive or static. Family practices 
include numerous activities, such as endless negotiations between men and women 
centered around the ‘standards’ for housework, decisions concerning if and when to have 
children and how to organize their care without jeopardizing one’s career, and so on. As 
David Morgan stresses, ‘the Janus-faced character of everyday life – looking to both self 
and society at the same time – is seen or constructed in its clearest form in the case of 
family practices’ (Morgan 1996:193). Relationships between husbands and wives can be 
analyzed as gendered practices, those between children and parents as age-specific 
practices, and so on. 
                                                     
12 As Smart & Neale (1999) argue, the works of Giddens (1992) and Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 
(1995) contributed to bringing “the family” back into the center of sociological concerns and their 
theories have been critically discussed based on new empirical studies (e.g. Jamieson 1998) 
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 Silva & Smart (1999) also argue that it is possible to analyze work outside the home 
as constituting part of family practices. For example, practices that seemingly have 
nothing to do with the family – husbands working late at the office or drinking with 
mates on the way home from work, for example – are family practices in that they 
reinforce certain constructions of fatherhood and masculinity. This conceptualization 
enables one to stress that paid work constitutes part of family practices, since it influences 
the organization of care responsibilities, and provides a fruitful nexus for studying the 
interactions between the private and public spheres. 
2.2.4 Deconstructing the Public/Private Dichotomy: Theorizing the Relationships 
between States, Gender and Families 
Classical (and many contemporary) theories of modernity are based on a 
conceptualization of the public/private divide that reifies their separateness. The 
private/public distinction is employed in several distinct and often diverging ways in 
political and social thought. In the liberal-economist model, ‘public’ refers to state 
administration, while ‘private’ implies the market economy. Most classical approaches see 
public in terms of political community and citizenship, while feminist approaches 
conceive of the public/private distinction as referring to the one between the family and 
the larger political and economic order (Weintraub 1997). I employ the concepts ‘private 
sphere’ and ‘public sphere’ in this sense: the former refers to the sphere of the family and 
intimate relationships, while the latter refers mainly to the state, market economy and the 
labor market.  
For most classical theories of modernity, the key focus of analysis has been the 
nexus of relationships brought about by industrial capitalism: namely, the increasingly 
specialized division of labor, expansion of science and technical rationality, economic 
dominance of wage labor, commodity production and the emergence of a political 
citizenry. The theoretical gaze was directed at the visibly public realms of economics and 
politics, where ‘modern man’ emerged (Marshall 1994: 27). ‘Modern women’ were mainly 
thought as conveniently placed inside the home. The association of women with the 
‘private’ sphere, with the expressive roles and emotions and establishment of this 
arrangement as something ‘natural’ is the theoretical trick that keeps women invisible in 
most theories of modernity. 
 As Marshall (1994) argues a basic task for a ‘critical modernist’ feminist project is to 
make gender visible in the dualistic categories which underlie most theories of modernity: 
“The changes associated with modernity – such as the separation of the family from 
wider kinship groups, the separation of the household and economy…and the emergence 
of the modern state – are all gendered processes. The roles which emerged alongside the 
differentiation of the economy and the state from the household – worker, citizen– were 
(are) gendered roles” (Marshall 1994: 9, emphasis original).  
 In this comparative study, the interactions between state policies, gender relations 
and family practices in two national contexts has a central place. 1990s has witnessed an 
increase in international comparisons state models and social policies with a focus on 
their gendered outcomes.   
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 In his analysis of the relationship between gender and the state, Connell (1990) 
argues that as the central institutionalization of power the state has a considerable, though 
not unlimited, capacity to regulate gender relations in the society as a whole. However, 
classical theories of the state are unhelpful in theorizing this relationship, in the sense that 
they have little to say directly about gender:  The liberal tradition presents ‘citizen’ as an 
unsexed individual abstracted from social context and in the socialist analyses of the state 
the contending classes seem to be all of the same sex (Connell 1990: 510).  
 Historically, mainstream theorizations of the state concentrated mainly on state 
policies’ influences on the major institutions of the ‘public’ sphere, especially in the labor 
market, and were significantly gender-blind.13 Early feminist theorizing about the state 
was mainly directed to analyzing the impact of welfare state policies on women. As Julia 
O’Connor’s title From Women in the Welfare State to Gendering Welfare State Regimes (1996) 
indicates, the last decade is characterized by a shift towards incorporating gender into the 
comparative analyses of welfare state regimes (e.g. Sainsbury 1994, 1999, Orloff 1993). 
There is not one single feminist perspective, but what unites existing ones is a concern 
with ‘gendering’ different aspects of welfare states by studying women as both paid and 
unpaid workers, clients, consumers, and citizens.   
Most feminist scholarship on state-gender-family relationships starts with a review of  
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) highly discussed welfare regime models and follows different 
paths in an attempt to bring gender into the analysis.  
 Esping-Andersen’s analysis of welfare regimes is  based on three key dimensions and 
questions:  
1. State-market-family relations: Does the state responsibility begin only when the market 
and the family fails in providing services?  
2. Stratification: What kind of a stratification system (class structure) is promoted by 
social policy? 
3. De-commodification: To what extent is distribution detached from the market 
mechanism? De-commodification refers to the degree to which social rights permit 
people to make their living standards independent of pure market forces.  
 
Esping-Andersen’s main contention can be summarized as “politics matter:” He 
especially points out the central place ‘the history of political class coalitions’ have in the 
formation of welfare-state variations. Welfare state regimes refer to clusters of distinct 
welfare states characterized by the principles of stratification and the bases of social rights 
on which social policy is built. These principles result in qualitatively different 
arrangements amongst state, market, and family. They are reflected in the character of 
programs (targeted or universal), the conditions of eligibility, and the quality of benefits 
and services (O’Connor 1996). Esping-Andersen identifies three different regimes: 
Liberal, Conservative and Social Democratic.  
                                                     
13 In general, the state-family relationships did not receive much attention from “mainstream” 
researchers. The term ‘mainstream’ refers to analyses that do not consider the significance of 
gender, and ‘feminist’ refers to analyses that take gender as a fundamental structuring mechanism 
in society (O’Connor 1996: 3). 
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The liberal regime is based on a ‘residualist’ logic. State intervention is subordinate to 
the market and benefits are means-tested. Entitlement rules are strict and 
decommodification effects are minimum. Typical examples are the United States and 
Australia. The conservative regime is based on a corporatist logic. In this regime, social 
rights connected to status and class and maintenance of the traditional family are 
emphasized. Germany, France and Italy are typical examples. The social democratic regime 
is characterized by high institutionalism, universalism and egalitarianism. Social benefits 
are based on citizenship and are financed by taxes. An equality of highest standards, 
rather than an equality of minimal needs, is pursued and level of decommodification is 
high. This regime is typically exemplified by Scandinavian countries. 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes have been used as a starting point for several 
feminist projects of ‘gendering’ welfare state policies (e.g. Orloff 1993, Sainsbury 1994, 
1999, Lewis 1992). Feminist analyses show that when we focus on gendered outcomes 
the applicability of the standard welfare state regime typology is partly challenged.  
In her powerful critique of Esping-Andersen’s conceptual framework, Ann Orloff 
(1993) has argued that concepts like ‘worker,’ ‘citizenship’ and ‘decommodification’ are 
based on a male standard and gender relations and their effects are ignored. She stated 
the necessity of taking into account of “the very real gender differences in productive and 
reproductive labor and access to civil and political rights and how these differences 
influence the ways in which men and women struggle for and claim benefits from the 
state as citizens” (Orloff 1993: 309). Gendering the state-market-family dimension entails 
a recognition of  the unpaid caring and domestic work of women. In this framework, the 
state can be defined as “woman-friendly” to the extent that policies reduce the sexual 
division of labor by shifting the burden of domestic work to public services and to men 
(Orloff 1993: 314).  Decommodification also needs to be gendered since benefits that 
decommodify labor give male workers greater capacity to resist capital and enter the 
market on their own terms, but unpaid services provided by mothers, wives, daughters 
also enhance male workers’ capacities. Orloff suggests that decommodification 
dimension must be supplemented with a new analytic dimension  that taps into the extent 
to which state promote or discourage women’s paid employment – the right to be 
commodified (ibid.: 318). Another analytic dimension that she suggests is a dimension 
measuring independence, namely ‘the capacity to form and maintain an autonomous 
household’.  
  Drawing upon the feminist critique of mainstream welfare state analyses, Sainsbury 
(1994, 1999) has outlined gender models of social policy emphasizing the importance of 
gender and familial ideologies as a key variation. Her basic ambition has been to analyze 
the patterning of variations between different welfare models as distinct “gender policy 
regimes”. A gender policy regime entails a logic based on the rules and norms about 
gender relations that influences the construction of policies (Sainsbury 1999: 5). Sainsbury 
specifies three gender policy regimes: The male-breadwinner regime, separate gender 
roles regime and individual earner-carer regime.  
 In the male-breadwinner regime, men have entitlements stemming from the principle 
of maintenance, while married women’s entitlements are primarily as wives. The separate 
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gender roles regime underlines a strict division of labor between the sexes, but attaches 
weight to both the principle of maintenance and the principle of care. The individual 
earner-carer regime envisions greater equality between women and men and “the 
transformation of the traditional division of labor between the sexes, so that each 
individual is involved in both caring and earning” (Sainsbury 1999: 260). This gender 
regime and the social-democratic regime have complementary logics, in that both 
individualize and thereby de-familialize social rights.  
 In his recent work, Esping-Andersen (1999) acknowledges his insufficient attention 
to gender differences and family as a major producer of welfare and gives attention to the 
feminist critiques of his earlier work. He analyzes different welfare regimes according to 
their degree of ‘de-familialization’ defined as “the degree to which households’ welfare 
and caring responsibilities are relaxed – either via welfare state provision, or via market 
provision” (Esping-Andersen 1999: 51). Hence, de-familialization would indicate the 
degree to which social policy render women autonomous to become ‘commodified,’ or 
to set up independent households. Mentioning the correlation between high familialism 
and low fertility, Esping-Andersen argues that “Contemporary welfare states can no 
longer count on the availability of housewives and full-time mothers. The more they do 
so, either by actively encouraging familialism or by passively refraining from providing an 
alternative, the more they diminish welfare at both the micro- and macro-level. At the 
micro-level, familialism is now counter productive to family formation and labor supply. 
This means low fertility, lower household incomes, and higher risks of poverty…At the 
macro-level, it implies a waste of human capital (in so far as educated women’s labor 
supply is suppressed)” (Esping-Andersen 1999: 70).  
 The current fertility rates in Europe – with Scandinavian countries ranking highest 
and Mediterranean countries lowest – support these arguments. Paradoxically, 
familialistic policy regimes seem to be counter productive for families. De-familialization 
at the policy level supports family formation at the individual level, by covering a good 
part of the ‘opportunity costs of having children’ for working mothers. These arguments 
will guide my analyses of the different gender and family policy regimes that prevail in 
Turkey and Norway.  
 The theoretical stand that I have specified above has particular methodological 
implications. In the following section, I will present a brief account of the methodological 
principles that have guided this research project. This will give way to a presentation of  a 
processional account of the interviewing process and the type of analysis applied. 
2.3 Reflections on Methods and Methodology 
Taking the promise of the ‘sociological imagination’ seriously results in a methodological 
sensitivity that is specifically attentive to reflexivity, cross-cultural comparisons, and 
historicity. Reflexivity involves two different, but combined, levels: the reflexivity of the 
individual sociologist, as an awareness of her social coordinates and an awareness of the 
values she holds, and the reflexivity of sociology, as understood in terms of the ‘double 
hermeneutic.’ Sociology is reflexive in the sense that “sociological knowledge spirals in 
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and out of the universe of social life, reconstructing both itself and that universe as an 
integral part of that process” (Giddens 1990: 16).  
 The reflexivity of the individual sociologist is crucial in this study, since the 
researcher’s social position and biography is inherently connected to the formulation of 
research questions and is what makes the collection and analysis of  data in the two social 
contexts possible. This condition necessitates a constant scrutiny of one’s own 
presuppositions and ideological dispositions, and is both a blessing and a curse at the 
same time. As Bourdieu (1992) argues, sociology can be a powerful instrument of self-
analysis which allows one better to understand what she is by giving an understanding of 
one’s own conditions of production and of the position one occupies in the social world. 
He defines “epistemic reflexivity” as the self-analysis of the sociologist as cultural 
producer and a reflection on the socio-historical conditions of possibility of a science of 
society. Defined this way, reflexivity becomes an indispensable element in the process of  
all sociological research: “Reflexivity is what enables us to escape delusions by uncovering 
the social at the heart of the individual, the impersonal beneath the intimate and universal 
buried deep within the most particular (Bourdieu, 1992: 44).” 
 The comparative aspect is also inherently connected to my personal biography and 
theoretical stance. Being away from a familiar environment and being exposed to new 
modes of social relations were the initial factors that arose my comparative curiosity. As 
Dogan and Pleassy (1984) argue, observers who cultivate a distance between themselves 
and the society in which they live find new perspectives opening, and they may refine 
their perspectives by contrasting different societies. Accordingly, my ‘expatriation’ – 
which equipped me with the perception of an outsider – has been a crucial element in the 
choice and execution of this comparative project. At the same time, the several years I 
spent in Norway provided me the insider-information that is necessary for gathering and 
interpreting context-sensitive data. 
 The theoretical goal of reaching ‘beyond the particular, while remaining sensitive to 
culture and difference’ (Calhoun 1995) and the ‘critical modernist’ feminist project 
outlined above both point to the necessity of cross-cultural and international sensitivity. 
Comparative awareness also helps the sociologist stay away from the dangerous trap of 
falsely universalizing ‘features of the theorist’s own era, society, culture, class, sexual 
orientation, and ethnic or racial group’ (Fraser & Nicholson 1990: 27). 
 The historical sensitivity emerges as inherent in this perspective. Since the promise of 
the sociological imagination is the hope to understand what is going on in the world by 
grasping the intersections of history and biography within a society (Mills 1959), all 
sciences that have human beings as their subject matters are intimately related to 
sociology. The separation of history and sociology is characterized as a ‘disastrous 
division’ by many social scientists (e.g. Bourdieu 1992, Abrams 1981). Particularly in a 
comparative study in which the major explanatory units are nation-states, the necessity of 
taking a historical viewpoint is self-evident.  
 Where does this standpoint place one on the age-old methodological issues: namely, 
the qualitative/quantitative divide, generalizabilty, validity, and reliability? 
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2.3.1 Towards a Critical Methodology? 
“How artificial the ordinary oppositions between theory and research, between qualitative 
and quantitative methods, between statistical recording and ethnographic observation, 
between the grasping of structures and the construction of individual can be. These 
alternatives have no function other than to provide a justification for the vacuous and 
resounding abstractions of theoreticism and for the falsely rigorous observations of 
positivism, or, as the divisions between economists, anthropologists, historians and 
sociologists, to legitimize the limits of competency: this is to say they function in the 
manner of a social censorship, liable to forbid us to grasp a truth which resides precisely in 
the relations between realms of practice thus arbitrarily separated. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992: 28, emphasis added)” 
Despite sound evidence of its unproductiveness the qualitative/quantitative distinction is 
constantly reproduced in the field of sociology. My methodological position rests on an 
uneasiness with the terms themselves and the ways they are falsely dichotomized.  As 
Raymond Morrow puts it: “…nothing about qualitative research…necessarily precludes 
the use of quantitative representations…Ethnographers and historians can and do count 
things. Moreover, the activities of research design, data collection, and analysis in 
quantitative social research necessarily are based on the interplay of constructed meanings 
(1994: 208).” The major distinction in social inquiry is not between the techniques of the 
research, rather on the ways different strategies conceptualize social actors. The strategy 
of statistical analysis is to model the social world in terms of causal relations between an 
observed system of variables and to construct the “subject” as ‘the member of an 
aggregate.’ Nonstatistical research, on the other hand, attempts to describe a society by 
referring to the systemic and social relations that constitute it and constructs the “subject” 
as a participant in different forms of social organizations (Morrow 1994: 208-9). In his 
proposition of a ‘critical methodology,’ Morrow (1994), offers a  typology of ‘extensive’ 
and ‘intensive’ research designs as a more productive way of differentiating research 
strategies. Extensive research designs require a large number of cases (a representative 
sample) and this demands reducing the number of properties analyzed. In contrast 
intensive research designs consider small number of cases in terms of a large number of 
individual properties (ibid.: 250). Morrow’s central contention is that nonstatistical, 
historical and comparative case studies are most compatible with the research problems 
identified by critical theory and its concern with intensive research designs (ibid. : 253). 
The basic characteristics of this study –namely, its comparative style, historical sensitivity 
and intensive design– place it in the school of critical methodology as identified by 
Morrow (1994). This comparative research can be characterized as ‘intensive,’ in the 
sense that it focuses on a small group of  social actors in two different social contexts and 
analyzes the variations and similarities on a large number of dimensions. The major 
sources of data are open-ended face-to-face interviews, that are interpreted in light of 




2.3.2 The Comparative Aspect 
It can be argued that all empirical social science is basically comparative: thinking in 
comparative terms is inherent to sociology since all empirical observation must be related 
to some kind of theoretical construction, and no theoretical construction has any value 
unless it bears some relation to empirical observation (Øyen 1990: 4). However, the term  
“comparative research” has a specific usage. It refers to studies which are concerned with 
cross-societal similarities and differences and which use attributes of macro-social units in 
explanatory statements (Ragin 1987: 5). 
 In his analysis of the logic of comparative research, Ragin (1987) argues that it is 
possible to distinguish two types of comparative research: Case-oriented and variable-
oriented methods. The basic goal of variable oriented strategies is to produce 
generalizations about relationships among variables. In this type of research generality is 
given precedence over complexity. The basic goal of the case-oriented strategies, on the 
other hand, is to understand and interpret the diverse historical experiences of societies 
and cultures. Consequently, in-depth analysis of a small number of cases is given 
precedence over generality in case-oriented research. 
 Traditionally, there has been a clear tendency among comparative researchers to rely 
either on the synthetic approach of the historian or on the representative approach of the 
survey, since it seemed necessary to use techniques that would embrace whole societies 
(Bertaux 1990). Because of  this tendency, little attention has been paid to the use of such 
approaches as interviews with lay persons, life stories and similar ethnographic data. 
Bertaux argues that this is due to a general suspicion that the quality of such “soft” 
methods of observation is based more on the talent of the researcher, than on the 
scientificity of their approach: “ Interviewing selected persons about their life experience 
is an approach that has tremendous potentialities for sociological research, but which will 
only show all its potentialities within a post-scientist epistemology; that is, an 
epistemology which cares more about the originality, depth, radicality of new hypotheses 
than about their provability (Bertaux, 1990: 167). As Silverman argues “interview data 
display cultural realities which are neither biased nor accurate, but simply ‘real’. They 
reproduce and rearticulate cultural particulars grounded in given patterns of social 
organization (Silverman 1985: 157)”. In studies based on interview data the claims to 
reliability, validity and potentials for generalizability should be judged by the reader on the 
basis of the information on the interviewing process, ways of contacting interviewees and 
details of  analysis techniques.  
2.4 Interviews: Experiences, Measures and Analyses  
The face-to-face, open-ended interviews I carried out with Turkish and Norwegian 
couples have provided rich accounts of their daily practices, problems, and negotiations, 
as well as their evaluations of certain societal issues. The individual men and women 
reflected both on their own lives and other people’s behaviors, problems, and 
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expectations. The interview guide had questions related to several general topics: Family, 
housework, childcare, work, gender, time-use, and future plans.14  
 I have no reason to doubt that the interviewees attempted to provide a ‘truthful’ 
picture of their lives and that they had positive intentions. To think otherwise would be 
to believe that the couple had joined in a conspiracy to impair my research. On the 
contrary, most interviewees expressed an enthusiasm concerning this cross-national 
comparative study. They thought it was important and appreciated being a part of it. By 
accepting being interviewed on the most intimate and public aspects of their lives, they 
demonstrated a basic belief in the usefulness of telling their stories. Their willingness to 
participate in this research without any material return and their readiness to use 
approximately two hours of their time by answering a stranger’s questions signify that 
they took the research project seriously. Most of the respondents asked further questions 
about the research project and generally displayed curiosity concerning my life. In several 
cases, I talked about my own life, experiences in Turkey and Norway, and answered the 
questions of the interviewees after the interview. My position as both an insider and 
outsider in the two contexts have contributed to the increased curiosity of interviewees.  
 Apart from minor reality distortions, such as exaggerations or the downplaying of 
certain conflicts, I believe that most interviewees did their best to report accurately about 
their lives. I characterize most of the interviews as “successful,” apart from one interview 
in Turkey that was shorter than the others were. This was mainly due to the male 
interviewees’ lack of interest and slight hostility towards my project. I had contacted this 
couple through a colleague of the woman, and had a feeling that she had insisted that her 
husband participate. Even though he was openly reluctant in the beginning, I actively 
tried to include him into the conversation. Towards the end of the interview he got more 
involved and open. Interestingly, this couple also was the one who had the most apparent 
disagreements concerning gender-related issues.  
 The fact that I interviewed each couple together also contributed positively to the 
trustworthiness of the accounts. In some cases, respondents corrected each other when 
they considered the answer of their spouse to be lacking or not totally ‘true.’ For example, 
Ipek gave her husband, Ilhan, a warning when she was not satisfied with his answer 
concerning their housework arrangements: “Look, this interview depends on you to give 
honest, open, and orderly accounts,” and added,  “Let me put it this way, Ilhan did not 
say it clear enough: when it comes to the division of housework, we have a totally typical, 
traditional woman-man model.” In her study of different family practices in Norway, 
based on face-to-face interviews with couples, both as a couple and alone, Syltevik (2000) 
also mentions that  more conflict themes were taken up and discussed during the 
interviews when both spouses were present and that these interviews produced a more 
nuanced account of the couples’ family lives.   
                                                     
14 See Appendix 2 for the complete interview guide.  
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2.4.1 Establishing Contacts and Deciding the Number of  Interviews  
The persons that I chose to interview had to meet a number of criteria, since I had 
decided to base this comparative study on a highly specific group. Contacting potential 
interviewees via colleagues and friends who personally knew individuals with these 
characteristics seemed the best path to follow. The interviews included questions that 
were quite private. Seeking consent via a personal acquaintance (the ‘contact person’) 
thus increased the success of this task. Trying to recruit interviewees through information 
letters posted by a stranger who planned to ask many private questions did not seem to 
be a wise strategic move. These considerations proved to be true. Gaining the consent of 
the interviewees was not a rapid process. One interviewee even mentioned that she 
normally would not agree to such an interview, but did this time since it was ‘a very 
respected friend of hers’ who asked them to participate. After the contact person spoke 
with potential interviewees and gave them information about the project, I received the 
addresses and phone numbers of those who agreed to be interviewed. I sent them a 
detailed ‘information letter’ that included an answer sheet and a stamped envelope. They 
were asked to write down their names and sign to indicate their consent to being 
interviewees.15  
 I started interviewing in Norway in the summer of 1998. After having eight 
interviews, I traveled to Turkey for my first field interviews in October 1998. By the end 
of  that year, I had talked with six Turkish and eight Norwegian couples. In the spring 
term of 1999, I started analyzing the existing interviews while I completed the theoretical 
requirements for my doctoral education. In August 1999, I started contacting new 
possible interviewees in Norway and conducted three more. Originally, I had planned to 
base the project on 10 Turkish and 10 Norwegian couples. After the first round of 
analysis I recognized that the Norwegian interview accounts were signaling a sort of 
‘saturation,’ i.e. the internal variation was lower among the Norwegian group and certain 
patterns had started to appear. However, the Turkish group appeared as extremely 
heterogeneous and it was harder to trace the patterns. This factor led me to a decision to 
carry out more interviews in Turkey. I traveled to Istanbul in November 2000 and 
conducted seven more interviews: with six couples and a divorcee.16  
  The interviewing process of this project had a long time span. The first pilot 
interview in Norway was dated March 1998, and the last interview in Turkey was in 
November of 2000. The reason for that long time interval was partly chosen, and partly a 
result of  uncontrollable factors. My initial decision was to carry on interviewing and 
analyses during a relatively long period of time, while I was completing the theoretical 
qualifications for my doctoral education. This would give me the opportunity to carry out 
an in-depth analysis and provide me the time that I needed to translate the interviews 
from Turkish and Norwegian into English. The unintended factor further extending the 
                                                     
15 This process to assure informed consent and a declaration of professional secrecy is also 
demanded by the concession rules of Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD).   
16 I did not include the interview with the divorcee in the ‘sample,’ but benefited from her 
accounts and reflections while analyzing divorce as a phenomenon in Turkey. 
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interview period was related to the length of time some interviewees used after receiving 
the information letter before finally agreeing to be interviewed. By the end of 2000, I had 
interviewed 16 Turkish and 11 Norwegian couples and I was satisfied with the existing 
level of variation and convergence within the groups.  
2.4.2 Background Characteristics of the Interviewees 
The two groups of interviewees share the following characteristics: All have attended 
college (with a minimum of 2 years after high school), all are (or have been) 
professionally employed, all live in urban areas, all have been in a heterosexual 
relationship for several years, and all have experience with raising children (either their 
own or partners’) (See Table 2.1).  
 
Norwegian Interviewees:  
I interviewed a total of eleven Norwegian couples. Seven couples were in the 30-45 age 
group and four couples were in the 45-65 age group. Three couples were cohabiting 
without formal marriage and eight were married. Four of the interviewees had been 
married before and divorced before their current marriage/cohabitation. One man 
shared custody of a child from his earlier marriage. One couple did not have common 
children, but both had children from their earlier marriages. The shortest relationship had 
had a duration of 4 years; the longest, 36 years. The average duration of the relationship 
for all Norwegian couples was 14 years. The average number of children in the 
Norwegian group was 2.  
 
Turkish Interviewees:  
I interviewed sixteen Turkish couples.17 All of the couples were married. Only one of 
them cohabited for 6 years before getting married and having a child. Three of the 
interviewees had been married before and the current one were their second marriage. 
One couple did not have common (biological) children, but had an adopted child and 
two children from the man’s earlier marriage (who lived with their mother). The shortest 
relationship had had a duration of 6 years and the longest 37 years. The average duration 
of the relationship was 18 years. The average number of children in the Turkish group 
was 1.4. 
 The Turkish and Norwegian interviewees are similar in terms of general economic 
level and life-styles. All live in urban areas, have attended college, have a positive attitude 
towards modernization. They all believe in the merits of getting a higher education and 
working in the professions. None of the interviewees were exceedingly religious, and 
interview accounts make it clear that religion is not a factor influencing their decisions 
and practices in life. These groups are the representatives of the ‘most modern’ segments 
of the two societies. Their dual-earner life styles, professional employment, and middle-
                                                     
17 In one of the interviews, the man could only answer some of the questions since he had to leave 
because of an unexpected work obligation.  
 
43 
class positions give them a basic economic security, even though most Turkish 
interviewees faced significant economic constraints on their life-style choices.  
 
Table 2.1. Main Characteristics of the Interviewees 




16 women and 16 men 
22 individuals: 




22 interviewees younger than 45 
10 interviewees older than 45 
Average age: women: 45, men: 49 
14 interviewees younger than 45  
8 interviewees older than 45 
Average age: women: 44, men: 45 
Civil Status All married Eight married, three cohabiting couples  
Number of children Ten couples had 1 child. Six couples had 
two children 
One couple had 1 child. Six couples had 
two and four couples had three children.  
Education Average of 16.25 years of education per 
interviewee 
Average of 16.75 years of education per 
interviewee 
 
A major difference between the Turkish and Norwegian interviewees in terms of parents’ 
education and occupation is that the majority of Turkish interviewees had mothers who 
were full-time housewives: out of 32 Turkish mothers, 28 were housewives. Two of them 
sewed at home to earn extra income. Out of 22 Norwegian mothers, only 3 were full-
time housewives. The rest were in part-time or full-time employment. This means that a 
big majority of  Turkish interviewees grew up in “traditional” families with a mother who 
stayed at home and a father who was the main breadwinner. For most Norwegians, this 
family type had started to change when they were young and most of them grew up in 
dual-earner families, though some of the mothers were employed only part-time.  
 
Occupational Characteristics:  
All Turkish and Norwegian interviewees were professionals. There are variations 
concerning types of occupations (See Table 2.2). Most of the Norwegian interviewees 
were employed in the public (state) sector. Out of 22 Norwegian interviewees 18 (10 
women and 8 men) worked in public (or semi-public) institutions, while 4 (1 woman and 
3 men) worked in private firms. Out of 32 Turkish interviewees, 11 were employed in the 
public sector (5 women, 6 men) while 21 (11 women, 10 men) worked in private firms. 
 I did not directly ask the income levels of interviewees. However, from the type and 
sector of occupations, I can estimate roughly their earning levels. Apart from my 
estimations, actual income levels were mentioned in passing in some of the interviews. 
Based on these indicators, in seven Turkish couples, the woman and the man had equal 
levels of income, while in five couples, the man had a higher income and in four couples 
the woman had a higher income. In eight Norwegian couples the woman and the man 
had equal levels of income, while in three couples, the man earned more. None of the 
Norwegian women earned more than their partners. 
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Table 2.2 Interviewees’ Occupations 














(total: 17 interviewees)  
Private Sector 4 doctors 
3 high-level managers 








(total: 20 interviewees) 
1 engineer 
1 journalist 








(total: 5 interviewees)  
 
Due to anonymity concerns, I will refrain from indicating the exact profession of the 
individuals. In relevant cases, indicating the sector of the interviewees’ profession will 
provide information on basic work conditions.   
 All the interviews were tape-recorded. Afterwards I personally transcribed the 
interviews fully in their original language, Turkish and Norwegian. I have translated the 
sections that I use as quotations into English. The longest interview lasted for 3 hours 
and 20 minutes, and the shortest 55 minutes (This was the ‘less-successful’ interview 
explained above). The average length of the tape-recorded interviews was 2 hours. I 
started the interview by filling out a background information scheme. After that I turned 
on the tape recorder. Some of the interviewees continued telling stories and asking me 
questions after I switched off the recorder. Accordingly, the actual interviews lasted 
longer than the sections that were tape-recorded.  
 The unit of analysis is the gendered individual forming a couple. Gender, age group, 
nationality, type of profession are main dimensions of variation.  
 I did not use computer programs for interview analysis. I preferred to construct large 
tables by hand with key characteristics and quotations in the cells, to see the connections 
and appearing patterns. This particular way of working and intensive involvement with 
interview texts also enabled me to remember the interviews, more or less, by heart after a 
few months of analysis and this made it easier to navigate through the texts in search for 
specific themes and quotations later. 
 I use extended quotations to demonstrate the ways individuals make sense of the 
issues at hand, evaluate and present their situations and decisions and interpret these 
accounts in light of larger societal configurations. Grouping together similar accounts, I 
look for emerging patterns. When there are divergent accounts, which distinguish 
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themselves considerably from the emerging patterns, I present them separately and 
attempt to interpret the reasons of these discrepancies.  
 I have also constructed cases that serve several related purposes. In the case studies, I 
present more detailed information on the individuals and quote relatively long passages to 
show the richness of interview accounts in their original flow. This enables me to show 
the ways couples develop a narrative together, opening up new perspectives to each 
other. Cases also serve to illustrate the instances when the woman and the man disagree.  
 All the couples are given pseudonyms that start with the same letter. Turkish 
interviewees have Turkish names and Norwegians have Norwegian. For readers who are 
not familiar with at least one of the two countries the differences will not appear so 
apparent. In that case, they could refer to the name list below. In presenting interviewees 
I decided to denote their age in parentheses after their names. This has a journalistic look, 
but I find it a practical way of denoting age of the interviewee which is an important 
piece of information. Whenever I present a couple, the first name is always the woman’s 
and the second name is the man’s. The following lists provide basic information on the 
interviewees of this study:  pseudonyms, ages, duration of marriage/cohabitation, 




1. Ann (34) – Arne (33) :  Cohabiting for 4 years. Two children (3 and 1) 
2. Bente (52) – Bjarne (57) : Married for 5 years. Four children (from former marriages)   
3. Camilla (31) – Cato (32) : Cohabiting for 10 years. Two children (6 and 8) 
4. Elin (56) – Endre (59) :  Married for 35 years. Two children (30 and 24) 
5. Grete (33) – Geir (32) :  Married for 4 years. Two children (4 and 2) 
6. Hilde (49) – Henrik (50) : Married for 25 years. Two children (23 and 17) 
7. Inger (58) – Ingmar (61) : Married for 35 years. Three children (34, 32, 27) 
8. Jorunn (34) – Jarle (35) : Married for 6 years (after cohabiting 4 years). One child (2) 
9. Lise (36) – Lars (36) :  Married for 10 years (after cohabiting 2 yrs). 2 children (7, 5) 
10. Mona (35) – Magne (37) : Married for 9 yrs.(after cohabiting 3 yrs). 2 children (4, 2) 
11. Nina (32) – Nils (36) :  Cohabiting for 5 years. 2 children (3, 1) 
 
Turkish Interviewees 
1. Ayla (54)  –  Adnan (58) : Married for 33 years. Two children (aged 32 and 28) 
2. Berna (51) – Bora (59) : Married for 32 years. Two children (aged 29 and 24) 
3. Ceyda (35) – Cemil (35) : Married for 6 years. One child (3) 
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4. Dilek  (41) – Devrim (41) : Married for 20 years. One child (17) 
5. Elif (37) – Emre (37) :  Married for 12 years. One child (7) 
6. Figen (33) – Faruk (34) : Married for 10 years. One child (4) 
7. Gaye (36) – Gökhan (38) : Married for 7 years. One child (2) 
8. Hale (30) – Hikmet (34):  Married for 6 years. One child (3) 
9. Ipek (35) – Ilhan (38) :  Married for 10 years. One child (3)   
10. Leyla  (32) – Levent (32) :  Married for 10 years. One child (2) 
11. Mine (62) – Murat (65) :  Married for 33 years. Two children (32 and 30) 
12. Nermin (68) – Nadir (69) : Married for 36 years. Two children (33 and 36) 
13. Oya (52) – Orhan (54) :  Married for 30 years. Two children (29 and 23) 
14. Sevim (44) – Sedat (44) : Married for 19 years. One child (16) 
15. Tulin (38) – Tolga (40) : Married for 11 years (after 6 years cohabitation). 1 child (5)  




Chapter 3 Changes in Families as Groups 
of Individuals, as Relationships and as 
Institutions 
“Terms such as ‘family’ should be seen as topics to be explored further, 
in all their usages and ramifications, rather than as resources to be drawn 
upon uncritically...‘family’ is often contested, publicly available, and often 
very powerful” (Morgan 1996: 11). 
In this chapter, the predominant aim will be analyzing the definitions of  ‘family’ and its 
dynamics by comparing the accounts of Turkish and Norwegian interviewees and 
scrutinizing the internal diversity of these groups. As a first step in this task, I will provide 
a brief review of the historical and cultural roots of the present family patterns in Turkey 
and Norway, together with comparative statistics on marriage, divorce and fertility rates. 
In this background, “how do interviewees define their families?” is the first question we 
will seek to answer. This will be followed by an analysis of interviewees’ evaluations and 
ideas about what they conceive as the major changes in families, particularly of increasing 
divorce rates.  
3.1 Historical and Cultural Factors Influencing the Present 
Family Practices in Turkey and Norway 
There is a prevalent popular belief and an official discourse concerning ‘the Turkish 
family’ in Turkey: “The family in Turkey is stronger compared to most other countries”. 
In this comparison, the point of reference is usually ‘the West’, mainly Europe and the 
USA. Article 41 of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic declares that: “Family is the 
foundation of Turkish society”. An historical approach is indispensable to understand the 
bases of this family ideology in Turkey. From the beginning of the modernization 
processes in the last decades of the 19th Century in the Ottoman Empire, discussions 
concerning women’s status in the family and in society have been pervasive and came to 
gain a significant symbolic power. Transformation of the traditional Ottoman-Islamic 
family structure into an egalitarian, modern, nuclear family in which women would 
participate in the public sphere by keeping their commitment to their roles as ‘wives and 
mothers’ has been an ambiguous – but equally strong – ideal formulated by the major 
ideologues of Turkish modernization. The leading ideologue of  this period was Ziya 
Gökalp. According to Gökalp, family morality based on pre-Islamic Turkish cultural 
values included norms such as democracy in the ‘parental’ family as opposed to the 
autocracy of the patriarchal family, the equality of men and women, and monogamous 
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marriage (Kandiyoti 1995). He advocated a return to a societal structure in which women 
would participate equally in socioeconomic life and in educational institutions. Even 
though he advocated a place for women in the public world of work, he stated clearly 
that he placed the greatest emphasis on women’s maternal duties and on socializing 
children. He elevated motherhood as a major role in building of the modern Turkish 
nation of the future (Duben & Behar 1991: 215). Gökalp’s ideas have been influential for 
Atatürk and the whole project of Turkish modernization. Kemalist reforms aimed at 
transforming all the cultural and symbolic aspects associated with the Islamic way of life. 
The secularization of the family code and the enfranchisement of women were part of a 
broader effort to liquidate the theocratic remnants of the Ottoman state (Kandiyoti 
1995). The new Turkish Civil Code abolished polygamy, endorsed compulsory civil mar-
riage, right of divorce for both partners and egalitarian inheritance laws. It also granted 
women the right to choose their spouses and maintain their maternal rights even after 
divorce. However, the civil law failed to establish full legal equality between the sexes 
since it contained several clauses that endorsed a traditional and conservative family 
model.18 
 In approaching Norwegian families, a historical understanding of the social 
homogeneity of Norwegian society and the dominance of the social-democratic ‘equality’ 
ideal, which comprises equality between the sexes, are necessary first steps. Norwegian 
society never had a real feudal structure. From the Viking Age onwards, most of the land 
in Norway has been owned by independent farmers who played an important role in the 
country’s history. Historically, the division of labor in the Norwegian farms was one 
where the wife tended the farm while the husband went fishing or hunting. Women were 
thus often used to rough work and to being alone for long periods with major 
responsibility for the farm and the household (Gullestad 1984). Historically, there have 
been regional differences in family formations in Norway. Holter (1993) argues as a result 
of industrialization and urbanization, “different family cultures have to some extent been 
supplanted by a more homogeneous middle class culture, with greater emphasis on 
the…individual’s freedom and rights” (Holter 1993: 160). This also implied a progress 
towards more gender equality within the families. In Norway, important changes have 
taken place in the family structure since 1970s: more cohabiting without formal marriage, 
reduced fertility and fewer children, postponed marriage and child-bearing, more births 
outside marriage, more divorces and more single parents. Now let us take a closer look at 
these trends by comparing them to the ones taking place in Turkey. 
3.1.1 Marriage, Divorce and Fertility Rates  
Turkish society differs from most European societies with respect to the stability and 
power of the family as an institution, with defined rules and regulations. The marriage rate 
is extremely high, while the divorce rate is still low. Cohabitation without formal marriage 
is very rare and is often morally stigmatized. However, as in all developing and developed 
                                                     
18 These clauses will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 6. 
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countries, the family as an institution faces certain challenges in Turkey. Divorce rates are 
slowly increasing, especially in urban areas, and fertility rates of women with higher 
education are low. Yet, the practice of getting married to begin a family is still a dominant 
social norm both in urban and rural areas (Tekeli 1995). 
 Crude divorce rate in Turkey has increased from 0.48 in 1995 to 0.51 in 1998. 
Norway has witnessed a slight decrease in divorce rates in the last few years, after record 
high figures in early 1990s. Crude divorce rate was 2.38 in 1995 and 2.11 in 1998 (UN 
2001). 
 In Norway, family, in its traditional institutional form, seems to have lost its 
dominant position in society and marriage has become one of several alternative forms of 
cohabitation,  for couples with or without children (Knudsen and Wærness 1996). The 
practice of cohabiting without formal marriage is the most important change in the family 
pattern in Norway after 1945. This change took place very rapidly and was met with few 
negative sanctions from the parent and grandparent generations, rapidly becoming a 
widely accepted civil status (Rogoff Ramsøy 1994). Since 1987, official statistics started 
including cohabiting couples with children as a family category (Noack 1996). There has 
been an increase in the number of cohabiting couples (with children) from 27.000 in 
1987 to 94.000 in 2000 (SN 2000). The number of cohabitants in Norway (with or 
without children) was estimated at around half a million in 1998 (SN 1999). In 1999, 
approximately half of the new born children had unmarried parents. Birth outside 
marriage is rare in Turkey and is not a socially accepted practice.  
 Fertility rate in Norway is relatively high – 1,8 children per woman – compared to 
most other European countries. After a sharp decrease in number of births in the 
beginning of the 1980s, fertility rate increased slightly and has been relatively stable in the 
last decade (Sosialt Utsyn 1998). The dominant tendency among Norwegian women is to 
delay births. The age at first birth has increased from 25 in 1986 to 26.7 in 1996. 
 Compared to Norway, fertility rate is higher in Turkey, though there has been a sharp 
decrease from the 1970s onwards. Level of education has a significant effect on fertility 
rates of women in Turkey. While women with lower levels of education give birth to an 
average of 2,5 children; this number declines to 0.8 children for women with higher 
education (SIS 1994). The average number of children of the Turkish and Norwegian 
couples that I have interviewed was in line with these general trends. It was 1.4 for 
Turkish and 2 for Norwegians.  
 One of the main findings of my previous comparative study (Sümer 1996, 1998) was 
the central and ambiguous position that the institution of the family had in the lives of 
young  Turkish women. The continuing importance of tight family relations went hand in 
hand with a visible trend of individualization. Younger Turkish women stated that they 
were experiencing pressures to get married and form a ‘happy nest’ as soon as possible in 
their social environments. However most of them also felt that they had the power to 
resist and fulfill their own plans of ‘self-realization’ first (Sümer 1996: 138-144). For 
Norwegian women, family retained its significance as a source of emotional support, but 
had lost its dominance in providing economic support and control.  
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 These previous findings formed the basis for formulating the research questions of 
the present project, which aim at ‘deconstructing’ (cf. Gittins 1985) certain myths 
concerning ‘the’ family by analyzing cross-national and historical variation in the ways 
family practices are organized and experienced. A first step in this task is understanding 
different definitions of the term ‘family’. Does ‘family’ mean different things in the two 
countries? 
3.2 Who is your Family?: ‘Nuclear’ vs. Festive Families 
The first question of the interview was designed to learn what the term ‘family’ means for 
the interviewees and which persons they think of when they say ‘my family’. The answers 
to this question yield a peculiar picture: Younger Turkish respondents include fewer 
people in the group they see as their family and many underline the primary importance 
of the small, ‘nuclear family’.  
Many Turkish respondents used the scientific term ‘nuclear’ (çekirdek) when drawing 
the boundaries of their families. Among the Norwegians, only one respondent, who is a 
social scientist, used this term while talking about the family. The sociological concept 
‘nuclear family’ seems to be more popular in Turkey. In the processes of top-down 
modernization, the modernizing elite had to redefine all major institutions. The family 
institution had held a central place in the debates between the Islamists, Traditionalists 
and Modernists. In recent decades, it lost this centrality, yet it still comes to the public 
agenda in the context of specific events.19  
Evidently, Turkish people associate having a nuclear family with being ‘more’ 
modern. In the Turkish context, family is a more institutional (as opposed to emotional) 
concept, which implies more defined interaction rules and responsibilities. A main 
variation in the Turkish group occurred between the younger and older interviewees. 
Older respondents tended to speak of a bigger family, while younger ones more clearly 
differentiated between their own family, as ‘the first nucleus’ and their own parents and 
siblings, as ‘the second’. Dilek (42) said that there is a good deal of difference between the 
two circles and Devrim (42), her husband, agreed: 
Who do you include in the group, when you say ‘my family’? 
Dilek: Definitely, my husband and my son. This is the first nucleus. I mean, I 
don’t have my mother, father and sisters in the first nucleus. That is certain. But in 
the second circle, I have my parents and sisters. But there is a good deal of 
difference between them, I mean between those two circles, from my point of 
view. 
                                                     
19 For example in the summer of 2001, a love-affair ‘scandal’ of a married minister led to heated 
debates in the media on the topics of adultery, infidelity, love, marriage and so on. In all these 
debates ‘the sacred Turkish family’ was used in a taken-for-granted manner and was discussed in 
relation to Turkish ‘custom and practices’ (örf ve adet).  
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Devrim: I also think the same. I mean, I don’t see mothers and fathers as family. I 
think of my wife and child as separate. I mean, that is so both as scope and as 
bonds of relationships.  
Dilek and Devrim have a daughter and they received active help from their mothers 
when she was small. However, they also experienced serious problems in the first years 
of their marriage as a result of too much motherly involvement. They even came to the 
verge of a divorce. After a tough period, Dilek and Devrim decided to save their 
relationship by putting a distance between their own relationship and their relationships 
with their parents. Even though they stress the importance of this separation, in practice 
they have frequent contact with their mothers.  
There are other examples of these types of ambiguities. Leyla (33) and Levent (33) 
only define each other and their child as their family. However, at the time of the 
interview Levent’s mother lived with them and took care of their 3 years old son.  
Who do you include when you say ‘my family’?  
Leyla: For me, it is my husband and son. 
Levent: It is the same for me.  
The interesting point is that both grandmothers lived at times with this couple and took 
turns taking care of their grandson in recent months. Given this close involvement and 
vital support, this delimitation of the ‘family’ and exclusion of grandparents appears 
almost ungrateful. But this can be seen as an attempt to balance the privacy of one’s own 
family in the context of the network of other close relatives. In many families parents-in-
law may get too involved with the internal affairs of younger families, and this results in 
conflicts. The pervasiveness of the ‘strong and close family ties’ ideal in Turkey as a 
dominant model conflicts with the realities and ideals of younger, more individualized 
couples, who strive for independence and self-determination. Accordingly, even though 
in practice, people have daily contact with their close relatives (especially parents-in-law) 
they feel the need to draw visible boundaries between the two circles and give primacy to 
the ‘first nucleus’. Ceyda (37) and Cemil (35) also have close contact with their mothers 
but they choose to define their family as consisting of three persons:  
Who do you include in the group ‘my family’? 
Cemil: Me, my wife and my child. 
Ceyda: It is the same for me. If I think of this in a more detailed manner, then I 
may include our mothers as well, but in the first stage, it is these 3 persons.” 
This delimitation and drawing clear boundaries of the nuclear family is also related to life-
phases. Couples who have small children, and who depend on support from parents 
seem to operate with this two-step conceptualization. The couples who stressed these 
boundaries were the ones who lived close to their in-laws. For others, this did not appear 
to be a major issue.   
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Figen (33) and Faruk (34) also differentiated between themselves and their parents 
and siblings. Faruk had a special way of defining who he thinks of as family:  
Faruk: When I think of my family, I think only of us, this, my own family… 
Figen: Sometimes, one also thinks of one’s parents as well, right? 
Faruk: Yes, but they come afterwards. Brothers and sisters as well, they come 
after…I mean the relationships here have priority…For example, when I earn 
some money, I don’t think, ‘what can I do with my brother?’…Therefore, I guess 
family can be defined as the relations with whom you want to spend your 
earnings, so it is here! (laughs) I mean it is a place that you can make major 
sacrifices. 
The most unusual answer to this question came from a couple who also have other 
characteristics that set them apart.  Tulin (38) and Tolga (40) had cohabited for 5 years 
before they got married and had a child. They are the only Turkish couple who cohabited 
before getting married and they reflected on the difficulties they faced related to their 
atypical ‘choice.’ During the period they cohabited, they had almost no contact with their 
parents, since their parents would not accept their cohabitation as ‘legitimate.’ Finally, 
they made the decision to get married to end these practical difficulties. Still, both Tulin 
and Tolga have difficulties conceptualizing themselves as a ‘classical family’: 
Who do you include in the group ‘my family’? 
Tulin: I mean, frankly, I don’t have such a notion in my head…I don’t know, I 
think of us more like a ‘team’.  
Tolga: It is more or less the same for me. Because I still cannot place us three into 
the classical family structure I have in my mind. I mean I always think of our 
parents when I say family. 
Older Turkish respondents had more persons included in their families, mainly as a result 
of the fact that their children had got married, and this led to extension of the original 
nuclear family. Most of them have close contact with their children’s families and provide 
support in childcare. These relationships can be conceptualized as functionally connected 
nuclear families, since the two families live in separate but nearby households and actively 
help each other, both financially and more importantly by providing care. This type of an 
‘intimacy at a distance’ is reported as a common trend in urban Turkey (Aykan and Wolf 
2000). 
Older interviewees, sometimes in a nostalgic manner, talked of more crowded families 
and closer family ties. Berna (51) and Bora (59) articulate their respect for the family as an 
institution and wish to keep their strong family ties: 
  
Who do you include when you say ‘my family’?  
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Berna: My husband, my children, my daughter-in-law, my sister and her family, my 
husband’s siblings. There are no others left, our parents have passed away, so 
that’s all; we are not such a big family.  
Bora: We still continue certain principles of the patriarchal family, if I may use this 
expression. We have really strong family ties. Even though we live apart, we never 
break the ties.  For example, my brothers are in (another city) now, but we always 
visit each other, especially on religious holidays. 
The use of the term ‘patriarchal’ is interesting in this context. Bora was using it to denote 
‘strong’ family ties, without acknowledging its male-dominated aspects. During the 
interview, Berna and Bora reflected on the problems related to gender-inequality in 
Turkey and advocated for the need to equalize the societal situations of men and women. 
In this context, the use of the concept ‘patriarchal’ denoted a family system in which ties 
are strong and there is respect between the members. Bora apparently did not use the 
concept to convey a sense of male-dominance, since he was also critical of the secondary 
status of Turkish women in general and welcomed the trend toward more equality in 
families, as well as in the labor market. However, he did not approve of the loosening of 
family ties and decreasing ‘respect’ for the family institution either. He is a typical 
example of the Turkish people who advocate further modernization by keeping certain 
traditional values – in this case the patriarchal family – intact. This is an inherently 
ambiguous ideal almost impossible to maintain. It is becoming clear that the Turkish 
interviewees’ conceptualizations of family are greatly influenced by the special 
modernization history of the country. How did Norwegians approach these issues? 
Compared to the Turkish interviewees, Norwegians indicated larger groups of 
persons as their families. They did not strive to separate out different nuclei and rank 
these in terms of significance, as most younger Turkish couples did. Some Norwegians 
also mentioned two-levels, according to proximity of relations, but this separation mainly 
stemmed from geographical distance: 
Magne (37): As far as I am concerned, I think primarily of the four of us, because 
we do not have the rest of the family here, in this city. But if I expand it one step 
further, then it is grandparents on both sides, parents, and our siblings with their 
children. I have those two levels.  
Most Norwegians argued that who they define as their families is a context-dependent issue. 
Grete (33) and Geir (32) had slightly different ways of thinking about who their family is: 
Grete: It all depends… 
Geir: Yes, if I shall think of family, then I think of parents, on both sides, also my 
grand-parents.. 
Grete: If somebody asks me ‘who is your family?’ then I think my point of 
departure would be only you and the kids. 
Geir: I think of it much larger, actually, I include my brother as well. 
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Grete: Yes, in other connections, I would also think like that. 
Norwegians tend to think of the ‘big family’ in relation to celebrations, festivities and 
church holidays. Especially, Christmas celebrations have a significant place where 
extended family members are embraced: 
Endre (59): I include both my family and her family, but it is a very small family. I 
don’t have any siblings...she has one sister…Her parents are still alive, but my 
parents died. Earlier, when we talked about the family, we included everybody. We 
were all together at Christmas Eves, both your parents and my parents.  
For most Norwegian interviewees ‘the family’ included those persons they would invite 
to celebrate a major occasion: 
Lise (36): When I am at work and talk about Lars (her husband) and the kids, I don’t 
say ‘my family’, I just say Lars and the kids. But when I say ‘my family’ it is more 
related to visits and celebrations. For example when the kids have a birthday we 
have a ‘family-visit,’ and then it means both your parents and my parents. While I 
say ‘my family’ I refer mainly to my brother, sister and parents.  
In the Norwegian group, there was not a significant difference between younger and 
older interviewees in terms of definitions of families, yet some of the cohabiting couples 
appeared to have a dissimilar approach to defining families. Camilla (31) and Cato (32) 
had been cohabiting for 10 years and they had two children. They mentioned that they 
saw a slight difference between ‘her family’ and ‘his family’:  
Camilla: It depends on the context. Here in Bergen, I talk about the four of us. 
But when I talk about the family otherwise, I think of brothers and sisters, my 
parents, grandparents and all.  
Cato: Back to everybody who is alive, pure and simple. Camilla: Yes.  
Cato: But in a way, your family is not totally my family.  
Camilla: No. That’s true. 
Ann (34) and Arne (33) are also a cohabiting couple who mentioned a similar difference. 
Arne included many relatives in his family while Ann mentioned that she did not 
conceive of these persons as her family: 
Ann: I think that I am in a family with them (Arne’s aunts and cousins) but they are 
not my family. 
Nina (32) and Nils(36), who have been cohabiting for five years, mentioned that they 
became a ‘family’ after having children:  
Nils: Earlier, it was Nina’s family and my family, and two of us were cohabitants 
who actually were not a family. Then we had a child and became a “we” family... 
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Nina: Now your family and my family became also a ‘family’. And you and I 
became a family. We have to practice this before the mirror! (laughs) What I 
thought as ‘his family’ and ‘my family’ separately, now became ‘our family,’ 
because we are attached to each other in a different way after having a child.  
These reflections exemplify that in the Norwegian urban context, official marriage has 
lost its centrality to start a family. Having a child is conceived as the step into being a 
family, either with or without formal marriage.  
3.3 Differing Family Ideologies in Turkey and Norway 
When I had first formulated the question on the definition of family, I had an 
expectation that Turkish interviewees would denote larger groups. This expectation 
stemmed mainly from the findings of my prior research, which had pinpointed the 
significance of the family as a key institution in Turkey, with its enabling and constraining 
characteristics operating on many different levels. However, I came to realize that this 
expectation also had an ideological basis, since I also held the general belief that in 
Turkey ‘the family’ as an institution is stronger and family relations are tighter compared 
to western countries. Accordingly, the fact that most younger Turkish couples operated 
with a ‘two-step’ conceptualization of the family and sharply separated the ‘first nucleus’ 
from the second was surprising. Historical sensitivity and a theoretical separation of 
actual ‘family practices’ and ‘family ideologies’ provide several related explanations for 
this phenomenon.  
 First of all, the question ‘who is your family’ is ideologically more loaded in Turkey. 
In the process of modernization, the family and its transformation has always had a 
central place. Most researchers and the modernizing elite believed that a transition to the 
‘modern nuclear family’ would take place as a ‘natural’ result of modernization. As 
documented by several researchers later (e.g. Özbay 1998, Duben & Behar 1991) a false 
belief prevailed that a majority of families were extended families in the Ottoman Empire 
and this type of family signified traditionalism and almost backwardness. In many circles, 
extended families were associated with backwardness, while nuclear families symbolized 
modernity.  
 Kandiyoti (1995) also emphasizes the central position of an evolutionary type of 
modernization theory in influencing family ideologies in Turkey:   
“Turkey had more than ever become a country where a myriad of different gender 
regimes in the family coexisted historically. However, the language adopted to 
describe this variety and diversity was, for a long time, that of modernization 
theory. Turkey was assumed to be embarked upon a trajectory leading from 
tradition to modernity, with corresponding structures for the family and conjugal 
relations. Sociological and demographic studies described the extended family as 
rural and traditional, and the nuclear family as modern and urban…The idealized 
model of the nuclear family involved companionate marriage, role-sharing 
between spouses and child-orientation. Ironically, at a time when this type of 
conjugal family was being denounced as the site of women's oppression in the 
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West, it was held out as a more liberated state of being in Turkey…This vision was 
by no means totally misguided; it celebrated the greater autonomy of the young 
heterosexual couple from the interference and control by older kin (Kandiyoti 
1995: 312-13).”  
Accordingly, the stress on the nuclear family among Turkish interviewees can be 
interpreted in the context of this ideology concerning the modern way of living. In reality, 
as the interview accounts clearly showed, Turkish couples had intensive contact with 
closer kin, especially with their own parents. Nevertheless several younger interviewees 
stressed the importance and the centrality of the ‘first nucleus’ in their lives. This 
phenomenon exemplifies how family practices and ideologies may diverge.  
 Apart from this ideological reason, there is also a relevant material explanation for 
this phenomenon. Turkish interviewees include fewer people in the group they define as 
their families because this inclusion has important practical consequences and brings 
heavy obligations. In the absence of well-developed policies for the care of the elderly, 
close family members still form the main support network in times of need (Özbay 
1998). While counting several persons as family mainly reflects feelings of closeness for 
Norwegians, this has more serious practical consequences for Turkish couples. Taking 
care of elder parents by living in a nearby neighborhood, or together with them, is a 
common practice in Turkey, as is relying on close family members in old age. 
 In Norway, the welfare state has to a much larger extent taken over the elder-care 
services. The most common and preferred arrangement for care of the elderly is state-
subsidized institutions. Some Norwegian respondents mentioned that at times they 
experienced a type of ‘guilty conscience’ resulting from little contact with their elderly 
close kin. Even though they think that having the welfare state step in and take over the 
daily care of those in need has been a positive development, some are concerned about 
the loss of contact and loneliness that results.  
 The practical consequences of family definitions are dissimilar in the two countries. 
Younger Turkish couples with small children who are dependent on active support from 
their parents feel the need to stress the importance of distinguishing between two 
different family circles. This ideological separation enables them to draw boundaries 
between their ‘own’ small, nuclear families and extended family relationships, as well as 
retain a feeling of privacy and independence – cherished values of (late)-modern lives. 
The accounts above make it clear that ‘being in a family’ means different things and 
brings dissimilar responsibilities in these two countries.  
 ‘Family’ is a wide-ranging concept. It can be approached, as done in the former 
section, as groups of individuals who are defined as the most important ones. It can also 
be analyzed as a social institution, going through transformations via complex 
interactions with other social institutions. We switch to that perspective to analyze the 
ways interviewees have evaluated the changes that they conceive as most apparent in 
families.   
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3.4 Evaluations of Changes in Families 
All Turkish interviewees agreed on the point that there have been important changes in 
families, putting the emphasis on several different aspects. A majority argued that family 
ties are not the same as before; they are getting looser. Some conceived this as a positive 
development – increasing individual freedom – while others thought of this as a loss. 
Most interviewees had both positive and negative evaluations concerning the changes in 
families.  
Ayla (54) and Adnan (59) reflected on the changes in family patterns and practices in 
the following manner: 
Ayla: There are our times, on the one hand, and present times, on the other. Of 
course we see a lot of changes in families. Now parents help their children a lot. 
For example, if their child gets married and if both of them work, grandparents 
help a lot. In our times it was not like this...fathers were patriarchal fathers, they 
did not give many rights to mothers.  
Adnan: With increasing education, families become more separate. People move 
to other cities, because of work opportunities.  These prevent families from 
getting  or being together more often. While in earlier times, father, son, daughter-
in-law, three or four families lived together, now families are divided into small 
pieces. The one who gets married moves to a separate flat and some problems 
lead to an estrangement from the family. Family ties are not the same as before. 
Ayla and Adnan put the emphasis on different aspects of change. Ayla sees and 
welcomes a transition from ‘patriarchal fathers’ to more helping families, while Adnan 
referred to a past where several families lived together and sees the loosening of ties as a 
loss. Both Ayla and Adnan have rural backgrounds and this separates them from other 
Turkish interviewees who have urban backgrounds. The families of ‘earlier times’ that 
Ayla and Adnan referred to are the rural families of 1940s and 1950s in which gender and 
generation hierarchies were much stronger.  
Another older couple, Berna (51) and Bora (59) also see important changes in the 
family ‘institution,’ and they also traced both positive and negative developments: 
Bora: It has been over 30 years since we got married. There are big differences 
between the family institution then and the family institution now. As we said 
before, we met each other through common acquaintances, through referrals of 
relatives. It was partly an arranged marriage.  But now the young generation is 
getting married in a totally different way. For example, before getting married our 
son told us that he had a girlfriend, but they were not thinking of getting married 
yet. After a while he came and said that they had decided to do so and in that way 
they formed their family nest. So, as parents we only had the duty of 
approval…And in our times there were patriarchal family relations. But now in 
Turkey, due to economic conditions, families have to be smaller. Especially in 
terms of several families living together: now this is almost nonexistent…This is 
both good and bad. The bad part is that young couples have harder economic 
conditions. The good part is young couples have the initiative and they don’t face 
problems like mother-in-law/daughter-in-law disputes… 
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Berna: And this is much more important, I mean their happiness. Because they 
solve the economic problems in one way or another. 
Bora: Yes, and they can plan their lives more comfortably, since there is not much 
intervention from the elders. They can use their initiative more freely, use more 
initiative. So we see this as a positive development. 
A move towards more democratic families, in which women are more liberated and there 
is a more balanced division of authority and decision-making between spouses, was 
conceptualized as a major trend by several respondents. Sevim (44) compared her 
childhood family to her current one and depicted a move from a ‘patriarchal’ to a 
‘democratic’ style: 
In my childhood, in terms of mother-father relations, my father had a definite 
sovereignty at home. In my family now, there is a more democratic structure. 
When I compare the two families in terms of relations with children, again my 
father’s decisions had priority... I mean my father had a pressing and harsh 
dominance, over my mother as well. Everything shall be asked to him, he will 
decide everything, the things to buy, the places to go and so forth... So, in other 
words, it was somewhat a patriarchal family. Now, in my family, we are not doing 
that insofar as it's possible. Sedat is also a democratic person. We solve our 
problems mutually. We decide together. 
Umut (39) also characterizes her family as more democratic compared to her childhood 
family, in which her father’s authority was absolute:    
When I think of my own childhood, there was a very disciplined atmosphere...My 
father was a very dominant figure and was  strongly disciplinary. I always felt his 
pressure on my mother as well. Our family is more egalitarian in terms of 
husband-wife relations... I mean, it is definitely a more democratic family. 
Another trend brought up by several respondents was the changing nature of parent-
child relationships. An important characteristic of the dual-earner, urban families is the 
decreasing number of children. These families have fewer children compared to other 
family types and also adopt a freer style of childrearing. Most of the younger Turkish 
couples that I interviewed had only one child and this was a conscious decision for most 
of them. Most interviewees argued that nowadays children have more say in families. Oya 
(52) compares her childhood to the present and portrays the differences:  
Younger children today have more free will, can insist on their rights, have more 
say at home and have their opinions consulted. Conversely, in our childhood, 
parents - especially the father - had the say; whatever he said was the rule. 
Hale (30), mother of a three-year-old boy, thinks that the biggest difference between past 
and present families is in the relationships between parents and children: 
There are very big differences between the ways parents treat their children. I 
think nowadays, parents are more tolerant, they give more freedom and voice to 
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their children. I mean, I think I had a more restricted childhood and perhaps 
because of that reason I try to give more freedom to my child.  
Due to the smaller number of children and a changing mentality, families are becoming 
‘child-centered,’ that is, children are given more say. Umut (39) mentioned the changing 
mentality with respect to favored methods of childrearing: 
I observe this in many families today, and it is the same in our family, that families 
are child-centered. I mean, when I think of my own childhood, there was a very 
disciplined atmosphere...Sometimes, my father observes us and criticizes a lot, 
saying that we are not training our kids good enough. We have adopted a freer 
method of child upbringing. Ways of thinking have changed a lot. 
Tulin (38) and Tolga (40) mention the economic bases of the transformations in families 
and evaluate these changes as a result of  ‘compulsory individualization’: 
Tulin: I suppose family relations have become looser; I mean they are not as tight 
as before...I think people became more individualized; they are divided into 
smaller units.  
Tolga: And more egalitarian relations are established between individuals. 
Tulin: And it is a little compulsory, maybe it (individualization) is not something 
we have chosen, but more brought about by working too much outside and 
spending too little time together at home. I mean, maybe it is the result of being 
independent out of necessity. 
It is interesting to note that Tulin and Tolga evaluate the changes in family relations by 
stressing the ambiguity of modernization: individuals are becoming freer, but also 
lonelier, by the same token. The modern ideal of ‘democracy in the family’ was conceived 
as a major trend by most Turkish interviewees.  
 When evaluating changes in families, Norwegians focused on different issues. A main 
change in family patterns mentioned by Norwegian interviewees was the increase in the 
number of working mothers, which led to changes both in the tempo of daily-life and the 
division of tasks and power inside the home. Especially the interviewees who themselves 
had mothers that were at home pointed to this as a main trend. According to Henrik (50) 
the biggest difference between his childhood and the present is that his wife Hilde is a 
full-time worker:  
The most important difference is that Hilde is employed, in contrast to my 
mother. So the biggest difference is that this leads to another way of distributing 
tasks at home, distribution of economic responsibility and everything else of 
course. Yes, this is the main difference, because my mother was a housewife.   
Increases in the number of working mothers also has led to changes in children’s daily 
routines. Grete (33) mentioned these changes as the most significant difference:  
There are changes of course, because my mother was at home when we were 
small, so we were at home and there were lots of kids in the streets. We played in 
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the streets and such. But now, the kids get up at 6:30, we drive them to 
kindergarten and pick them up at 4:30. So there I see a lot of change. 
Magne (37) also claimed that the biggest change took place in children’s daily routines: 
When we were small, kindergarten was an unknown concept. Neither we, nor the 
other kids in the neighborhood went to kindergarten. In most cases, mothers were 
at home, while fathers were working full-time. I think this is probably the biggest 
difference between the families now and when we were small.  
Some of the interviewees pointed out that grandparent-grandchild relations have also 
been altered, since most of today’s grandparents work long hours and do not have much 
time for their grandchildren: 
Geir (32): And we also notice that there is a change concerning today’s 
grandparents, in relation to what I was used to when I was a kid. Grandparents 
have less spare time, in a way...When I was a kid, my grandmother was at 
home...while my parents now, they are very much out at work.  They work long 
hours, just like we do. 
Nearly all Norwegian interviewees mentioned as major trends the increase in cohabitation 
without formal marriage and a higher tendency for relationships to break up. Most 
Norwegian interviewees were positive regarding the loosening of the traditional 
institutional characteristics of families. For example, Ann (34) considers a diversity of 
family patterns to be positive:  
I think it is positive that not everybody in society aims at getting married and 
having children. I don’t think that this means that 'family' is in a state of crisis. I 
mean, when the Christian Democrats say that the family is in crisis, they mean 
something else than what I mean, to put it that way.  
Norwegians tend to conceive of cohabitation as a legitimate form of living, especially 
until the couple plans to have children. Yet, it is becoming more and more common to 
have children without formal marriage. In Norway, the institutional aspects of family 
have weakened and practices have become individualized. Arne, a thirty-three year-old 
Norwegian man who has a daughter from his earlier marriage, and who is now cohabiting 
with the mother of his other two children, declared: 
We are not married, but I consider us an equally strong family all the same. 
This quotation illustrates simply and clearly that it is not ‘the family’ as such, but its 
traditional, institutional aspects that are dissolving in Norway. Cohabiting interviewees 
made it clear that they consider their relationship to be as ‘legitimate’ as those of married 
couples, although they are aware of the remaining legal differences. Camilla (31) and Cato 
(32) have been cohabiting for 10 years and are parents of two children under school age. 
They reflected on their status in the following way:  
Cato: We are still cohabiting, I think a little because I am stubborn and think that 
it must be possible to be cohabitants instead of getting married for that reason. In 
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a way, we do everything that married couples do: we have a house together, we 
have children together…but of course I am painfully aware of the fact that 
married and cohabiting couples are treated differently in the legal system… 
Camilla: It may happen that we will get married just to have the papers in a way… 
Cato: Yes, it may happen. However, I do not see the existence of a lot of 
cohabiting couples as a negative development… 
Camilla: It is totally all right. The important thing is to take care of each other, and 
to take care of children, irrespective of if you are married or not; and also 
irrespective of if you are a single parent...or if it is your own children or others’. 
The important thing is taking care of them.  
This definition of family as ‘a group of people who love and care for each other’ (Stacey 
1996) and related reflections exemplify the more open attitude concerning diverse 
organizations of family relations in Norway.  
However, not everybody in Norwegian society is in favor of consensual unions. 
Several Norwegian respondents stated their concern for the increase in the number of 
families that break-up, and some see this trend as a result of increases in cohabitation. 
Inger (58) is concerned about the high divorce rates and sees this as related to such 
increases: 
I think the big increase in divorces and broken up families in general is very 
regrettable, whether they are cohabiting or married, first of all because it is almost 
always a problem for children. If it is only adults, then they can manage the way 
they want. However, when there are children in the picture, then I think it is 
regrettable... I believe in a way…well, obviously some of the cohabitations are 
almost the same as marriage, but most are not. Statistics show that it is much 
easier to break up a relationship of cohabitation. I think it is important to have a 
stable home during the whole period when children are small. So seen from that 
angle I am sorry that there are so many cohabitations, because there are more 
break-ups.  
This brings us closer to comparing the ways Turkish and Norwegian interviewees 
evaluate divorce. I had a specific question pertaining to divorce, since I conceive attitudes 
towards divorce as a significant component of individuals’ general orientation towards 
institutional and moral aspects of  marriage and family at large. 
3.5 Evaluations of Divorce as a Social Phenomenon  
In Turkey, divorce rates are higher in big cities than in rural areas, but even urban divorce 
rates are considerably lower than in the international context. In the last decade, there has 
been a constant though slow increase in urban areas, leading to a higher tolerance in 
society. Yet being a divorcee still has various stigmas attached. In Norway, high divorce 
rates are a popular theme on the agenda. Especially children’s situation after divorce has 
been the subject of many hot media debates, as well as several academic research projects 
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(e.g. Moxnes 1990, Moxnes and Haugen 1998). In general, high break-up rates of 
marriages and cohabitation continue to be of concern, but at the same time are accepted 
as a basic, hard to change social fact. Several researchers approach to divorce not as ‘an 
expression for decay and for the low status of the family’ rather as ‘an expression for that 
the family has a high value and that people have high demands concerning what type of a 
family they want to live in’ (Moxnes 1990: 13, my translation). 
 Given the centrality of divorce-related issues in Norwegian society and the increasing 
‘popularity’ of the issue in Turkey, I wanted to include evaluations of attitudes towards 
divorce as a topic of comparison in this study. The couples I interviewed are all currently 
together, but some of them personally experienced divorce in their earlier marriages and 
all of them declare that they have witnessed divorces in their close social environment.   
A general look at the Turkish and Norwegian couples concerning attitudes towards 
divorce yields a picture in which a majority of the interviewees have a neutral attitude: 
they accept it as a legitimate action when marriages face severe problems. Only 3 Turkish 
and 4 Norwegian interviewees were openly critical of the increase in divorces, due to their 
common belief that people make this decision too easily, without trying hard enough to 
‘repair’ the relationship.  
All Turkish interviewees agreed that divorce is becoming more commonplace in 
urban areas compared to a few decades earlier, and nearly everyone thought that this 
increase is related to increases in women’s economic power. Other factors that were 
mentioned several times were increased selfishness and intolerance, decreasing respect 
for marriage, and higher and ‘unrealistic’ expectations related to marriage.  
A common belief among Turkish interviewees is that the conflicts and problems 
couples are facing nowadays are not exceptionally new, but before women had to put up 
with their marriages even when they were not happy, since they did not have the 
economic means to survive after a divorce. Hale (30) notices an increase in divorces in 
her social environment and evaluates this phenomenon in the following way: 
In old times, people would bear certain hardships more. Now women who seize 
their economic freedom do not bear them anymore. They say, ‘I can continue this 
struggle alone,’ and get divorced. People became more conscious. I think 
problems are the same: they were there earlier also. However, people continued 
their marriage as an obligation, not because it was such a good thing. 
Oya (52) also mentions women’s economic power as a main factor behind increases in 
divorce:  
Personally, I think that increases in divorce are related to fact that in Turkish 
society women started having more material means and started thinking more 
freely. Earlier, even though they wanted to have a divorce, women could not make 
this decision, since they did not have economic freedom or somebody who could 
support them financially.  
Another factor leading to more divorces that was frequently mentioned by interviewees 
was timing of marriages. Several interviewees argued that people who get married at a 
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young age and who make this decision rapidly tend to face higher risks of divorce. Early 
and rapid marriage decisions were thought to be related to unrealistic expectations. Nadir 
(69) sees unrealistic ‘dreams’ about marriage as a major factor: 
According to me, getting married early, rapidly, and not finding the life that you 
dreamed of after marriage (are the reasons behind divorces). I mean, not obtaining 
the things one sees on TV, movies and in lives of those who have higher incomes, 
in one’s own family life. 
Seeing divorce as a result of  ‘disappointment’ in marriages based on ‘high expectations’ 
was a prevalent argument. Tulin (38) had a similar remark:  
There has been a big increase in divorce. I think it was 2-3 years ago, many 
couples who got married at the same time as us, got dissolved…I think in 
relationships that start at a young age, people have especially high expectations. Of 
course we all have big dreams and big expectations, if not related to life, related to 
our relationships, and I think after a while this gradually turns into a 
disappointment. Certain social conditions, and maybe a gradual decline in 
economic conditions, come together and form different dynamics and people lose 
empathy towards each other. 
Among the Turkish interviewees, several stood out as being openly critical of increases in 
divorce. Berna (51) and Bora (59) are critical of increased ‘individualization’ which they 
conceive as ‘selfishness’ and especially Bora thinks that increase in divorces is a result of 
lost respect for the family ‘institution’:  
Bora: Today, especially youngsters, they think of marriage as a toy; its attraction 
carries them away, but of course when its difficulties emerge, then it is too late. 
Since they have married without knowing the marriage institution well, they do not 
have respect for it either. Consequently, divorce is very ordinary for them.(…) I 
don’t understand this. If a person has love and respect for an institution (marriage), 
it could not be so easy to demolish it. How can one demolish it so easily? One 
should instead make sacrifices to save it.  
Berna: And another thing is that the younger generation is more impatient, so that 
is another factor (in divorces). 
 
Dilek (42) and her husband, Devrim (42) believe that family is ‘sacred’ and think that 
some people divorce too easily. Dilek is critical of divorces that she thinks do not stem 
from real problems: 
There are a series of divorces with a snobbish logic that I see among my friends. 
You grip your economic independence, and then without thinking of anything 
else, without philosophizing about happiness, you get divorced. And most of 
those who divorce, they are not like “oh, I am divorced, I am happy” either…I 
don’t approach the matter that way. I think happiness is really a matter of effort. It 
is not easy to be together with a person 40 years, not at all easy to be together 
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feeling happy...I don’t believe that love can be seized by changing partners because 
of unimportant reasons. 
While some Turkish interviewees conceptualized divorce as more or less a ‘natural’ result 
of modernization and an increase in women’s economic power, the critical accounts 
mainly revolved around two topics: increasing selfishness and unrealistic expectations. 
Some of these factors were also mentioned by Norwegian interviewees.  
 For Norwegians, divorce is a more common phenomenon: it takes place at higher 
rates and, defined as a ‘social problem,’ it has been on the agenda for several decades. 
Most Norwegians acknowledge that the normalization of divorce has had certain positive 
affects, especially for women. Bente (52) thinks that it has given more freedom to 
women: 
I think that increased access to divorce, I mean that divorce has become more 
commonplace, has had many positive side-effects for the grown up. For children, 
I think it is more  ambiguous. I think that the relation between parents must be 
very bad for children to prefer divorce. But especially for women, it has no doubt 
afforded them more freedom. And, it is a type of freedom that demands 
responsibility from the grown-up people, that they do not make this decision easily 
but have it as an opportunity if there are no other possibilities.  
Grete (33) and Geir (32) reflect on divorce and conceive of it as a result of unrealistic 
expectations, but also as providing people a real choice: 
Geir: It depends on the expectations you have beforehand and how much you are 
willing to work on the issues...I have a feeling that many people go around and 
think that they will be in love all the time. But when you have two kids and such, 
one still loves the other, but it changes form.  Children take most of the love, 
that’s what they do.  
Grete: Yes, and maybe also earlier people had the attitude that marriage would last 
no matter what, while now people have more of a real choice. Divorce has been 
more common and more accepted and of course consequently relationships are 
more insecure.  
Bjarne (57) criticizes what he conceives as individualistic trends in society which became 
prominent in the last two decades: 
What we register in our times, maybe from 80s onwards, is that people have 
developed considerably more focus on their own happiness and welfare, and on 
what is good for  them, and this affects children negatively. I see this as a striking 
feature of the 80s. Either it is children of divorce who are sent alone on airplanes 
with signs on them20...or it is cohabiting couples, who break up and move in with 
someone new, so that it becomes a real mess in the end.  
                                                     
20 Young children travelling alone by airplanes wear a sign around their necks that says “I am 
travelling alone”.   
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There were two topics that crystallized as common arguments used by both Turkish and 
Norwegian interviewees: The first one relates to an ‘increased individualization and 
selfishness’ and the other one concerns ‘high expectations leading to disappointments.’ 
These arguments are in line with the propositions formulated by Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim (1995) on the risky nature of intimate relationships, involving 
disappointments based on higher standards set on living together.  
 Let us now take a closer look at the ways one Turkish couple evaluated divorce 
approaching from different angels, reflecting on several reasons and disagreeing on their 
relative importance.  
3.6 Case A. Ipek and Ilhan: An ‘Amateur Sociological’ 
Assessment of Divorce 
When evaluating increases in divorce in Turkey, Ipek and Ilhan, a couple in their mid-
thirties, provided ‘thick descriptions’ and interpretations of what they have observed in 
their environment. Neither of them are social scientists, but they are obviously interested 
in this theme and are curious to understand how divorce interacts with other social 
changes, both at institutional and individual levels. I will quote from the interview at 
length, in more or less its original flow. The sequence below is a special form of interview 
interaction, where the couple almost forgot the presence of the interviewer and carried 
on a heated debate, providing a rich narrative on divorce in Turkey that may not have 
been revealed through direct questioning.  
 Ipek (35) has an urban background. She works as a consultant in a private firm, with 
long working hours and high level of stress. Ilhan (38) also has an urban background. He 
is an academician working at a state university with high level of flexibility. They have 
been married for 10 years and have a 3 year-old son. Both display egalitarian attitudes 
concerning gender, yet the ways they organize housework and childcare are highly 
traditional. This is an issue which Ipek is critical about.   
Ipek started evaluating divorce by bringing up women’s “second shift,” which often 
leads to exhaustion and conflict. Ilhan introduced the concept of ‘individualization’ which 
he sees as central in understanding divorce. They discussed other related phenomena, 
disagreeing on their relative importance in explaining why divorces are at rise: 
Ipek: There are divorces, for example in my own social environment. Even those 
people who got married in a very traditional way and who I thought would never 
divorce, may get divorced. I think basically there is this main reason...in the city the 
woman has to leave the traditional role in order to work outside, because city life 
makes it difficult for only the man to support the household. Normally, in 
traditional relations, the woman stays at home and the man works…Nowadays, 
women work much more outside the home, either in the public or the private 
sector. Because of this work, they contribute to the household economically...So, 
OK, both man and woman contribute economically, but it is also expected that 
the woman continue with her traditional tasks. Everything feels heavier because 
she works outside and then comes home, cooks the dinner, sets the table for her 
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husband, takes care of her child, and so on. And in such a system, I think that the 
woman is led to exhaustion, and this intensifies incompatibilities. That is to say, it 
lessens the bonds of affection. And in this framework, women can make the 
decision to divorce more easily, compared to the old times. This is what I think. 
How about you? 
Ilhan: Of course, the widening of the areas of freedom has a role in this. Because, 
as you said, in the past, people carried out their lives in more limited social 
environments and with more limited budgets, whether they wanted it or not. But 
the development of economic opportunities and differentiation of social 
environments has activated certain emotions more easily. But what I think as a 
serious factor apart from this, and maybe the most important one, is 
individualization. Even though this is meant as a concept that provides freedom 
for human beings, I think it seriously takes people to loneliness and to a point of 
solving all problems by being alone… 
Ipek: In fact, I don’t think that this is so determining in marriages, I mean in 
separations. Maybe in a very small section of society. 
Ilhan: I mean, in the end, even though people do not put individualization as a 
goal for themselves, they follow a lonely path of development, whether they want 
it or not. In this lonely path of self-development, even people in the first circle, 
that is the family, are not included, since you have a different social environment, a 
different work environment, and maybe this brings with it a type of differentiation. 
And maybe individualization also decreases endurance for certain things, because 
you don't feel like you have to endure. You think, ‘everybody can use the freedom 
of behaving the way they want.’ So you also behave the way you want...when 
everybody is inclined towards experiencing all the feelings alone, when such an 
inclination increases, maybe you start reacting more severely to the quarrels that 
take place all the time. Even though you could cope with such problems, even 
though you could tolerate them, you start not tolerating them. (…) 
Ipek: But now, you say that experiencing emotions individually, decreasing 
tolerance, and so on are important. But I think that in fact, in the traditional 
structure, the woman is conditioned, is trained to continue the relationship. 
Whatever happens, it is very difficult to break this mechanism. I mean, even if she 
enrolls in a university, the traditional structure is dictated to her so strongly, you 
know that issue of ‘the female bird builds the nest’ is forced on her with all its 
ramifications. Accordingly, in this respect, leaving the marriage, especially if you 
have children, is hard. Nobody can do it so easily. So I think there must be much 
more serious inclusion of this, rather than just individualization. (…) Of course, 
another thing may be related to changes in values. Maybe this is what lies at the 
root of the increases in divorce. Especially in former generations, marriage was 
always defined as something sacred, but in one way or another we all saw that it is 
not anything sacred. It can be a type of comfort brought by this.  
Ilhan: I don’t agree with that. In many ways, my parents’ generation evaluate 
marriage maybe in a much more healthy way. We always had the logic of being 
against, a type of being ‘anti,’ and marriage was always presented to us as 
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something sacred, and we claim that we are against marriage. But this anti- point 
of departure, in a strange way, leads us to seeing marriage as much more sacred 
than our parents and having higher expectations related to that concept. The 
things that my father expects from my mother are very simple things. Whereas, I 
do not have as simple expectations as my father, from the person I am together 
with. I want an intellectual satisfaction, I want a sexual satisfaction, I want her to 
represent me well  in different places in different styles, I want her to join with me 
in all types of activities, and these are in fact not realistic wishes. And when you 
look at it, former generations had very simple, very logical and very concrete 
wishes related to marriage. Maybe in that framework, we evaluate marriage falsely 
and load it with too many meanings.  
Ipek: But also changing values have an affect, I mean in ending marriage more 
comfortably... One thing is that the new generation evaluates marriage differently, 
in a way freeing it somewhat from that sacredness. But in addition to that, I think 
earlier, being divorced was evaluated as much worse, socially, especially for 
women. I think now this is broken. This is a very important factor: now a woman 
can take place in this society as a divorcee (widow). Of course, there is a section of 
society that still condemns her, but also a section that accepts her... So this is also a 
factor that makes the decision of ending a marriage easier.  
Several important observations and interpretations crystallize from the narrative above. 
One basic factor making opting for divorce possible for women is related to their 
economic power. According to Ipek, women’s economic independence, together with 
loosening traditional values, are the main factors behind the increasing divorce rate. Ilhan 
has a different approach: He thinks that people have become more selfish and less 
tolerant. He also believes that people have unrealistic, high expectations that lead them to 
disappointments concerning marriage. Ilhan’s evaluations have similarities to the points 
mentioned by several Norwegian interviewees and support the theses developed by Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim (1995) concerning trends in intimate relations in the contours of 
reflexive modernity.  
 
3.7 Summing up the Main Points 
Themes that were articulated by the Turkish interviewees concerning changes in Turkish 
families can be grouped under three general headings: 
 Family ties are getting looser: Most of the interviewees claimed that there is a trend in 
Turkish society towards looser family ties. This is conceived as having both positive and 
negative consequences. The main reasons behind this change are specified as a 
combination of factors like urbanization, increasing levels of education, and mobility. 
 Families are getting more democratic: As a positive development, several interviewees 
claimed that families have become more “democratic”. Women are more liberated 
compared to earlier times and fathers are less authoritative and dominating than before. 
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 Families are getting smaller and child-centered: Especially urban, double-career families are 
having fewer children than the rest of society. There are many families with only one 
child. As a result, families are becoming more “child-centered.” Children now have more 
say inside families. 
 When asked about their thoughts concerning changes in families, most Norwegians 
mentioned that there have been both positive and negative trends and mainly referred to 
two major factors: The transition from the ‘housewife’ to the ‘working mother’ families 
and the increase in risks of  divorce and break-ups. 
 While younger Norwegian couples were generally positive about the diminishing 
hegemony of marriage as the dominant form of living together, some older Norwegian 
informants appeared to be more skeptical concerning these developments. Some of the 
older Norwegian interviewees criticized the increases in the rate of divorce and the high 
numbers of couples who break-up, due to its harmful effects on children. Younger 
Norwegian interviewees displayed more tolerant attitudes, although they were also 
concerned with the high risk of break-up that relationships face.  
 Both Norwegian and Turkish interviewees mentioned that nowadays people have 
higher and unrealistic expectations concerning marriage and argued that this was a major 
factor behind increasing divorces.  
 In this chapter, evaluations and own experiences of the interviewees draw a general 
picture of the trends in family formations in the two countries. Let us now take a closer 
look at the internal dynamics of the interviewees’ own family practices by focusing on the 




Chapter 4  Housework and Child-Care 
Arrangements 
“As reproductive work is concerned with the social and cultural 
reproduction of human beings, the actual doing of the work – who does 
it, when and where – is a crucial part of its meaning…it is an expression 
and reproduction of social relations, and in particular of relations 
between genders” (Anderson 2000: 14). 
Couple relationships and family practices are complex and multifaceted. Different life-
spheres put varied demands on individuals and modern life necessitates careful planning 
and organizing to allocate scarce time according to priorities. There is a lot of work that 
needs to be done inside the household.21 For example, human beings need to eat several 
times a day. Food is not only a physical necessity, but also a source of pleasure, 
togetherness, relaxation and joy. Cooking and eating at home often results in dishes that 
need to be washed and put back into their place. Both the spaces and equipment used in 
everyday life need cleaning and maintenance. This is necessary not only for obvious 
hygienic reasons but also for creating the sense of well-being that is vital for peace of 
mind. Clothing requires labor as well. Clothes need constant washing, drying, folding and 
ironing. We rely on having clean, decent outfits to participate with self-confidence in 
many arenas of life. These are just some of the major activities upon which our daily lives 
depend. These activities have not always been considered important in sociological 
analysis. For a long time, housework was ignored completely and  it is still an invisible 
and undervalued activity.  
 One of the contributions of feminist scholarship has been documentation and 
analysis of the centrality of socially reproductive, unpaid work, done mainly by women 
inside the household. Ann Oakley’s (1974) pioneering sociological study of housework 
was one of the first published works on this subject and has paved the way for many 
other studies and perspectives on these issues. The 1990s witnessed an increase in 
analyses of unpaid domestic labor using various types of data and focusing both on single 
countries and international comparisons. A basic finding of various cross-national studies 
on the gendered division of labor is that women still perform the bulk of household work 
across nations, although there is a decline in the gap between women’s and men’s 
household labor in recent years, especially in Scandinavian countries (e.g. Baxter 1997). 
Three main perspectives can be identified in the field of analysis of unpaid household 
work (Bittman et al. 2001). The first, and perhaps most widely discussed one, is the ‘New 
                                                     
21 Most studies on ‘household work’ focus on both housework and childcare. In this chapter, I will 
analyze these two areas separately. The terms ‘housework’ or ‘unpaid domestic labor’ usually refer 
to all activities carried out inside the household, including child-care.  
 
70 
Home Economics’ approach formulated originally by G. Becker (1991). In this 
framework, the relative efficiency of men and women at performing different tasks is 
emphasized and individuals are characterized as altruistic spouses who optimize their 
time usage relative to a single family utility function. Very briefly put, these conditions 
result in the rational arrangement that the person with the higher potential wage does 
more market work and less housework.  
 The second main perspective can be labeled the ‘Bargaining Model,’ which claims 
that the partner with higher earning power is able to bargain to do less household work: 
“Whereas in a Beckerian world, the family has a single utility function and cooperates to 
allocate each partner’s time efficiently...in a bargaining world, partners are not entirely 
altruistic, and where they have conflict of interest, resources affect whose interests 
prevail”  (Bittman et al. 2001: 6).  
 The third main perspective includes approaches to household labor that underscore 
the omnipresence of gender, both as beliefs and habits internalized within individuals and 
as constraints external to individuals. In this perspective, gender has pervasive effects at 
many levels, structuring identities, expectations, norms and institutions.  
 None of the perspectives above in isolation give satisfactory results in analyzing 
actual divisions of unpaid labor inside households. The gendered, institutional, economic 
and cultural aspects influencing arrangements for housework must be considered 
simultaneously. As the recent detailed study of Bittman et al. (2001) shows, efficiency, 
bargaining and gender all have a role in household dynamics, and gender overrides 
money in important ways: women’s unpaid hours of work are minimized when spouses 
contribute approximately equal income, but ‘gender trumps money’ when women 
provide more income than their husbands. When women earn more than their husbands, 
the time they use on unpaid work increases, as if “trying to neutralize the deviance of 
husband’s dependence” (ibid.: 35).    
 It is important to study both actual unpaid work arrangements and the levels of 
satisfaction and conflicts resulting from these divisions. Individuals are more complex 
than most economic theories presuppose: “Partners are not cultural dopes who are 
shackled to simplistic attitudes, but complex, often contradictory economic and social 
actors who seem, on the whole to be trying to make their relationships work,” (Layte 
1999: 166). 
 Household work is not only ‘drudgery’ either, since such work has important 
elements of love and caring (Ahlander and Bahr 1995). Division of unpaid work is 
important because it often influences spousal feelings of equity, fairness, love and caring. 
A certain level of satisfaction is necessary for the continuance of couple relationships. 
These aspects of the division of housework cannot be captured solely by time-use data. 
As Ahlander and Bahr (1995: 66) also suggest, methods that encourage close attention to 
lived experience and the meanings people give to their activities seem more appropriate 
to study the moral dimensions of family work.   
 In her path breaking study of couples’ sharing of housework and childcare, American 
sociologist Arlie Hochschild (1990) relies on in-depth interviews and participant 
observation to analyze how women’s ‘second shift’ at home influences the internal 
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dynamics of marriage. The term ‘second shift’ refers to the ‘leisure gap’ between men and 
women, since the major studies on time use show that most employed women work one 
shift at work and a ‘second shift’ at home. Hochschild’s analysis that considers both the 
economic and cultural factors influencing the divisions of tasks at home, and the specific 
gender ideologies of the individuals forming the couples, was a major source of 
inspiration for this study, which compares Turkish and Norwegian couples on similar 
issues.  
4.1 Arrangements of Domestic Labor: General Practices  
There are important ideological and institutional differences between Turkey and Norway 
concerning the organization of housework and care-work. These tasks are still considered 
to be mainly women’s responsibility and natural duty in Turkey. There is not a visible 
trend of questioning the gender inequalities in this area, even among the households in 
which both the man and the woman have paid work. Most dual-career Turkish  couples 
solve the problem of organizing housework and childcare by relying heavily on paid help. 
In Norway, on the other hand, there has been a societal trend of questioning the unequal, 
gendered distribution of housework and an improvement in state-sponsored child-care 
services, especially evident in the 1990s. Moreover, there is a visible trend of questioning 
continuing inequalities in these areas. The ‘official ideology’ and the shared ideal is an 
equal division, even though the practices may deviate from the ideals. 
In Turkish families, women have the main responsibility for housework. When 
Turkish women receive help with housework, it is mainly other women (their daughters, 
mothers or paid female helpers), not their husbands, who share their workload. Nation-
wide statistics show the extreme imbalance in performance of domestic tasks (See Table 
A5.3 in Appendix 5). In 67 per cent of the dual-earner households, the woman has the 
sole responsibility for cleaning. Only in 1 per cent of dual-earner households do 
husbands share this work. In 24 per cent of the households, the woman receives help 
from other family members (mainly daughters) and 8 per cent of the households rely on 
paid help. 
 For middle-class families with sufficient finances, hiring a ‘woman’22 for housework is 
an institutionalized arrangement. Women who have migrated from rural areas to big cities 
are the main providers for such services23. Most middle-class women working full-time 
prefer to hire help, especially for cleaning but also for washing clothes, ironing and 
cooking. The availability of these relatively cheap services is an important factor behind 
the stubbornness of the traditional gender division of labor inside the household. Most 
husbands do not face any pressure to participate in housework, since if their wives do not 
have the time, there is always another woman who can do the work relatively cheaply. In 
                                                     
22 The domestic workers who clean the houses are called kadin, literally meaning ‘woman’ in 
Turkish and this practice is another signifier of the gendered aspects of this phenomenon. 
23 As the first examples of detailed studies on domestic workers in Turkey see Özyeğin (2001) and 
Kalaycıoğlu & Rittsberger-Tilic (2000).  
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a recent study on the global politics of domestic labor, Bridget Anderson (2000) points to 
the fact that there has been remarkably little problematizing of paid domestic labor, and 
states that it is this labor that enables middle-class women and men to avoid the conflicts 
of interest inherent in the gendered division of labor (Anderson 2000: 1).  
 In Norway, in the context of a strong “second wave” feminism, all traditional gender 
arrangements were questioned in society during the 1970s. However, many social 
researchers point to the fact that the division of labor inside the home has been 
exceptionally resistant  to change in practice, even though equality in all areas has been 
accepted as an ideology (Wærness 1999, Brandth & Kvande 1998). The trend from the 
1970s on has been a similar use of time on housework for women and men, though 
equality has not yet been achieved. In Norway, time-use surveys show that in the last 
decades women have slightly decreased the time they spend doing housework and 
markedly increased the time they spend in the labor market. Men, on the other hand, 
decreased slightly the time spend in wage-earning activities and increased slightly their 
share of household work, especially child care (Kitterød & Haraldsen 1992). In the two 
decades from 1970 to 1990, Norwegian men have increased their participation in 
household work by an average of 23 minutes per day and women have reduced their 
housework by an average of 1.5 hours (ibid. 70). Among childless couples, the husband’s 
time used in household work amounts to 70 per cent of the wife’s time, however this 
figure decreases to 50 per cent for couples with children (Wærness 1999: 213).  
 In light of these general trends, let us now turn to the stories of dual-career couples 
regarding time use for unpaid household work. A question in the interview guide was 
formulated to learn about the ways couples organize housework. I was mainly interested 
in cleaning, cooking, clothes-washing and shopping arrangements, since these activities 
need to be done often and take a great deal of time. See Appendix 5 for a tabular 
presentation of the ways interviewees organize housework and the relative importance of 
this issue for the particular couple.  
 The narratives provided by Turkish and Norwegian interviewees concerning 
housework differ markedly in terms of both quality and quantity. First of all, Norwegians 
had much more to tell on this topic. For most of them this has been a subject of debate, 
an area of negotiation, and a source of conflict. Most of the Norwegian interviewees 
presented the historical development of the pattern of work that their household 
manifests at present.  
4.2 Sliding into Separate Domains 
The dominant ideology is ‘equal sharing of housework’ among Norwegians, though 
practices vary greatly. The changes in this area are visible: men seem to have accepted the 
idea that housework is also their problem. None of the Norwegian couples that I 
interviewed practiced the traditional model assigning all housework to women and 
maintenance and repair to men. When interviewees stated that there was a gendered and 
unequal pattern in their division of housework, they felt the need to explain why. Most 
Norwegians said that a ‘natural’ pattern emerged after many years in which the man and 
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the woman took responsibility for certain areas. For several of them, this was the result 
of discussions and conflicts.   
Most couples have settled on a model with which they say that they are satisfied. After 
trying different sharing arrangements, Camilla (31) and Cato (32) decided to solve the 
problem by bringing in paid cleaning help:  
Camilla: Before we got the cleaning help, there were always discussions on when 
we should do it... I mean we agreed that both of us would do it, but not on when 
and how...I felt like I was going around and nagging all the time, so it was in fact 
to avoid those discussions that we brought in paid help. 
Cato: Yes, it was smart to do that! 
Camilla: Because, before that we always had discussions exactly on cleaning.  
Having paid-help for cleaning is becoming more common among dual-career couples, 
even though it is still a minority who have it. Only 5 per cent of all women between the 
ages of 16 and 66 had paid help for cleaning in 1995 (Kitterød 1996). Among the eleven 
Norwegian couples I interviewed, only two had paid housework help. The younger 
couple above took that decision to avoid conflicts. The other couple, Bente (52) and 
Bjarne (57), who also use paid help for cleaning, see this as a practical solution, even 
though division of work has never been a theme for discussion:  
How do you organize housework? 
Bente: We do it in a very simple way (laughs). Every 14 days somebody comes 
here and cleans. And in the meantime we do very little, we cook, do the dishes, 
and tidy a little, but we don’t clean the whole house… 
Bjarne: We got married as adults so the arrangement of practical things has never 
been a theme. I mean it hasn’t been something we sat down and discussed and 
made agreements on.  It fell into place totally, well more or less totally naturally.  
Bente: But if Bjarne has been of the old-school, and did not feel it was natural to 
do things around the house, then we would have had to make agreements I think! 
(laughs) I would not have it as my natural duty, if I felt that we couldn’t share it.   
All interviewees above the age of 45 reflected on changes that have taken place in this 
area, both in their own relationships and in society at large. Most women mentioned that 
it was them who took the initiative to achieve a more egalitarian division of housework. 
Elin (56) and Endre (59) now share equally, but Elin said she had to fight for that 
arrangement:   
Endre: I think cleaning the house together is totally all right. It is so easy and we 
do it very fast, under 3 quarters of an hour!   
Elin: But I had to fight for it a little. Endre: Yeah, you bet.  
Elin: We had a struggle over this earlier. Endre: …but now it works well. 
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Most older Norwegian respondents mentioned that there was an imbalance in the 
distribution of housework before, especially when they had small children. Inger (58) 
articulates her earlier dissatisfaction:  
Inger: It  was much worse when we had small children. I had a very big portion of 
the work and I was not especially satisfied with that.  
Ingmar: We had household help in-between. 
Inger: Yes, the first 4 years after I started working. After I finished my education I 
started working full time. It was then I had the first two children... Then we 
actually had household help and it was OK. But on the other hand, maybe it 
resulted in you not learning to do your share from the beginning, since there was 
another person who cleaned the house and cooked.  
Even though Norwegian male interviewees seem to have accepted the idea that 
housework is also their responsibility, the main task of organizing and ‘seeing’ what needs 
to be done still falls mainly on women. Ingmar (61) acknowledges the differences in this 
area:  
Ingmar: In practice it is Inger who uses more effort on housework. I’ve gotten 
maybe a little better lately, but not so much… 
Inger: Yes, but you did get better, now you cook sometimes. You can cook now, 
you couldn’t before…But we have more or less a clear division of work, where 
you vacuum the house every week and I clean the bathroom and tidy up. So in 
fact, we share cleaning quite well.  
Ingmar: Yes, we have a more equal division of work that can be done quickly.  
Inger: But it is still me who sees things, sees what must be done.  
The issue of setting the standards for housework is often reported as a source of  
gendered conflict. Most couples had different views concerning what needs to be done 
and how often, and some women feel that they have higher standards than their partners. 
Standard-setting for housework is a common area of gender-conflict among most 
Norwegian couples and it is usually women who feel more responsible for ‘making sure 
that the work gets done.’ Nina (32) and Nils (36) had to negotiate on the standards:  
Nils: Division of housework functions well, but of course there have been 
negotiations because as a point of departure, we have somewhat different views 
on what the standard should be. I mean, maybe I have more tolerance for 
messiness than her. So we must, in a way, find some standard which will satisfy 
both of us. 
Nina: In terms of taking responsibility, I mean who will see what needs to be 
done, I feel that I have more responsibility for making sure that things get done. 
And I automatically associate this with gender.  
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While, Nina chose the task of actively trying to change Nils’ standards, Camilla and Cato 
decided to get paid-help to solve the conflict over differing standards.  
 In general, most Norwegian couples settled on a plan in which the woman and the 
man do different things. ‘Sharing everything equally’ is an ideal which has been hard to 
realize in practice. Some of the interviewees reflected on the fact that even though their 
point of departure has been to be non-traditional, they sometimes end up with a quite 
conventional situation. Magne (37) claimed that he and his wife are good at different 
things and the ‘mutual demand for precision’ leads them to take primary responsibility 
for the things at which they are better:  
Magne: I thought about this, that we have glided into relatively traditional gender 
roles and wondered why that is so. I think it has something to do with the demand 
for precision from both sides…I am very careless with the clothes for example, 
and therefore I took tasks for which I felt a need for more accuracy, like 
maintenance.  
Several Norwegian interviewees used terms like ‘sliding away from’ sharing and ‘gliding 
into’ a more traditional pattern while explaining their division of housework. Jorunn (35) 
is satisfied with their sharing arrangement, though she sees a gendered pattern in terms of 
‘heavier’ and ‘lighter’ work:  
Jorunn: In our house, we share most of the chores, even though maybe there is 
a tendency to fall into doing “boys’” and “girls’” things, depending on how 
heavy the work is. For example it is Jarle who changes the tires on the car and 
such things, so he does the heavier work. But inside the house, when it comes 
to sharing cooking and vacuuming, we do that quite well.  
For Grete (33) and Geir (32), his long working hours have been the main reason for 
‘gliding out of’ the sharing pattern:  
Grete:  We started with a type of sharing. In the beginning Geir made dinner 
and I did the clothes, but after a while we glided totally out of it. But it is mainly 
because he works so much that he doesn’t come home before dinner is over, so 
it is me who does the cooking as well.  
Geir has a job in upper management with long working hours. It is interesting that Grete 
accepts this as a legitimate reason for not sharing even though she also has a demanding 
career. Their slightly traditional gender ideology is a factor in understanding this 
phenomenon. Grete is the only Norwegian woman who uses her husband’s demanding 




4.3 Devaluing Housework and Delegating it to another 
‘Woman’  
In general, Turkish interviewees had less to discuss concerning housework. This is not an 
area that has much daily significance as a topic of discourse. Both men and women take it 
for granted that they pay another woman to take care of the cleaning. The work that is 
left, namely cooking, shopping, washing clothes, ironing, etc. is in most of the cases the 
women’s responsibility, though there are exceptions. Some men ‘help,’ especially in the 
kitchen, and some couples get paid help for that task as well. “Who will do the 
housework, when and how?” has not been a topic of negotiation for Turkish 
interviewees the way it has been for Norwegians. Turkish women have lower 
expectations of sharing compared to Norwegian women, and they appreciate a ‘helping’ 
husband, since they define housework as their own responsibility. 
 Several male interviewees clearly stated that housework is not their area of interest and 
admitted their lack of  responsibility. Figen (33) and Faruk (34) practice the traditional 
model: 
How do you organize housework? 
Faruk: It is not me who organizes! (laughs) 
Figen: We had a woman who came for cleaning once a week. But now I started 
working again, so she will come maybe twice a week or we will find another 
solution. I mean I won’t touch housework from now on, I hope. (What about 
shopping?) 
Figen: Sometimes we do shopping together, sometimes alone. It depends on 
who has work to do and who has the car. 
Faruk: I don’t enjoy shopping that much. I mean, it gets too stressful, I don’t 
want to spend weekends with that. And also my work tempo is quite different. 
For example now, I have to travel to (another city) stay for 4 days, and return, 
and I have to do this  for the next 3 months. So, since I stay here only for a few 
days, I don’t want to spend my time shopping or the like at all.     
Housework is only Figen’s concern, and what is more it is devalued by both. Figen is 
looking forward to leaving all housework to another woman. 
Cemil (35) is a high-level manager and he explicitly displayed a lack of interest in this 
question, which took the form of interrupting his wife when she was talking about 
housework: 
Ceyda: For cleaning, there is a woman who comes twice a week. Apart from 
that, we do daily tidying together. But it seems like cooking, washing dishes and 
clothes, these tasks  fall more on me. And we do the shopping on Sundays, 
because it is not possible in weekdays, I mean when we both work very hard 
and come at home around 8...(Her husband  interrupts)  
 
77 
Cemil: A cleaner comes twice a week, and there is a daily sitter for the kid. 
That’s it.   
This behavior may be interpreted as a sign of hostility towards a problematization of the 
unbalanced division of housework that clearly benefits the man, as well as an under-
valuation of the topic.  
Ipek (35) is a mother of a 3 year-old baby who apparently shoulders the whole 
‘second shift’ at home. She used the interview as a chance to remind her husband the 
unfairness of this situation: 
How do you organize housework? 
Ipek: I am leaving this subject to my husband, he will explain it better! (laughs) 
Ilhan: I do the man's work, and she does the rest. This is just a joke but… 
Ipek: Now you can ask him “what is the man's work?” 
Ilhan: It can be changing the bulbs, small repairs, but apart from that I help. 
Ipek: Let me say it this way: First of all in our relationship, I will say it frankly, 
Ilhan said it a little indirectly, but in our relationship we have a typical 
traditional male-female model. What is that model? The whole responsibility 
for the house rests on the woman, maintenance and continuation. But in the 
traditional model shopping belongs to the man, yet in our model everything 
works somewhat to the contrary, because the woman also does the shopping. 
The woman does the housework, the woman does the shopping (laughs) and at 
the same time the woman provides finances for the home, as much as the man. 
(To her husband) Do you have any objection?  
Ilhan represents the type of man whose deeds do not match their words concerning 
gender equality. During the interview he claimed that he has egalitarian ideas concerning 
gender arrangements, yet he seemed comfortable letting his wife do all the domestic 
work.   
 In some of the couples, Turkish men stated that they ‘help,’ and some women also 
mentioned this in an appreciative manner. Turkish women’s conception of ‘sharing’ is 
extremely modest: they expect less and get satisfied by a minimum amount of help from 
their husbands. Some of them talk about the housework as ‘theirs,’ just like the 
housewives that Ann Oakley interviewed almost three decades ago (Oakley 1974: 159). 
Change is painfully slow concerning gendered divisions of housework even for the dual-
earner couples who have egalitarian ideals and expectations. 
Oya (52), who is an ambitious, career-oriented woman, relies on ‘her’ helper for 
housework and is satisfied with her husband’s symbolic contributions:  
I have a household-helper. She comes three times a week. I undertake the work 
of shopping and cooking. Apart from that, in my daily work, my husband helps 
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me. I mean, he makes the salad, makes the tea, he can serve tea for the guests. 
So, yes, we have a type of sharing.  
Due to the non-existence of societal references on this issue, working Turkish women 
have very low expectations of sharing and demanding ‘help.’ Only when they get too 
exhausted is asking for help deemed justified. Sevim (44) realized in the course of her 
account that what they practice cannot really be called ‘sharing.’ This was a moment in 
which she seemed to dissolve the ‘family myth’ (Hochschild 1990):  
Sevim: In general, we share. But when I say that we share, I mean that Sedat 
helps me in some matters. For example, if I will have a large group of guests, he 
sets the table. Or we do the shopping together. Sometimes, if I am very tired, 
he goes and does the shopping himself. But he does not interfere with anything 
else. I mean, there is a lot of work at home, like washing clothes, ironing and 
the like. Of course, he does not do any of these…Sometimes, when I get very 
exhausted, I tell him to do something and then he does. But it is not as if it is 
his duty or a real division of labor. So we do not really share in that way.  
Some husbands state that they ‘help’ if their wife tells them to do so. Some men appear 
to be particularly skillful in playing helpless, especially when it comes to sorting the 
clothes: 
Utku (43): I participate in the housework in-between, so the things I do are not 
very fixed. For example, I put the dishes into the dishwasher after dinner…or I 
can put the clothes into the washing machine. If Umut tells me to do so, then I 
do it. Because otherwise I don’t know if the machine is full or if it is the white 
clothes that are to be washed or what. 
Some of the male interviewees stressed that they can do most of the housework if it is 
necessary, but they also add that their behavior deviates from what the ‘standard Turkish 
man’ does. Adnan (59) is proud of his contribution to housework but carefully 
mentioned that his is not a typical example:  
Adnan: We do almost everything together, more or less. When my wife works, 
if cleaning, cooking, or shopping needs to be done, I can do that...When my 
wife went to graduate school, I had to take care of the children, prepare their 
food and so on...But this was our idea. 90 per cent of Turkish men cannot 
manage, or do not help, so let me add that. Most men go directly to the city 
club or something like that after work, spend time there; they don't care for 
their children; they don't think of that as important...so our situation does not 
reflect that of Turkish men in general. Most Turkish men do not bother about 
housework or childcare, whether their wives work or not. The majority of men 
do not help.  
For those who do not help, long working hours or more demanding jobs were the most 
common and legitimate excuses, and often went unquestioned. Dilek (42) claims that her 
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husband, Devrim, is not a standard Turkish man even though he does not ‘help’ in 
housework: 
How do you organize housework?  
Dilek: Look, this is interesting. Devrim is in fact not a standard Turkish man. 
But our work rhythm has been such that, throughout our working lives, I have 
been the one who had a little more spare time... He always had longer hours 
than me, therefore he could not help. But I cannot say he never helped, because 
that is not his character, his type. I believe that, if he had a job like mine, if we 
both came home at 6, he would share, that’s what I believe. But he can tell you 
himself.  
Devrim: Yes, that’s right.  
Even though women get some help from their husband in certain practical tasks, the 
main responsibility of ‘organizing’ is women’s work. According to Umut (39) that is 
actually what takes most energy. She provides a rich account of the daily organization 
work she carries out:  
I think the most difficult part of the work at home, which is not always stated 
openly, is its organization. I mean you might lose your mind with this! Who 
needs what? What will be done when? When will the babysitter come? What do 
I have to tell her? What will I cook today? What do I need to buy to cook that 
meal? I mean, you do the work but apart from that, organizing the work also 
demands a lot of brain-power.  
Five out of sixteen Turkish couples that were interviewed claimed that they have an 
egalitarian approach to dividing housework Those couples also get paid help, but share 
the remaining workload in different ways.   
Levent: Such work is not organized at our home; whoever does it is stuck with 
it. But we do it equally. (Leyla: Yes.) More or less. I mean everybody can do 
housework. Apart from ironing, I cannot do ironing. 
Leyla: Yes, apart from ironing, and I don’t do ironing! (laughs). 
In contrast to Norwegian couples, the present division of work has been more or less a 
result of  ‘natural’ preferences, not deliberate negotiations. Tolga (40) was quick to say 
that he takes full responsibility for the kitchen: 
How do you organize housework? 
Tolga: I have the kitchen! 
Tulin: I don’t think we so much say, ‘these tasks are yours, these are mine.’ But 
of course, there are tasks which have been defined after so many years. So, yes, 
the kitchen is his, clothes, etc. are mine. Apart from that, the woman comes 
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and cleans anyway! (laughs) I mean, there is not much left. The only thing I see 
as a nightmare is cooking orderly everyday, and Tolga does that. 
Emre, a 37 year-old man who has egalitarian attitudes and who has been sharing the 
housework explains the societal factors leading to patterns of inequality:  
Doing housework is something very disturbing for men in Turkey. They see it 
as a woman’s work and the system is suitable for that…and the women also see 
it as their normal work, as their destiny in a way, because they have been 
socialized that way in their families…I know of families in which both the man 
and the woman work, for example the woman works at the bank, comes home 
at 7 o’clock in the evening, makes the dinner, feeds her child, looks at her 
child’s home-work, washes the dishes, puts the child to bed …and while the 
woman is in the kitchen the man watches TV and reads the paper . 
Emre participates actively in housework and childcare and has mentioned that he has 
received negative reactions from the neighbors regarding his ‘unmanly’ behavior. This 
exemplifies the ways ‘hegemonic masculinity’ is constructed by subordinating different 
masculinities (Connell 1987). Housework is actively constructed as ‘women’s work’ and 
sustained as such by questioning the masculinity of men doing it. 
 The interview accounts make it clear that modernization, higher education and 
professional employment have not led to a radical transformation of traditional attitudes 
concerning sharing of housework among dual-career Turkish couples. Some couples do 
practice a relatively egalitarian pattern of organizing housework; however in most cases 
this is a result of personal egalitarian gender ideologies rather than conscious struggles 
and negotiations. The widespread use of paid household help eases the burden of 
women’s ‘second shift’ and renders housework less visible and significant.  
4.4 Main Differences and Similarities 
The major difference between the Turkish and Norwegian groups is that all of the 
Turkish respondents have paid cleaning help, though the amount of time for which they 
hire such help varies. The rest of the housework has a clearer gender imbalance: it is 
mainly women’s responsibility. There are exceptions to the rule, but the general picture 
that emerges is still highly gendered. Another main difference is the fact that there was a 
more visible tendency among Turkish interviewees to take the gendered division of 
housework for granted. Both women and men tended to underplay the inequalities and 
conflicts in this area. Norwegian interviewees, on the other hand, strived to explain and 
justify inequalities. Norwegian society provides a context in which general egalitarian 
attitudes and relatively strong women’s rights and equality movements provide a 
framework for discussing and negotiating these issues. Housework is more visible and 
political in Norway, and Norwegian interviewees had higher expectations concerning 
equality. Even though some of them argued that they had ‘slid into a traditional pattern,’ 
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of sharing housework, what they conceived of as “traditional” would be considered quite 
radical in the Turkish context.  
 Income levels of the women and men do not seem to have a significant influence on 
the ways interviewees arrange housework. Interestingly, the two Turkish men who were 
actively sharing the housework were earning less than their wives. 
 In terms of differences between older and younger couples, the two groups again 
differed: older Norwegian couples provided detailed and informative stories on how 
societal expectations and standards concerning the divisions of housework have changed 
from 1970s onwards, and they evaluated their own practices in this historical perspective. 
The practices of younger and older Turkish couples, on the other hand, were not 
significantly different, mirroring the nonexistence of this topic on the societal agenda. 
The availability and pervasive use of relatively inexpensive household help prevents 
gendered conflicts in this area.  
 Given these basic differences, there are also certain similarities between the two 
groups: though there have been developments towards more equal sharing of housework 
in Norway, general organization and standard-setting is still mostly women’s work, as in 
Turkey. Another similar tendency among those who struggle for a type of sharing is the 
strategy of defining separate domains of responsibility for the woman and the man, 
instead of trying to divide all work equally. Let us now hear the story of Lise and Lars on 
how they ended up in practicing this model. 
4.5 Case B: Lise and Lars: Gendered Sharing of Housework 
Lise and Lars are both 36 years old. They have been married for 10 years and have two 
children. The interview with them has been one of the longest and they had many 
interesting stories concerning both their own family practices and their evaluations of 
gendered patterns in society at large. Lars is actively involved in care of their children and 
Lise mentioned several times how lucky they are to have a support network concerning 
childcare. They have both relatives and neighbors who help them with child care when 
necessary. Both Lise and Lars underlined several times that they like their jobs but ‘family 
comes first’.   
Lise and Lars have provided a detailed historical account of the emergence of a 
pattern of sharing in time. I conceive their story as reflecting the typical Norwegian 
pattern: believing in the importance of equal sharing, disagreeing on standards and 
settling down with defining separate domains of responsibility, based on personal 
preference and skills. In the final analysis, both are satisfied but Lise sees a gendered 
pattern in this and feels greater responsibility for household standards:   
Lise: Once upon a time we had many discussions. We would make work-
division lists and we sat down and made a list of all the tasks which had to be 
done and then we distributed them. We had to even agree on a time when we 
should do certain things, because it irritated me. For example small stuff like 
how long dirty pans should stay in the kitchen had annoyed me! (laughs) We’ve 
given that up now. But we share in a customary way. Lars has the responsibility 
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for the car while I don’t and if something is broken it is he who fixes it. The 
only exception is that he is also best in ironing! 
Lars: I feel like we share the tasks quite equally.  After many years it has fallen 
into this pattern. Lise does not like vacuuming, so it is mostly me who does it, 
and I also wash the windows. It is Lise who washes the clothes.  
Lise: And I have the kitchen, at least tidying it. 
Lars: Yes, because we are a little different on that. Even though I tell her ‘you 
can go to bed, I will tidy it later’ she says ‘no, I want it done now!’. 
Lise: I cannot relax otherwise. I mean, I cannot sit down and relax when 
everything is in flux. I must have a minimum level of order in things. And also I 
feel a greater responsibility for seeing that things get done. For example, if 
somebody comes to visit us and it is not tidy around, I feel like it is my 
responsibility. Even though it shouldn’t be like that, that is how I feel.  
Lars: Yes, obviously you feel a bigger responsibility for the housework than I 
do. Maybe therefore, things fell in that pattern. But generally, there is some 
inequality only in shopping for food and cooking, other things we share.  
Lise: And you have the ‘man’s work’, with reparation and painting, while I do 
the small tidying.(…) I think when everything gets to be too much Lars can let 
things go more than I can…I mean you share equally, but there is a gender-role 
pattern there all the same! I just can’t sit down and relax when things are 
waiting to be done around me; I just get restless. 
Lise and Lars have disagreements concerning standards for housework, yet they feel 
satisfied with the present model they have. Lars has the responsibility for paying the bills 
and for the typical ‘man’s work’ like painting and maintenance. Lise regrets that she is not 
better at practical reparation tasks because she wants to be a good example for her 
children and does not want to socialize them into a gendered pattern. Lars had an 
interesting comment on one disadvantage of doing ‘man’s work’ which reflects a 
significant change that took place for some of the Norwegian fathers:  
Lars: I think we are sharing quite well. But there is one thing that annoys me at 
times. For example when I have to paint the house, I have to use the week-ends 
and evenings, and then I cannot spend any time with the kids and that really 
makes me crabby. I feel like it is unfair that she can be with the kids all the time, 
when I have to go out and do this work!  
This focus on the importance of time spent with children was an emerging characteristic 
of most younger Norwegian fathers. Let us now take a closer look at the ways Turkish 
and Norwegian couples organize childcare.  
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4.6 Organization of Childcare 
One of the main problems dual-earner couples with children face is finding high-quality, 
reliable and affordable childcare services. Lack or scarcity of good childcare arrangements 
is a factor forcing mothers out of the labor market, at least until the child approaches 
school age. Depending on their specific family policy models, different countries have 
distinct arrangements concerning public childcare. Due to the prevalence of a 
‘familialstic’ policy logic problems related to the care of children are not defined as public 
issues in Turkey. Having a child is seen as one of the most personal aspects of life, and 
individual couples are supposed to arrange childcare either by receiving support from 
close family or relying on private alternatives. Ideological factors are at play here. 
Defining motherhood as women’s most sacred duty is prevalent, and women prioritizing 
home and children are idealized (Koray 1998). A complex combination of ideological, 
cultural and economic factors play a part in defining childcare as a private issue, 
contributing to a lack of public policies and public debates.  
 In Turkey, policies designed for working parents are limited. For example, maternity 
leave periods are short. Mothers that are employed in the public sector are entitled to a 
leave of absence 6 weeks before and 6 weeks after birth. They may take up to 6 months 
of unpaid leave. As a result of the strength of the ideology which assumes that care for 
young children should be carried out in families (i.e. by women), publicly financed 
daycare centers are few in number and have low standards. Existing private centers are 
not affordable for even most middle-class families. Full time home-care is cheaper and 
therefore preferred, especially for children under 3. Most dual-earner families use private 
arrangements like paid household help and private childcare centers, or they receive help 
from grandparents and other relatives.  
 Compared to Turkey, childcare services are comprehensive and highly 
institutionalized in Norway. Costs of the child care services are shared between the state, 
the municipality and the parents. Percentage of children in the age group 1-5, attending to 
a state-subsidized daycare center has increased from 19.3 in 1980 to 61.1 in 1999 
(Statistics Norway). 
 In the last decade policies directed at dual-earner families have stressed the 
importance of enabling both parents to combine employment and parenthood. 
Motherhood and fatherhood have been ‘politicized’ (Ellingsæter 1999). The sharing of 
care work became the key issue in the 1990s. The most important reforms have been 
those that allow women to combine motherhood and employment and encourage fathers 
to take greater responsibility in caring for their children. Parental leaves of absence have 
gradually been increased.24 An important (though not sufficient) aspect of 
institutionalized family policies in Norway has been the increase in the supply of state-
subsidized daycare centers for children (barnehage) in the last decade. Norway has been a 
late-comer among the Scandinavian countries concerning the development of family 
policies (Wærness 1998). Since 1970s there has been a gap between the supply of and 
                                                     
24 Family policies in Norway will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 6. 
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demand for daycare in Norway, though this gap has been constantly decreasing since the 
late 1980s. There is general agreement in this society that attending daycare is beneficial 
for children over the age of three: “access to high-quality, state-sponsored daycare for 
children over 3 years of age has come to be regarded as educationally advantageous and 
as contributing to children’s equality of opportunity” (Knudsen & Wærness 2001: 70). 
This issue has been more controversial, however, for younger children. Let us now 
proceed from this general introduction to the childcare arrangements prevalent in Turkey 
and Norway to an analysis of the practices and evaluations of interviewees. There are 
divergences between the Turkish and Norwegian groups concerning the ways they 
organize (or have organized) care for their pre-school children. There are also significant 
differences between the younger and older couples in both countries.  
4.6.1 Norwegian Interviewees and Ways of Organizing Childcare 
Most younger Norwegian interviewees stated that they have preferred to send them to 
public daycare, if available, immediately after the 1 year parental leave of absence. One 
important difference between the Norwegians who had small children in the 1970s and 
those who had them in the late 1990s is the length of leaves of absence and the 
availability of daycare (See Table 4.1).   
Table 4.1 Prevalent Childcare Arrangements of Norwegian Couples in Two Different Decades 
1970s 1990s 
Shorter maternity leave: 3 months Longer parental leave: 12 months 
Only the mother taking parental leave More fathers sharing parental leave to varying degrees 
More use of private full-time caretakers 
at home 
Preference for state-subsidized daycare centers (barnehage) vis-à-vis 
cash for care or private caretakers. 





 Both prevailing ideologies and existing services have changed in the last three 
decades. In the 1970s, the husband’s career often had priority. Furthermore, it was not 
taken-for-granted in society, as it is today, that mothers would continue employment after 
having children.  
 In early 1990s, parental leave was lengthened and the 1-month quota for fathers was 
introduced. These policy changes went hand-in-hand with attitudinal changes concerning 
appropriate arrangements for the care of pre-school children. Support for the idea that 
both mothers and fathers should be active in childcare, and have the opportunity of 
combining employment with parenthood, increased (Knudsen and Wærness 1996). 
 These differences were reflected in the accounts of both younger and older 
Norwegian interviewees. Most female interviewees who had small children in the 1970s 




 All the Norwegian interviewees who had small children in the 1970s had full-time 
private home-care at various times, since public daycare centers were very limited. Inger 
(58) was the mother of three small children in the 1970s, and she combined several 
strategies in arranging for childcare. She stopped working for a short while, then had a 
private caretaker at home, and finally, when the child reached the age of 5, they got a 
place in state-subsidized daycare:   
In those times, it was very difficult to get a place in daycare...so they had a place in 
daycare maybe only for a couple of years. 
Elin (56) explained how she “assumed” that she would be a housewife after having a 
child and how this resulted in serious conflicts:  
We were married for 4 years and then we had our first child. I had the idea that 
I should stay home, because that was what my mother did…at the same time, I 
am not fit as a stay-at-home mother. I became more and more crabby, more 
and more difficult to get along with. I had not finished with my studies at the 
university either; I had 1 year left to get my degree. In the end, our relationship 
got worse. I was not satisfied. When Endre (her husband) came home, I 
demanded that he tell about his whole day, and I complained and nagged that I 
hadn't been out to meet people. In the end, he said ‘enough is enough! You 
should get out of the house again.’ So, I left the stay-at-home mother role, the 
housewife role, and all that and started studying again. We found a babysitter 
(...) I completed my studies and then started working. And since then I've 
worked full-time, and everything has gotten better. 
  The younger Norwegian mothers did not assume that they would stay at home after 
having children. All returned to work after the legal leave of absence period. Some of 
them were eager to start working full-time again. Grete (33) said that it felt very good to 
start working after one year at home:  
It was delightful being at home, but in the last months of my leave I started 
looking forward to working again. It was very nice to start working again. 
The satisfaction concerning the length of leave depends on several factors. Most parents 
feel good about going back to work full-time if they find high-quality childcare. Another 
important factor is the type of occupation. Jorunn (35) explained that it was hard for her 
to start working again due to her job’s specific characteristics: 
When I started working again, it was hard to motivate myself because I have 
the kind of job in which many people depend on your contribution…on your 
physical availability. That can be tough from time to time…I like working…but 
right now I could imagine spending more time with Jens (her child). 
Younger fathers are more actively involved in childcare than were older interviewees 
when they had small children. With one exception, all younger fathers took leaves of 
absence (of varying lengths) to care for their newborn children. The only young father 
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who did not take an official leave was the one who had a high-level managerial position 
in the private sector. 
The way some fathers talked about childcare arrangements showed that they conceive 
of themselves as highly responsible for the care of their children. Arne (33) took the 
longest period of  paternal leave to care for his children. He used 3 months of the 1-year 
leave period:  
Arne: Now he has started daycare. He started when he was 1 year old. During 
the first year, Ann had the leave for the first 9 months and then I took leave for 
3 months.  
Ann: So we had eighty per cent of the salary.  
(later in the interview) Arne: It was very good to be at home those three months. 
But I think it also is related to the fact that you know you will be back at work 
after a while. 
The changes in actual practices and expectations related to fathers’ involvement in 
childcare became clear in interviews. Henrik, a fifty year-old father of two explained how 
he ‘got away easily’ in the 1970s:  
It was sure easier for me, since Hilde took most of the responsibility when the 
kids were small…At that time (in the 1970s) it was my education, my career, 
which was defined as the first priority. I had first choice in a way…so I got 
away easily that time. 
 The interview accounts signal a change concerning Norwegian fathers’ involvement in 
childcare and an appreciation of the policies that help couples to combine employment 
with their parenthood obligations25. How do Turkish couples arrange for care of their 
children given the absence of such policies? 
4.6.2 Childcare Arrangements of Turkish Couples 
There is greater variation in the Turkish group in terms of how childcare is organized. 
Most couples rely on a combination of arrangements, while the dominant solution for 
those who can afford it is having a full-time, private caretaker (See Table 4.2). Economic 
factors are more determinant in Turkey. Female interviewees who have lower paying jobs 
with little flexibility were forced to stop working for a while after giving birth. This was 
especially common in 1970s. Conversely, women who are more career-oriented and who 
have high salaries returned to work relatively quickly. These couples have the means to 
afford full-time caretakers.  
Table 4.2 Prevalent Childcare Arrangements of Turkish Couples in Two Different Decades 
                                                     
25 Norwegian interviewees’ evaluations of state childcare policies will be analyzed in detail in 




Longer withdrawal from the labor market for mothers 
 
Scarcity of private daycare centers 
 
Competitive labor market pressuring mothers with 
demanding careers to return to employment after a 
relatively short maternal leave 
Increasing number of private, expensive daycare centers  
Preference for full-time paid home-care  
 
The length of maternity leave or withdrawal from the labor market depends on a 
woman’s career orientation and the relative significance of her income in the family 
budget. At the time of these interviews, the average amount of money that a caretaker 
received monthly was almost equal to the salary of a teacher working in the public 
schools. It would have been impossible for a couple to afford this if they both worked in 
the public sector. In the last decade, there has been an improvement in the availability of 
private daycare centers for children, though with considerably high prices. Accordingly, 
only couples with relatively high incomes can afford private daycare centers.  
 Interviewees who had small children in the 1970s argued that it was even harder than 
today to combine motherhood and employment. Berna, a fifty-one-year-old woman who 
had two children in the 1970s explained the difficulties they faced:  
We had hard days when we were raising children…we did not have the family 
nearby to support us. My husband and I raised them on our own. We lived in (a 
smaller city) and there were no daycare centers there. Now I see what a nice 
education they give to my nephew at the daycare where he goes…The 
babysitter we had was just like a guard; she only watched them…They were not 
tolerant at the workplace either.  The directors were very rigid. They would 
make a hell of a fuss if you were 5 minutes late to work…so if the babysitter 
was late, Bora had to call his office to say he would be late and he would wait at 
home. And of course I would be preoccupied with it at work: ‘did she come or 
not?’ So we had many problems.  
Dilek (41) stopped working for 3 years after giving birth. She explained that this was not 
a necessity but a choice:  
After Demet (her daughter) was born, I stopped working for three years because I 
thought that it was necessary to enjoy the child. We did not have much money, 
and we had problems making ends meet, but I felt it would be so meaningless to 
make my mother take care of this child. If you are going to do that, you shouldn’t 
have one. What is the meaning of having a child if you cannot experience it? So I 
quit my work for three years.   
It was mainly mothers who took long breaks from employment to care for children. A 
few of them received active help from their husbands. Those fathers who had flexible 
work-hours, especially, were more involved in caring for their newborns. Emre (37) 
explained how he took care of their son while his wife Elif (37) worked long hours: 
 
88 
At that period, I did not need to work continuously. I could choose my 
working hours. So I took care of him more intensively than his mother did. I 
took over the whole duty…but after that period, we had to find a babysitter. 
My mother also came to care for the baby.  
Fathers taking over of childcare by taking leaves of absence from work is not a common 
practice. One father did this, but the couple explained that this happened as a result of 
economic necessity.  It was not designed to achieve equal parenting:  
Tulin: After birth, I was at home for 3 months. After that we started looking 
for somebody to care for him, but we couldn’t. At that time, my salary was 
higher than Tolga’s. So he stopped working and I started again. I was able to 
arrange my work hours around nursing. We found a babysitter when he was 6 
month old. Of course it is not easy to leave him with the babysitter, so Tolga 
was at home with them for an additional month. After that he also started 
working.   
For several couples who have close family living in the same city, the active involvement 
of grandmothers has been an important form of support. It is common to test different 
solutions and to settle on a combination of different types of care-giving arrangements. 
Sevim (44) explained the arrangements they tried for the care of their daughter:   
When she was small, my mother made an important contribution. At the same 
time, we tried babysitters and daycare centers…In fact we tried everything 
possible. First we had a babysitter, but it did not work. Then my mother started 
coming. When (our daughter) grew up a little, she started at a daycare center. 
But of course, she went to my mother’s house after daycare since she got off 
early. 
 ‘Trying all possible ways’ is a common practice among dual-earner couples for 
finding the optimal childcare solution. Many interviewees mentioned that they had 
to shift caretakers several times due to different problems, ranging from 
disagreements on payment to caretakers’ treatment of children.26 Ipek (35) argued 
that it was easy to find a babysitter, but also very easy to lose one: 
Babysitters can be found easily, but also lost easily, because you can never be really 
happy with one…Especially in families like ours, with only one child and a child 
who was had at a late age, the babysitter knows the importance of this child and 
does a good job using this knowledge to blackmail you, saying ‘I can do 
housework, but then my time to care for your child will be less, or I will only take 
care of your child and she will be happy’…so you say ‘all right’ even though they 
leave the house dirty. 
Despite these issues, having private caretakers was the most widespread arrangement 
among Turkish interviewees who had children under school age. For the Norwegian 
                                                     
26 Caretakers are found either through professional agencies that charge a high commission, or 
through informal networks. Women who do not have formal education can become caretakers. 
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parents, on the other hand, state-subsidized daycare centers were the most common 
solution. 
 There are important differences between the two groups in terms of childcare 
arrangements. The most significant factor is the lack of public policies concerning 
childcare in Turkey. Public daycare centers are very few in number and the paid maternity 
leave period is short. In Norway, parents have the benefit of one of the most generous 
parental leave schemes in the world. The availability of state-subsidized daycare centers 
has increased in the last decade, though there is still a gap between supply and demand. 
Another major difference is fathers’ active involvement in childcare. Young Norwegian 
fathers use their right to a month’s leave of absence from work, and this gives them the 
opportunity to be involved in the care of their children from an early age. A last 
significant difference between Turkish and Norwegian interviewees is the availability of 
grandmothers to help with childcare. In the Turkish group, grandmothers were active 
caretakers. Norwegians reported that this was not possible, mainly due to the fact that 
either their parents were also still in full-time employment or they were living in another 
city.  
 In this chapter we have analyzed the myriad ways dual-career couples organize 
housework and care work that is so essential for healthy continuance of their lives. We 
have seen that arrangements for the domestic work has key gendered aspects and nation-
specific characteristics. Now let us turn to the ways these couples reconcile their family 




Chapter 5   Balancing Work and Family 
Lives 
“Anyone who would talk about the family must also discuss work and 
money, and anyone who would talk about marriage must also talk about 
training, professions and mobility, and specifically about unequal 
distributions despite by now (largely) equal educational prerequisites” 
(Beck 1992: 103).  
 
This study is about the practices, problems and balancing acts of families in which both 
the woman and the man work outside the home. Why is this a significant issue in the new 
millennium? For modern, urban individuals, work is becoming more and more a source 
of self-realization and satisfaction, rather than only a means of earning money 
(Hochschild 1997). Work, especially when defined as a ‘career,’ becomes an important 
source of identity and a key element in life-planning. Family relationships are also 
furnished with new, higher expectations and demands in late-modern times (Beck and 
Beck-Gernsheim 1995). One of the basic contradictions in late-modernity is that work 
outside the home is organized differently than work inside the home: market forces apply 
outside, while at home unpaid work is taken for granted. Individual competitiveness and 
mobility, encouraged by the job market, run up against the opposite expectations of the 
home, where one is expected to sacrifice one’s own interests for the collective project 
called family (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995: 26). The demands of these two spheres 
often clash, given the limitations of time and energy available to individuals. The 
problems are aggravated when there are two careers being pursued, and especially when 
there are children in the picture who need constant time and care. A major factor creating 
these conflicts is the organizational logic of the labor market, which often conceptualizes 
workers as ‘free’ individuals and ignores their family and care responsibilities: “Jobs in all 
advanced industrial countries are structured for individuals, not for family members. 
Thus, parents are hampered by employment policies and practices, as well as by cultural 
norms, that engender competition between work and family roles” (Moen 1989: 5).  
 Women’s move into the labor force in steadily increasing proportions in the last 
couple of decades has been a ‘social revolution’ leading to important changes in the ways 
family practices are organized. Unpaid housework and care work, previously done by 
housewives, must now be done by others or shared by husbands. However, many studies 
point to a ‘stalled revolution’: women have gone to work, but the workplace, the culture, 
and most of all, the men, have not adjusted themselves to this new reality (Hochschild 
1989, Shelton 1992).  
 The findings of my prior study made visible the centrality of these issues in the lives 
of young and highly educated Turkish and Norwegian women (Sümer 1998, 2001). Their 
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reflections concerning the difficulties of combining family and work were based on their 
own observations of the practices of people around them, since none of them were yet 
mothers. However, they all thought they would face problems if they were to combine 
motherhood and full-time employment in the future. These stories of troubling 
expectations made me wonder how men with similar backgrounds would talk about the 
phenomenon of ‘clashing demands.’ Would they see any problems related to combining 
fatherhood and employment?  
5.1 Clashes of Work and Family Demands for the Norwegian 
Interviewees 
There is variation among Norwegian interviewees due to life-phase differences. The 
clashes of contradictory demands of work and family are felt more severely when there 
are small children to raise. Younger Norwegian interviewees provided lengthy accounts 
of their problems and older ones reflected on their experiences of having small children 
and working full-time in earlier phases of their lives. The main problems most Norwegian 
interviewees mentioned concerning the effects of work on family life are related to time-
pressures. Parents with small children feel a ‘squeeze’ between the demands of work and 
their families, and at times feel like their whole lives are steered by the clock. Lise (36), 
mother of two children aged 5 and 7, explains the time pressures she experiences in her 
daily life:  
Sometimes I feel like everything is a big rush...Delays and deadlines start in the 
morning: you have to be at work at 8:30 and there are many things that need to be 
done before that – finding clothes for the kids, preparing breakfast, making lunch-
boxes – really a lot of organization. Then you come to work and face many 
deadlines there: “Did you finish that report?” “Yeah, I am trying to...” and then 
before you know it, it is close to 3. There is someone in your office, willing to 
discuss an important issue, but you start checking your watch. Then you rush to 
pick up the kids and they say “Mamma, you should have been here at 3!” and you 
see that it is already 3:30. So there are a lot of moments of stress concerning time, 
and in between it feels like a great rush...I feel like the watch is steering my life. 
Sometimes I feel like it is a train driving at full speed and I am just hanging on... I 
do not have any control anymore! 
Lise’s is a typical story of time pressures that most parents of small children report. She is 
actually one of the luckier ones, since her husband Lars (36) is almost equally involved in 
childcare. They also have a family-network that can step in and help with childcare when 
necessary.  
Contemporary working mothers have to deal with difficult balancing acts, but their 
conditions are more favorable compared to the difficulties faced by mothers in the 1970s. 
At that time, the husband’s career was usually given first priority, places in state 
subsidized daycare centers for children under school age were very limited, and the social 
environment was more infused with traditional attitudes concerning working mothers 
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which assumed that children would suffer if their mother worked (Knudsen and 
Wærness 1999).  
Bente, a 52 year old Norwegian woman explained how she felt that her career 
proceeded at the expense of her children in the 1970s:  
Did you ever feel that your work influences your family life negatively? 
Yes, I actually did, when I had small children.  I had a very busy job but I felt I 
should try not to let it influence the family, that I should try to manage everything 
at home at the same time. Sometimes one gets so tired that one cannot manage it 
anymore, and that happened to me now and then. But the times that my 
conscience bothered me the most were the times when I traveled in connection to 
work. Then I always felt terrible about my children. So my experience was that the 
work went on at the expense of my family. 
There is an interesting pattern concerning the career developments of older Norwegian 
interviewees. Most of them received additional education after their children grew up. In 
that way, they could shift to better paying, more challenging and prestigious jobs. Inger 
(58) who took higher education after her three children grew up and moved out, told 
about the expectations that prevailed in Norwegian society in 1960s and 1970s:  
In my generation, it was unthinkable for women to invest too much in education. 
When I first started high school, it was the highest education I could 
consider...This is one of the reasons that there are not so many women in high-
level jobs now, because we were trained to think that you should have a job that 
you can combine with having children. And being ambitious was not seen as 
positive.  
In Norwegian society definitions of good motherhood and good fatherhood have 
changed radically since the 1970s. The welfare state took active steps to implement 
policies that would enable women to combine employment with motherhood and 
encourage fathers to be more active in childcare. In the early 1990s almost revolutionary 
measures were taken: the parental leave period was widened and time-account schemes 
that allow parents to take portions of their paid leave in combination with part-time work 
were introduced. Attitudes have also changed, toward a general acceptance of the 
employment of mothers with pre-school children and toward higher expectations 
regarding sharing parental and bread-winning responsibilities between spouses (Knudsen 
and Wærness 1996).  
 However, the labor market has its own logic of organization, and some Norwegian 
interviewees mentioned that it is not always easy to get managers to accept their priorities. 
Lise (36) and Lars (36) mentioned still existing gender inequalities: 
Lise: The job I have is very important for me, but still, in relation to the children, I 
give priority to the children…So I gave a message at work that I would rather do 
my work at work, and not take much overtime...But it is not always easy to get 
them to agree to that. (...) 
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Lars: I think it is hard for women to pursue a career. Women struggle more if they 
choose to give priority to their careers…Because if you choose to have a career 
and have children, and if you do not always choose to put your children first, in a 
way that becomes visible to friends or family, then it is much tougher for women 
to justify that choice than men who do the same thing. There is a gendered 
expectation that women should take care of children, and it is still much stronger 
than for men. At the same time, if as a man you take care of your children just a 
little, it does not take too long before you receive a lot of positive feedback. And it 
does not take long before a woman receives a lot of negative feedback, when she 
fails to put her children first… 
Lise: There is a long way to go for real equality.  
Lars: So in that area, the relation between work and family, and the priorities of 
each, women struggle much more than men do.  That is so obvious.   
Lise:…when women apply for a little higher position, they get the question ‘do 
you think you can manage this job with 3 children?’ Do you think any man would 
receive that question? 
The conversation above illustrates the still existing discrimination and barriers in the 
labor market facing mothers. Even though a majority of the population supports the 
employment of mothers at the ideological level, practices in the labor market change only 
slowly.  
 Due to changes in expectations, both men and women experience the demands of 
success, both at work and at home, as stressful. Both mothers and fathers with young 
children provided detailed stories concerning the pressures and problems they 
experience. Younger Norwegian fathers, especially, articulated the conflicts they 
experience in balancing their work and family lives. In Norwegian society, expectations 
related to fatherhood have changed quite dramatically in the last few decades. Almost all 
of the younger Norwegian fathers interviewed reflected on the clashing demands of the 
labor-market and their families.  
Societal expectations concerning men’s priorities and their participation in childcare 
have changed. Cato (31), father of two children under school age, argues that the labor 
market has changed, but that there are still ‘old-fashioned bosses’: 
A modern boss knows that there are these things called children, and that the 
father must also go to the daycare center to pick up the kids. He knows because 
possibly he also takes care of his own children. An old-fashioned boss is maybe 
not so aware of this...And it is almost like people who do not take any part in the 
care of their children are not appreciated, I mean those who only bother about 
their job. This has almost become an inferior status position. Also, it is now 
considered high status for a man to say that he takes care of his children. At least 




Bjarne (58) reported that he could not spend much time with his children when they 
were growing up because of his work, and argues that today he might have done things 
differently:  
There were times earlier in my life in which I probably would have prioritized 
things differently if it were today...Not that my children turned against me because 
I worked too much. But this was the 70s, when people thought that in the end, 
working hard would be the best for the family, and that when they got that 
promotion, the budget would be in order.  
Lars (36) who is a father of two children committed to ‘putting the family first’ also 
mentioned that there have been important changes in the ways men think and behave in 
relation to their children:  
Maybe in the 50s and 60s, men did not have a guilty conscience because they were 
not with their kids, since it was socially accepted that men did not need to feel 
guilty for providing for the family. But today, I think many men struggle with a 
guilty conscience because they have to prioritize, or they feel that they have to 
prioritize their work in relation to their kids... An important reason that I continue 
working at the same job is that I have a great deal of freedom…I can adjust my 
job to the family instead of having to adjust the family to my job. That is terribly 
important for me.  
Men talking about adjusting their jobs to their families is a new trend. Those who choose 
to do this face several problems. Magne (38), father of two small children, explained the 
pressure he feels from the expectations that he should be available both at home and at 
work:  
There is a little pressure because it is expected that one should be everywhere. 
Sometimes I am pulled between different expectations. In the professional world, 
it is expected, maybe in an undefined way, that you should be more available than 
you actually can, if you are also going to participate at home, as is expected. So 
there can be time pressures.   
Time pressures and the stress related to them are common, and are reported by both 
mothers and fathers of small children. A factor which many couples experience as 
problematic is the demand of working overtime. Too much overtime work was 
mentioned by a majority of interviewees as a problem that has a negative influence on 
family life. Both men and women report instances of overtime that they consider 
problematic. Ann (34) and Arne (33) discuss this issue and how it influences their 
relationship:  
Does your work influence your family life negatively? 
Ann: Hmm, this is an interesting question! (laughs) 
Arne: Sometimes I work in the weekends. Some days I work double-shifts. One of 
my responsibilities at work – beyond my regular functions – is to repair the 
computer system. When something happens in the system, I have to go and fix it. 
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It is not mandated that ‘you must be at work,’ but it is expected that you will be 
available. The degree to which I take this on as necessary versus  the degree to 
which it is a real expectation is hard to tell. But at the very least, that extra function 
I have necessitates that I am update about the conditions equipment all the time 
and handle whenever problems arise. It is a type of overtime, and of course it 
influences (my family life)…You cannot say ‘no’ to that too often.  
Ann: And I have a feeling that I prioritize the family more than you. If that is 
reality, or my imagination, is another issue.  
Arne: We have discussed that a couple of times… At home, I do not mention the 
times that I said ‘no’ to working overtime, so in a way it is not visible. And also 
that extra function I have talked about makes it so that I must take on 
responsibilities that are not always imposed by others…but that I impose on 
myself. But there is of course a conflict between family and work.  
In this context of clashing expectations and conflicts, Norwegian couples have developed 
several solutions to reduce the time-pressures and resulting stress. 
5.1.1 Strategies for Balancing Family and Work Lives  
In general, there is a common tendency regarding balancing work and family among 
younger Norwegians with small children: to decrease their working hours and give more 
priority to their families, at least while their children are small. Mostly, it is women who 
talk about cutting back at work. Some have already started working less than full-time 
after having children. Jorunn (34), mother of a 2-year-old child explained the reasons:  
I chose to start working eighty percent, and I have experienced it as very positive: 
the fact that I do not need to use all my time at work, that I have the opportunity 
to be home one day, or that I have days in which I can use my time exactly as I 
want to. Of course I have to consider Jarle and Jens (their child), but at least you do 
not have the work demands and pressures. That is very positive I think…I have a 
job that exhausts me and then my utilization of time at home is not always as 
good. When you are so tired and exhausted, you can’t use your time as 
rationally…So ideally, I could think of working even less, maybe fifty percent. 
There are so many other ways to use time other than working, like being at home, 
being with Jens and all three of us doing things together.   
In Jorunn’s case, the high stress level, physical exhaustion, and relatively low pay have 
been important factors leading her to the decision of cutting back at work.  
Camilla (31), who decided to decrease her work hours to half-time, explained that she 
has been work-oriented and ambitious for several years, but now feels like she is done in 
that sphere. She wants to be at home with her kids more, without totally losing contact 
with the world of work:  
I don’t have great ambitions at work…I decided to work part-time from now on. I 
will have more time for the house and the kids. At the same time I will have 
contact with my work environment, so I will have both. But I do not have any big 
ambitions at work; I am done with it! …It is as if I am shifting my ambitions from 
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work to home. I would rather do that. Here in Norway, we measure everything in 
money and success at work, I think, but there are ways of seeing oneself in other 
ways as well… One must try to plan so that one can manage economically without 
having to work more, rather cut off at work and get more time. Time becomes 
more and more important. It does not help having all the world’s income if you 
don’t have time to enjoy yourself. 
Grete (34), mother of two small children, feels like her days are too turbulent, and plans 
to decrease her working hours in the near-future: 
I would like to spend more time with the children. I feel like daily life has become 
too hectic...when the kids start school, I would like to work less. Also, 
economically it will be less expensive to have them at school (than at a daycare 
center), so I will be able to afford working shorter days and be at home more, at 
least in that first period when they are at school.  
There are also fathers of small children who expressed a desire to work less, even though 
none of them have yet taken concrete measures. For example, Nils (37) explained how he 
wants to be more family oriented in this phase of his life:  
Now I define myself very strongly as a ‘father of small children’…the smaller they 
are, the more dependent they are on you…so right now, while I have such small 
children, I want to be more family oriented and less work-oriented.  
Flexible work hours and the opportunity to adjust work life according to family is 
appreciated by Norwegian fathers who are active in the care of their children:  
Lars: One of the reasons that I continue in my job is that, first of all, it gives me a 
lot. I think it is interesting, and I also have a great deal of freedom. I have so much 
freedom that I can adjust my work to meet family needs, instead of adjusting my 
family to meet work needs.   
New technologies also enable some parents of small children to balance work and family 
responsibilities. Jarle (36), father of a 2-year-old child, has been working long-hours lately 
and is not very satisfied. He explained that he has arranged a home-office, and hopes that 
he will be at home more from now on:  
Does your work effect the family negatively? 
Yes, it does sometimes, when I have too much to do, so there is always a conflict 
between doing things well at work and being present here at home. But I think of 
it this way: much of my work does not depend on people, so I can just as well sit 
at home and work in the evening. Before I worked extra overtime at work, but 
now I have PC at home with an internet connection, so it will be easier to sit at 
home and work, when Jens is sleeping. 
Jarle feels lucky to have a job that allows for such arrangements. Most Norwegian 
interviewees talked warmly about the flexibility they have at their jobs and presented this 
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as the most important factor enabling them to balance work and family in less stressful 
ways. Magne (38), father of two children, explained the reasons for his job satisfaction:  
My work means quite a lot to me. I use a lot of time at work and have many social 
contacts. I am very content with my work. It is also related to the fact that I have a 
great deal of flexibility, especially the ability to work here at home, when the kids 
are sick or something. I have a home-office here. I think that is very practical. 
These young fathers of small children who play an active role in their care solve the 
problem of clashing demands by establishing home-offices. Flexibility at work, defined as 
controlling one’s own working hours and opportunities of working at home is an 
appreciated benefit.  As the interview accounts demonstrate, younger Norwegian fathers 
actively try to incorporate clashing demands of work and family obligations. How do 
Turkish fathers talk about balancing employment and parenthood? 
5.2 Turkish Interviewees and Family-Work Balance 
One significant difference between the Norwegian and Turkish groups is the absence of 
Turkish male voices on these issues. One father mentioned that he suffers from a ‘guilty 
conscience’ due to the limited time he spends with his children, and another said that he 
stopped taking about work at home after their child was born, but none of them gave 
detailed accounts or reflections regarding conflicting demands of work and family. 
Utku (43) has ‘abnormal’ work hours and this prevents him from being with his 
family:  
I suffer from a guilty conscience because of my long work hours...I cannot be at 
home when they are awake, I cannot take care of them, we cannot eat together. So 
there is such a vicious cycle. 
Utku felt bad about the limited time he spends with his children, but he did not consider 
taking any measures to change the situation either. Most Turkish fathers conceived 
childcare as mainly their wives’ responsibility. In some couples differing priorities 
concerning family and work led to important conflicts. One such case will be analyzed at 
the end of this section. 
 Compared to the Norwegian interviewees, the Turkish group in general reported 
fewer cases of stress and time pressure related to having small children and full-time 
work. There is a basic difference between the daily arrangements of the two groups: while 
all the Norwegian couples with children under school age use daycare centers, Turkish 
couples have full-time in-home care. Having a full-time caretaker at home reduces time-
pressures. The issue that needs careful planning and organization – namely delivering and 
picking up children from daycare centers, which is a pressing factor for Norwegian 
couples – is not a problem for most Turkish couples.   
 In general, long working hours, high stress levels and limited time left to spend 
together are common themes mentioned by many younger Turkish interviewees. Most 
older Turkish interviewees either are retired or have grown-up children, and therefore are 
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not experiencing problems now. But they all reflected on the difficulties they had earlier, 
especially when their children were small. The type and sector of work had more visible 
and dramatic effects in the lives of Turkish interviewees. Jobs in the private sector 
demand longer hours and are more stressful. Gender differences are also more visible. 
While most women talked about their experiences concerning the difficulty of combining 
motherhood and employment, few men talked about fatherhood/employment issues.    
 The couples who reported a balanced work and family life are those who receive full-
time support (either paid or unpaid) for childcare, and those who are able to adjust their 
work-hours with respect to children’s needs. Parents of small children who have a 
relatively high degree of flexibility at work appreciate this as an important benefit that 
enables them to reconcile work and family, especially childcare demands. Tulin (38) 
acknowledged the importance of having a certain amount of freedom in deciding one’s 
working hours:  
Does your work life influence your family life? 
No. Because in the firm where we work, there is a lot of work and sometimes 8 
hours is not enough.  But in return we can rearrange our working hours. Even 
though we can’t rearrange them for the whole day, I can say that it is pretty flexible 
compared to what is common... For example today, there was a meeting at the 
kindergarten for parents, so I left early. But I stayed longer yesterday to 
compensate for that. We can make such adjustments and this is a big advantage.  
Balancing work and family life is a pressing issue, especially when the couple has children 
under school age. Several of the older female Turkish interviewees took longer breaks 
from work after giving birth, due to the non-existence of good and affordable daycare. 
Those who reported that they have managed to reconcile work and family are the ones 
who had a network of support mechanisms, usually a combination of paid and unpaid 
helpers. Mine (62) explained how she managed to combine having two small children 
with working:  
I can say that I received quite traditional supports; such things are common in 
Turkish families...When my children were small, I received a lot of help from my 
mother. She did not stay with us or anything like that, but she was always present 
as a controlling agent. And we had a helper (caretaker) at home all the time...So I 
was very lucky, to have all that help...But I remember that it was a difficult period. 
But as a woman, I believe that you must carry on, even though it is one step 
forward, two steps back. I believe that one can conquer all the difficulties at work 
without neglecting the children.  
 Nermin (68) was not forced to interrupt her career, as she had a large support network 
and several paid helpers:  
Work was quite heavy in those days (1960s and 1970s). I had a helper who lived 
with us. In addition, there was a woman who came for cleaning 3 days a week. 
And also, two years after we got married my father-in-law passed away, so my 
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mother-in-law started living with us. Therefore, there was a grandmother present 
at home as well.  
The availability of private daycare centers has increased in the last decade. They are high 
quality, but also expensive. Younger couples choosing this alternative are the ones who 
do not have close family members in the same city and those who have high income 
levels. Having a full-time babysitter at home is a more affordable solution.  
Couples working in the private sector, in particular, mentioned the general problem of 
not finding enough time for themselves and their families due to their long work hours. 
Hale (30), mother of a 3-year-old boy, thinks that she is able to synthesize her career and 
family life, but this, at times, results in exhaustion:  
I think I manage to keep both work and family going, but of course this is very 
exhausting for me. I have nervous breakdowns from time to time. Right now I 
work in two different companies and sometimes at nights. And all of this work 
coincides with childcare, shopping and the like. I have no time to spare for myself. 
My job prevents me from getting sufficiently involved with my child. Fatigue and 
stress influence my relation to my husband as well, from time to time. I become 
more nervous and irritable at home…maybe it wouldn’t be like this if I had a 
more comfortable job.  
Both Ceyda (35) and Cemil (35) hold high managerial positions within demanding 
careers, and have always had long working days. After having a child, the time they have 
been able to reserve for themselves is almost non-existent:  
Ceyda: I did not work for 1.5 years after the birth, but we were abroad at that time. 
Cemil was attending a very intense school, and I was with Canan (their child) all the 
time. We did not have any time for ourselves... I started working again after we 
returned to Turkey, and now, because of my work and Canan, we do not have 
time for ourselves. And we have a mentality that is different from the general 
mentality in Turkey. For example, it is very common for people to leave their 
children with the grandmother and go out. We don’t do that. I mean, since the 
amount of time we spend with Canan is so limited, we do not want to use it for 
ourselves and leave her with somebody else. Therefore, we always try to plan to do 
things with the three of us, together…  
Having children is a major factor that disrupts the family/work balance by reducing the 
time available for each, and it is mainly women who talked about this issue. In Turkey, 
children are still seen as mainly the mother’s responsibility, and few men reflected on the 
difficulties of combining work and fatherhood. On the other hand, the problems women 
experienced in trying to combine motherhood and employment formed a recurrent 
theme. 
In Turkish society, motherhood has a high priority and a sacred status, while 
arrangements to help working mothers are limited. Unfavorable arrangements for 
childcare is a main factor driving many women out of the labor market. Elif (37), who 
has frequent contact with working women through her job, mentions some of the 
problems to which this group is exposed: 
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Working women are facing serious, really serious problems concerning how to 
secure care for their children. A portion of them give up working, if they do not 
have a very important contribution to the family budget. That is to say, until her 
child is old enough for kindergarten, the woman is restricted to the house and 
really goes through a depression. That sudden transition from work to home life, 
spending time only with a child, leads the woman to become depressed. 
Therefore, this is a very serious problem, the problem of reliable daycare where 
the working woman can deliver her child with confidence.  
Those women who have demanding careers that do not accommodate long breaks start 
working soon after giving birth, and this causes distress for many of them. Elif (37) 
belongs to this group of women and reflected on the specific problems she faced after 
having a child:  
The normal maternity leave was 42 days; I was working in the public sector then. I 
did not think that 42 days was enough, so I took 3 months unpaid leave…In fact I 
would have liked to have taken 6 months, and I felt the need to do that…but I 
thought, in terms of my profession, being away from work for too long would 
disadvantage me. I worried a lot at that point, and I remember it was so hard to 
start again…I mean when my child was 4 months old, I had no choice but to leave 
him to a foreign woman and go to work. Every morning I was deeply distressed. 
Ipek (35), mother of a 2-year-old baby, explained in detail how difficult it was for her to 
decide on having a child in the first place, and how the ‘masculine world of work’ started 
excluding her afterwards:    
After having children, you leave your career plans in the background…in fact it 
was very difficult for me to decide to have a child; my job was too important for 
me at some point in my life…I decided to have a child after I talked to many 
women, after a survey with many women (laughs). I asked: What is a child? What 
does it mean? Does it evoke a different emotion? Must it be experienced? I have a 
story, it is quite funny: In our work lives, we feel well adapted to working, feel a 
little masculinized... after a while, from your clothes to the way you walk, 
everything you are becomes a part of the masculine world. I mean you start 
identifying with it: you cut your hair short, wear suits, low-heels. I see similar 
characteristics in most of my friends. And one of them, who is also a woman who 
decided to have children very late – when she was 39 – said to me “Ipek, what is 
easier for women like us: to have an operation and become a man or to get 
pregnant and become a woman?” This was a very interesting question and it made 
a lot of sense to me…And after having a child, my career ambitions diminished, 
and at the same time, the work world starts excluding you. It is interesting, when 
you become a mom, you are diverted from a career, and this is not a pleasant 
thing. They (managers) say, “yes, you did a very sublime thing by becoming a 
mother,” on the one hand and imply, “stay away from career plans!” on the other, 
even though being a mother is not necessarily an obstacle. ...But they think that 
you can climb up the career-ladder only if your private life also becomes work, and 
maybe it is really like that (laughs)…in Turkish society, the world of work is a world 
of men. In the world of men, there are lobby activities, constant talking, politics, 
etc. But this can only be done if you have a lot of time. I mean you will both do 
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your work concretely, and have conversations with people and influence them 
politically. This can only be done if you do not have the problem of going home 
to your private life, only if your child is not waiting for you. You should be able to 
go out to dinner with your colleagues until late in the evening, and of course this is 
not a suitable condition for a mother of small children.   
Ipek’s story exemplifies the hidden mechanisms that function to exclude mother’s of 
small children from the labor market which is built on premises that “completely ignore 
private commitments.” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995: 96). Most women working in 
the competitive private sector in demanding careers have experienced similar problems 
related to the conflicting demands of the ‘world of work’ and the ‘world of home and 
family.’ Sevim (44), who had high ambitions at work, explained how she had to lower 
them due to the various difficulties she faced:    
After Sinan (their child) grew up a little, he started going to a daycare center. But of 
course the center closed early, so Sedat had to pick him up and take him to my 
mother’s house when I had meetings...Sometimes I came home very late. I heard 
many comments from my parents like ‘poor kid! He has to stay here until so late at 
night; he doesn’t have a proper home life.’ And all those things affect you, 
naturally. You cannot concentrate on your work... they push you to the edge. You 
come to the point of having to choose a preference. You have to decide: either an 
active career life or a proper family...It is very difficult for a woman to combine a 
family and child with a career. The family, the child and other invisible things 
prevent you from working intensively...Either you will be very insistent and say “I 
want to do this no matter the cost,” or you will make a choice. If you try to carry 
on both together, you wear yourself out, and both are left half done.  
The quotation above is a vivid example of the visible and invisible (attitudinal) barriers 
that women face in combining motherhood and an active work life. Sevim also explained 
how exhausting workdays influenced her relation to her son in the earlier years of her 
career:  
I have been in this profession for the last 20 years, and to tell the truth, now I have 
more comfortable workdays. I have much more time for myself now. But in our 
earlier years at work, we had a much faster tempo. I had to get up very early and 
run around the whole day…and stay at the office until 8 or 9 in the evening. In my 
working life, the thing that I have experienced as most difficult is going home so 
late. You come home exhausted and you don’t feel like doing anything at that 
hour. But you have to prepare dinner. My son would have returned from school 
by then, and he would want to tell me what happened in school. I would prepare 
meat on the pan and make the salad at the same time and say “yes, yes” to my son. 
And after a while he understood that I was not listening to him and he was very 
frustrated…So I went through a period of intense work, but I have been much 
more comfortable in the last 5 years. 
For a majority of the Turkish mothers combining full-time employment with 
motherhood feels like juggling that requires careful planning. Ceyda (37) mentioned how 
her thinking patterns changed after having a child:  
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And of course in planning, instead of thinking about, ‘me and my career,’ you start 
thinking about, ‘me, my career and the child’s school.’ Next to a very intense 
working life, you always think, ‘how is her school going today,’ or, ‘that book must 
be bought today,’ so there are always things that keep your mind busy.  
What are the specific measures taken when the family-work balance is disturbed? 
 5.2.1 Solutions/ Strategies/ Submissions 
Since the family/work balance is defined as a women’s (especially mothers’) problem in 
Turkey, it is usually women who develop strategies to restore a balance, to find more time 
to spend with their partners and children. Some of them decide (or are forced to) take 
long breaks from work after giving birth. Those who are ‘lucky’ find a balance by relying 
on help from both their mothers and paid caretakers.  
 The only solution Hale (30) sees to solve the problems she experiences in combining 
motherhood and work is to find a helper with good qualifications who would live with 
the family:  
What do you think could help you in balancing your work and home lives? 
A helper who could stay here for 24 hours. If I can find somebody who has the 
qualifications that I seek, I will want her to start immediately. That would be the 
only solution that would comfort me. 
While Hale sees the solution in hiring full-time household help, several other women 
decided to reach a better family/work balance by cutting back at work. 
Dilek (42) and Devrim(42) complain about the lack of time they have to spend 
together, and have decided to solve this problem by agreeing that Dilek will cut back at 
work. Devrim has ‘abnormal’ working hours, i.e. he works in the evenings and on 
weekends. Dilek works from morning to evening (5:30 p.m.) on weekdays. That is why 
they cannot see each other. She is not very fond of her job, while he likes his job and 
started earning a better salary in the last few years. The family now is not dependent on 
two full-time incomes. She will start working at 20 percent time, that is, one day a week. 
She states that this is an offer that nobody gets in the firm, and it will allow her to stay in 
contact with her workplace. Yet, she still conceives of this reduction as ‘quitting’:  
Dilek: There have been tasks at which I was very successful and which made me 
happy. But when I look at it in general, I can’t say, ‘oh, how happy I am to be 
working in this firm!’ And it was not so important anyway, since after putting our 
budget in order, I decided to leave my job at once, and this will happen next 
month. 
Devrim:...If we think about the conditions of today, the biggest imbalance in our 
family is that my wife and I are not together so much, that my working hours are a 
little too long.  
Dilek: So even though I am successful, I am quitting my job for the sake of love! 
...First, the firm resisted a lot, but in the end they agreed that I will come only 1 
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day a week, and this is not an offer that is given to anybody else. So even though I 
have been successful, I am leaving....We decided to increase the time we are 
together by adjusting to Devrim’s work rhythm.  
The fact that it is the woman adjusting to the man’s rhythm by stopping working has 
several related reasons in this case. The main factor is that her husband’s income is 
higher. In addition Dilek is not a career-oriented person and she was not very fond of her 
job. The couple did not problematize the gendered aspects of this decision. Dilek and 
Devrim preferred to explain the reason for this adjustment in romantic terms, instead of 
economic or gendered ones.  
Umut (39) decided to lower her ambitions at work and decrease her work hours after 
having her second child. She explains that having a second child was a conscious choice 
for her that she wanted very much, and therefore was willing to cut back at work and 
prioritize time with her newborn:  
I decided that I will not be very active at work and I will cut out the extra activities 
I had besides work...But this my own choice, I mean spending as much time as 
possible with my kid, especially in the first year. And my work allows for this; I 
have flexible work hours...Of course I run around in haste the whole day, but still 
I think that I have a more comfortable working life than those who work full-
time...I don’t feel that I am left behind in my career because I am a mother, but 
also, as I said before I don’t have very high ambitions either! 
As the accounts above reveal, Turkish couples use different strategies to reconcile their 
work and family lives. A common solution to restore the family-work balance when the 
problems arise is to cut back at work and lower ambitions, and this is primarily a 
gendered response carried out by women.  
 Some couples experience the family/work discrepancy as a major and chronic 
problem which mainly stems from economic necessity, combined with differences in 
priorities. I will conclude this section by presenting a case-study in which all of these 
issues stand out in bold relief.  
5.3 Case C: Figen and Faruk: Differing and Conflicting 
Gendered Priorities 
Both Figen (33) and Faruk (34) have the same level and type of education, but Faruk 
works at a private firm in which he is a partner and Figen has a lower-level job at another 
firm. She does not have high ambitions concerning work, but she enjoys doing it. Faruk 
spends long hours at work, usually until late in the evening.  
How important is your work? 
Faruk: Oh, I like my job!   
Figen: His job is his everything 
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Faruk: Yes, work is important. Because, according to me, people have certain 
pleasures in life, and doing something, accomplishing something is an important 
pleasure, an important excitement. Seeing that you have succeeded in something is 
very nice. I don’t get the same pleasure out of many other things...and our work is 
a little exciting, since you have deadlines counted in days and hours; the adrenaline 
rush is there, and I like that. It is very fun.  
To the woman: How is it for you? 
Figen: I am at work at 9 in the morning and leave at 6…I mean work is important 
for me, but not as important as it is for Faruk. I like my job and do it with 
pleasure, but it is not my whole life. I must have a private life apart from that. 
Work must have its place and must not transcend that. I must work until a certain 
time in the evening and then be able to do other private things. 
After giving birth to her first child 4 years ago, Figen decided to cut back at work. She 
stopped working for 3 and a half years and recently started working full-time again at a 
nearby company, after placing their child in a private daycare center in the neighborhood. 
Figen is critical of Faruk’s extreme attachment to work and Faruk is critical of Figen’s 
devotion to their child. They have different expectations related to work and family. The 
following conversation explicitly displayed their clashing priorities and expectations:   
Does work life ever affect family life? 
Figen: It affects it a lot. That is what affects our family most. I find his attachment 
to work extreme. This topic leads to problems between us. He thinks one way, I 
think another. Of course when he puts his thoughts into action, we have no 
coordination. The times we are at home, the times we see each other, they are 
never clear, they are inconsistent, and sometimes non-existent. Especially after 
having the child, I am quite sensitive on this issue, or to put it more correctly, I 
react more to this lack of coordination.  
Faruk: Yes, that’s right. This results in the fact that, Figen  and Filiz (their child) 
become a team, and I am a team alone. So it is divided exactly into two...  
Figen: Yes, that is really what happens, because I experience many things with 
Filiz. We became a duo, we both enjoy each other’s company, walking around 
together, playing at home…We do everything together and then come home to 
tell Faruk that we did this and that.  
Faruk: And I get pleased to hear these things and say ‘well done!’ (laughs) But 
Figen is very sensitive when it comes to the child.  
Figen: That is what Faruk thinks. He thinks that I am too sensitive and too 
involved.  
Faruk: But she is giving from herself while doing this. Like I said, I get pleasure 
from my work. Figen gets pleasure from the child.  He has become her most 
important goal in life. For example, when I say, let’s go somewhere, she first of all 
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thinks how she will leave Filiz. You can always find a solution for that, but she 
thinks that this will not be good for the child and she makes a 
sacrifice…Therefore, the child is very important for her. I mean it is the purpose 
of her life. 
Figen: It is not that much. The thing is you do not see the outcome, or the 
outcomes do not effect you.  
Faruk: And therefore we disagree a lot on these issues. I mean, she was more 
ambitious at work, but after the child she changed. For example, she interrupted 
her PhD… 
Figen: I think about that issue in this way: The birth of the child has distanced me 
from my profession, and I must now start everything from scratch. But at least it 
should be worth the sacrifice I made, at least the thing that comes into being will 
be better, that’s what I think.   
Due to their diverging priorities and expectations, Figen and Faruk live a divided life. 
Figen spends a lot of time with her child at home and Faruk with his colleagues at work. 
They criticize each others’ attitudes but cannot propose any way out of this dilemma 
either. They seem to have ‘agreed to disagree.’  
Faruk is an example of Hochschild’s respondents for whom, “home has become 
work and work has become home” (Hochschild 1997). He sees his work as a source of 
personal and social satisfaction. His colleagues are also his close friends, and they spend a 
lot of time together outside of work. He does not have clear boundaries between his 
work and his personal life. And Figen reminds him that he is able to maintain this style of 
living since he does not assume any responsibility in the care of their children.  
Faruk: I don’t want to live my life very programmed and scheduled. I think that I 
must be able to do things that I enjoy…Life should have some surprises. Instead 
of getting up, going to work at 9 and back to home at 6, and have such a routine, I 
want to experience surprises. That is why I like my job: you can face many 
problems and challenges.  
 Figen: But you have that comfort, you don’t need to go and pick the kid up at 6 
o’clock. You don’t have the obligation of preparing food for the kid at a given 
time. 
As this case makes perfectly clear, there are differences in women’s and men’s priorities, 
as well as opportunities, concerning the ways of balancing family and work.  
5.4 Cutting Back at Work: A Typical Feminine Response? 
A general look at the stories provided by both Turkish and Norwegian interviewees 
shows that balancing work and family is a significant area of concern for all the couples. 
The problems often manifest themselves in the form of overtime, which lead to conflicts 
at home. Such conflicts are often experienced as sources of stress in the daily lives of 
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these individuals. Parents of children under school age are specially exposed to time 
pressures. An important factor that reduces conflicts is a certain amount of flexibility at 
work that allows individuals to arrange their working hours according to family 
obligations and other priorities. Those interviewees who do not have the option of 
flexible work hours report higher levels of stress and strain. Among the Turkish 
interviewees, women had more to report on this issue, since the care of small children is 
still defined as mainly their responsibility. Women working in competitive environments 
in the private sector, in particular, are exposed to high levels of work-family conflicts. 
Both Norwegian women and men experience and reflect on clashing demands of work 
and family. The parents of children under school age, especially, report time-pressures. 
An interesting pattern emerges concerning young Norwegian mothers: all report a desire 
to decrease their working hours to spend more time at home with their children. In both 
Turkish and Norwegian groups, cutting back at work to meet the clashing demands of 
work and family lives appears as a women’s strategy of coping. 
 Compared to Turkish fathers, Norwegian fathers had much more to tell related to 
conflicts of combining parenthood and employment. The ways these young Norwegian 
fathers talk about childcare give hope about the possibilities of a development towards 
‘revolutionary parenting’ (hooks 2000). This necessitates new definitions of masculinity in 
which ‘caring’ is included as a positive trait. Equal responsibility for care taking also 
demands more opportunities for fathers’ involvement (Gerson 1993). Radical changes in 
the organizational logic of the workplaces in which caring responsibilities of all workers 
are acknowledged and social policies that support combination of parenthood and 
employment are needed. Norwegian state has been active in politicizing both fatherhood 
and motherhood in the last decade by policies that aim at changing the existing childcare 
practices (Ellingsæter 1999). In the next chapter we turn to a detailed analysis of the ways 




Chapter 6  State Gender Ideologies and 
Family Policies 
“Welfare states are centrally implicated in gender relations, both directly 
in the form of the orientations of their policies and indirectly in terms of 
norms that they embody and the processes they set in train as regards 
resource distribution among, and the appropriate roles of, men and 
women” (Daly 2000: 43).  
In this chapter, the state, which has been more in the background in previous chapters, 
will be the focus. The perspective I apply in approaching the Turkish and Norwegian 
states attempts to delineate their basic gendered aspects with a recognition of internal 
ambiguities and historical variations in their organizational logics, legal frameworks, and 
ideologies. States are complex wholes that comprise a set of bodies, each with its own 
rules, policies, and practices (Harding 1996). Given this complexity, the strategy I follow 
will be to limit my approach to legislation and policies that directly influence gender 
relations and family practices. The chapter is organized in four sections: In the first 
section, I will briefly introduce the general social security programs in Norway and 
Turkey in light of some existing comparative state policy models. In the second section, I 
will move to a more detailed analysis of basic gender-related legislation and institutions in 
the two countries. The third section will review specific family policies that are currently 
in place. In the fourth section, I will analyze interview accounts related to Turkish and 
Norwegian interviewees’ conceptualizations of and expectations from the state. The 
ultimate aim will be to reach an understanding of the ways different state policies are felt 
as enabling or constraining elements in the lives of the interviewees.  
6.1 Social Security Systems in Norway and Turkey 
Turkish and Norwegian states have differing organizational and ideological 
characteristics. The Republic of Turkey is constitutionally defined as a ‘democratic, 
secular, and social state.’ The first two fundamental aims and duties of the Turkish state, 
according to the Constitution are, ‘to safeguard the independence and integrity of the 
Turkish nation...and to ensure the welfare, peace, and happiness of the individual and 
society’ (Official internet pages).  
 The Constitution of Norway, on the other hand, does not make any reference to the 
welfare and happiness of its citizens. It declares that ‘the Kingdom of Norway is a free, 
independent indivisible and inalienable realm’ and mainly specifies the King’s power and 
responsibilities. A detailed analysis of constitutions will not be our concern here. Suffice it 
to say that the most striking difference between the two is the more modern and secular 
nature of the Turkish constitution, with its wider content. The Turkish Republic does not 
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have an official religion, while Article 2 of the Norwegian constitution specifies the 
Evangelical-Lutheran religion as the official religion of the State. The Norwegian 
Constitution has the same basic form as it did when it was laid down in 1814, and is not 
as detailed concerning social and economic rights as the Turkish Constitution, which was 
amended in 2001. 
 In this section, my main aim will be to compare the general social security policies of 
the two countries based on an analysis of different official documents. In this context, 
policy is understood as the ongoing actions of state organizations, which have a degree of 
stability and which affect people’s lives in significant ways. Social policy specifically is 
concerned with social purposes, including distribution of life chances, well-being, and 
quality of life (Harding 1996). 
 Even though specified as a constitutional duty, the goal of ensuring social security to 
all citizens has not yet been achieved by the ‘social’ Turkish State. The Norwegian State, 
on the other hand, is customarily referred to as a ‘welfare state.’ Before analyzing Turkish 
and Norwegian state policies in light of existing policy models, a note on the concepts of 
‘welfare state’ and ‘social rights’ will be in order.  
 The most essential element of a welfare state is governmental legislation that 
guarantees income maintenance and other support for citizens in case of occupational 
accidents, disease, old age and unemployment (Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1987). The 
concept of “social rights” is useful in analyzing  the bases of welfare states.  T. H. 
Marshall has distinguished three types of rights associated with the expansion of 
citizenship (O’Connor 1996: 49). Civil rights, refer to the rights of the individual in the 
eyes of the law – like freedom of speech and religion, the right to own property and the 
right to equal justice before the law. Political rights, refer to rights to participate in elections 
and to stand for public office. Social rights, refer to the freedom of every individual to 
enjoy a certain minimum standard of economic welfare and security. They include such 
rights as sickness benefits, social security in case of unemployment, and the setting of 
minimum-wage levels. The broadening of social rights is the basis for what has come to 
be called the welfare state. In their comparative analysis of welfare states, Esping-
Andersen and Korpi (1987) distinguish between a ‘marginal’ (residual) and an 
‘institutional’ model. The marginal model is premised on a commitment to market rule. 
In this model, governments play only a limited role in the distribution of welfare. The 
institutional model promotes the principle that all citizens should be equally entitled to a 
decent standard of living. The policy model in Turkey shows marginal model 
characteristics, due to its basic commitment to market sovereignty and conceptualization 
of state support as a last resort. Norway, on the other hand, exemplifies the institutional 
model, since the welfare of the individual is seen as the responsibility of the social 
collective.  
 According to the welfare state models identified by Esping-Andersen (1990) that 
were reviewed in Chapter 2, Norway can be classified as belonging to the social 
democratic regime, while Turkey displays both liberal and conservative characteristics. In 
Norway, the basic principles of the welfare model are universalism, decommodification 
of social rights, and equality at a high level of social welfare (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). 
‘Decommodification’ refers to degree to which social rights permit people to meet their 
living standards independent of pure market forces. In Turkey, liberal elements are 
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dominant: benefits are modest and the state encourages reliance on the market. 
Decommodification effects are minimal. However, a commitment to the preservation of 
traditional family structures – with indirect support of the male-breadwinner/female-
housewife family model – signal the existence of conservative elements. These features 
will be analyzed in detail in section 6.3.   
 Actual social expenditures of the two countries confirm these differences: according 
to the World Labor Report (2000), total social security expenditure as a percentage of 
total public expenditure was 27 percent for Turkey and 57.7 percent for Norway.  In 
1996, Turkey used 5 percent of its Gross Domestic Product for social protection 
benefits. The corresponding percentage for Norway was 19 percent.  
 Norway has a comprehensive and universal social security program. All persons in 
residence or working in Norway are compulsorily insured by the Norwegian Social 
Insurance Scheme (NIS) (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs Documents). Persons 
insured under the NIS are entitled to old-age, survivors’, and disability pensions, as well 
as occupational injury, single parent, sickness, maternity, and medical benefits. NIS is 
financed by contributions from employees, self-employed persons, employers and the 
state. The contribution rate of employees is 7.8 percent of pensionable income. The NIS 
combines universalist and employment-related benefits. Old-age pensions are made up of 
two parts, a basic pension and a supplementary, income-related pension. All residents are 
guaranteed a minimum income when reaching the age of 67, irrespective of previous 
income or contributions. Housewives had the right for basic pensions prior to 1992, yet 
in that year, a revolutionary change took place, enabling unpaid caretakers to earn 
entitlement to supplementary pensions if they provided care for children under the age of 
seven, or for sick or elderly persons who were not in institutional care (Leira 1996: 29).   
 In Turkey, old age pensions cover employees and their dependent spouses, and 
presuppose a minimum period of contribution of the employee27. Housewives are 
covered as ‘dependent spouses’ only if their spouses are employed. In 1999, the social 
security law underwent a major review, and two important changes took place: the 
retirement age was increased from 55 to 60 for men and from 50 to 58 for women. 
Minimum contribution periods were also increased. A positive development was the 
implementation of unemployment insurance, which had been lacking until that date. In 
her analysis of the social security system in Turkey and women’s place in it, Zirhli (2000) 
mentions that this new law does not solve the problems of women who are housewives 
or unpaid agricultural family workers. These two groups together form the majority of 
women in Turkey, and both groups lack direct social security coverage. She criticizes neo-
liberal attempts to limit further Turkish social rights, which are already among the least 
developed globally, rendering Turkey ‘one of the weakest welfare states of the world’ 
(Zirhli 2000: 109).   
                                                     
27 There are three major social security institutions in Turkey. A significant part of wage earners in 
manufactirng, industry and service sectors are under the social security program of Social Security 
Institute (SSK). The Pension Fund (Emekli Sandiği) provides security to civil servants and Bağ-
Kur is the institution covering self-employed.  
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 Let us now move on to an analysis of some of the gender related legislation and 
gender-equality institutions of the Turkish and Norwegian States.  
6.2 Gender-Equality Policies and Machinery 
Turkey and Norway display significant differences when their legal framework is analyzed 
with a gender perspective. In both countries legislative action has been central to 
promote  gender-equality, yet the strength and the contents of the policies show great 
variation. 
6.2.1 Turkey: Positive Changes and Remaining Ambiguities 
Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution states that, ‘all individuals are equal without 
discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, color, sex, political opinion, 
philosophical belief, religion or sect.’ However, an analysis of specific legislation yields a 
picture in which the gender-equality principle is violated. In what follows, I will provide 
examples of ambiguities and gender-inequalities existing in the legal framework, as well as 
in the operating ideologies of certain state institutions.  
Until recently, the Turkish Civil Code, which was revolutionary at the time of its 
adoption in 1926, included clauses that supported a traditional gender role ideology and a 
male-breadwinner/female-housewife family model:  
 Article 154: The husband has the legal standing to represent the conjugal union.  
 Article 152/2: The husband chooses the domicile and duly provides for the 
maintenance of wife and children.  
 Article153/1: The wife acquires the husband’s surname. 
 Article153/2: The wife, to the extent of her ability, must assist the husband by word 
and deed in his effort to maintain the home; the wife is responsible for household 
management. 
These articles have been the subject of numerous feminist analyses that criticized the 
ways they function to preserve the sexual division of labor and institutionalize women’s 
social and economic dependence on men (e.g. Arat 1994).  
 After contentious negotiations and decades of delays due to successful obstructions 
by conservative politicians, the Civil Code was finally amended in 2001. The clauses 
mentioned above were terminated or rephrased in gender-egalitarian terms. According to 
these changes, each spouse can represent the conjugal union: the ‘head of the household’ 
clause is eliminated. Women can use their own surname, but only as a second name in 
front of their husband’s surname. Earlier, the legal age for marriage was 17 for men, and 
15 for women. Now, the legal age is equal for both spouses at 18.  
 The clause related to sharing property after divorce was the one that was most 
heatedly discussed during the amendment negotiations. Earlier, the law provided for a 
separation of matrimonial property. Under this regime, women often suffered severe 
economic problems after divorce, since a majority of women were housewives and it was 
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customary to register property in the name of the man. With the new regulations, 
property acquired during the marriage is to be shared equally in cases of divorce.  
 As another positive step towards legal gender equality, Turkey has removed all its 
reservations from the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 2000. The reservations were based on the 
clauses of the Civil Code presented above, which had to be amended before a full 
acceptance of the Convention. Apart from the Civil Code, which had non-egalitarian 
articles that have been recently eliminated, the Criminal Code and the Labor Law also 
include gender discriminatory articles: 
 The Turkish Criminal Code differentiates between rape of minors, rape of adults, and 
rape that violates virginity. There is a more severe punishment for violation of virginity.28 
Article 17 of the Labor Law allows employers to cancel work contracts in case of 
pregnancy or birth. Due to this article, Turkey has not yet accepted the ILO convention 
(no.103) prohibiting the firing of women workers during the period in which they use 
maternity leave. 
 A positive development has been the annulment of an article of the Criminal Code 
that defined adultery separately for the husband and wife. The earlier version of the law 
stated that ‘a married woman can be charged with adultery if she has had sexual 
intercourse with a man other than her husband only once.’ For the husband, a continual 
and prolonged relationship with another woman must be proven. In 1999 both articles 
on adultery were annulled: adultery is no longer punishable by law.   
 Another step towards gender equality was taken with a change in the tax system.  
Earlier, in accordance with the practice of defining a ‘head of the household,’ the couple 
forming the household had to submit a single tax declaration. In that system, the tax rate 
was calculated by adding the income and property of both the husband and wife. This 
joint taxation led to injustices for dual-earner couples until 1998, when the law was 
changed and married women were allowed to submit a personal tax declaration. 
 All of these positive developments took place thanks to small but aggressive feminist 
organizations and the works of the General Directorate on the Status and Problems of 
Women (DGSPW) that was established in 1990. The Directorate operates with a gender-
egalitarian (at times radical feminist) gender ideology, and has been an active agent in 
initializing and coordinating social research and political activities on the basic problems 
of Turkish women, despite its limited budget and ambiguous institutional position. 
 A final note before concluding this limited analysis of the gender-related 
controversies and ambiguities existing in Turkish laws, regulations and official 
institutions: after the last elections, the coalition government decided to appoint a male 
director to the Directorate (DGSPW). Feminists criticized this decision while the 
government defended it, claiming that it is ‘gender discriminatory’ to argue that a man 
cannot understand the problems of women. I see this incident as another example of 
                                                     
28 Due to this legislation and existence of taboos on pre-marital sexuality, virginity tests and 
surgeries take place in Turkey. These practices have been subject to many popular discussions as 
well as scientific research (e.g. Cindoğlu 1997).  
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gender insensitivity, mainly caused by a naive ‘equality’ orientation and ignorance of the 
multifarious dimensions of gender.  
6.2.2 Norway: Legal and Institutional Steps Towards Gender Equality 
Norway has developed rather strong instruments for the promotion of gender equality in 
the last three decades. The Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, since 1972, has had 
the coordinating and initiating responsibility for gender equality (Report 1994). The 
Ministry manages shelters and hot lines for battered women and incest centers, and also 
administers funding to women’s NGOs. The Ministry is also responsible for childcare 
policies, parental leave and related policies, and measures that seek to reconcile work and 
family life. 
 According to the Gender Equality Act of 1979, all public authorities are obliged to 
promote gender equality in all areas of society. On this basis, gender mainstreaming has 
been applied since 1986. This means that all Ministries are expected to integrate a gender 
perspective and the goal of gender equality in policy formulation, decision-making, and 
executive procedures at all levels and in all policy areas. Gender mainstreaming is a 
strategy for creating awareness of gendered societal processes and outcomes (Ellingsæter 
1999). A committee of State Secretaries on gender equality has been set up in order to 
reinforce the mainstreaming strategy. The Gender Equality Ombud and the Gender 
Equality Complaints Board enforce the Gender Equality Act.   
 The Gender Equality Act, which was put into practice in 1979, prohibits 
discrimination between men and women, as well as treatment which in reality has the 
effect of placing one sex at an unreasonable disadvantage. Its  purpose is twofold: to 
eliminate direct discrimination and to influence attitudes. The law allows for affirmative 
action, that is, differential treatment that promotes gender equality. Affirmative action has 
mainly been implemented in favor of women, to secure their representation in male-
dominated areas (National Report 1994). The law is presently under revision, especially to 
strengthen the clause on equal pay for equal work, which does not function effectively in 
practice (National Report 1999). 
 As a result of these collective steps, Norwegian legislation is gender-neutral and active 
mainstreaming policies have helped women become better represented in politics, the 
labor market, and educational institutions, though full equality has not yet been achieved. 
6.3 Family Policies 
Concerning family policies, there are significant differences between Turkey and Norway, 
both in terms of their conceptualizations of “family” and in terms of the level of support.  
 Even though Article 41 of the Turkish Constitution declares that, ‘family is the 
foundation of Turkish society,’ specific policies to support families are not well 
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developed.29 Family is still conceptualized as predominantly ‘private’ and the state is 
supposed to step in only as a last resort in cases of extreme poverty or violence. In 
general, the prevailing gender regime underlying family policies in Turkey can be labeled 
‘familialistic’: the assumption that childcare and care of the elderly can and should be met 
within the family leads to low levels of public provision. Norway, on the other hand, is 
characterized by an ‘individualistic’ gender regime, since state provisions for childcare and 
elder care are based on the assumption that everyone will be in paid employment (Drew 
et al. 1998: 3). In Norway, problems related to having children are defined as social 
problems, and the welfare state is seen as a responsible agent in offering support to all 
parents. In Turkey, on the other hand, these problems are defined as primarily private, 
and the state is conceived of as responsible for help only for the poorest families.  
 According to the family policy models identified by Anne Helene Gauthier (1996), 
Turkey can be classified under the “Pro-family but non-interventionist model” while 
Norway fits into the “Pro-egalitarian model.” In what follows, I will provide the reasons 
for these classifications, mainly by focusing on cash benefits (family allowances, means-
tested family benefits, tax relief for dependent children) and work-related benefits 
(maternity/parental leave, childcare leave) as key indicators for family policies (Gauthier 
1996: 10).  
6.3.1 No Policies to Support ‘the’ Turkish Family  
The Turkish State does not have a definite family policy, other than a minimum-security 
offer to families in need. In 1990, a General Directorate of Family and Social Research,  
which mainly operates within a traditional family ideology, was established. Its main aim 
has been specified as, ‘contributing to the formation of a national family policy by 
carrying out projects to strengthen and preserve the unity of the Turkish family and 
developing policies to increase its welfare,’ (FRC 1991: 88, my translation and emphasis). 
Historically, the practice of referring to this institution in the singular, as the Turkish 
family, and attaching well-defined ideals, moral rules, and values to its structure and 
functioning has been prevalent in both official documents and popular discourse. At the 
institutional level, the concept of the Turkish family to which the official documents refer 
is the traditional, nuclear family, preferably with a housewife mother and a breadwinner 
father. According to the family ideology with which they are operating, divorces, 
cohabitation without formal marriage, single parenthood and homosexuality are all 
‘deviations’ from the normal (ibid.: 19).  
 As the underlying aim of the Directorate makes clear, a national family policy is yet to 
be developed in Turkey, since the existing social services directed to families are 
‘disorganized and lacking standards’ (FRC 1991: 255). 
 In Turkey, being married and having children are not factors that influence tax ratios 
(FRC 1991: 386). State employees receive a meager lump sum in relation to childbirth, for 
                                                     
29 Together with the recent amendments of Turkish Constitution in 2001, a gender-egalitarian note 
was added to this article: ‘The family is the foundation of the Turkish society and based on the 
equality between the spouses’.  
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a maximum of two children. Official demographic politics is anti-natalism in Turkey since 
1965 (DGSPW 1998).  
 Mothers working in the public sector are entitled to a leave of absence 6 weeks 
before and 6 weeks after birth. Maternity benefits during this time equal 66 percent of 
monthly earnings. Insured women (who have paid an insurance premium for a minimum 
of 90 days before birth) and non-insured wives of insured men are eligible for maternity 
leave. Mothers may also take unpaid leave for up to 6 months.30  
 As a result of the strength of an ideology that assumes the care for younger children 
and the elderly should be carried out by families (i.e. women), publicly financed 
kindergartens and institutions for the elderly are few in number and have low standards.  
 A gender-sensitive analysis of the legislation of Social Insurance Institution (SSK), 
shows the traditional gender role assumptions built into the structure: the social insurance 
system functions with a male-breadwinner family ideology, providing women 
entitlements as dependants. Both children and one’s parents can be defined as 
‘dependant,’ as long as they cannot provide their own livelihood. However, the law 
discriminates between the boy and the girl child. Boys lose the right to be covered by 
their father’s insurance when they reach the age of 18 (21 if they are students) while girls 
are covered until they are married, or start working, regardless of age. The underlining 
logic of this formulation is based on the expectation that girls will most probably pass 
from their father’s coverage to their husband’s. Boys, on the other hand, are supposed to 
be the breadwinners of their future families and are encouraged to find their own 
employment and individual coverage right after they reach the age of 18.   
6.3.2 Norwegian Policies Supporting Parents and Children, not ‘the’ Family 
Norwegian Welfare State’s official ideology is “gender equality in both public and private 
spheres” (National Report 1999) and there is a close link between family and gender 
equality policies. Family policies in Norway have the main purpose of offering financial 
support to all parents and to make it easier to combine employment and parenthood. 
Questions related to changes in family structures and gender relations rank high on the 
political agenda in Norway. As argued by several researchers (Hernes 1988, Leira 1996), 
discussions around the family within Scandinavia have a special tone due to the more 
‘public’ character of families. In the Scandinavian welfare model, the issues of care for 
dependents and of combining parenthood and employment are defined as public issues, 
and the state is seen as a responsible agent in offering support in these areas. State 
interference in family matters is widely accepted (Leira 1996). The equality ideal, which 
includes gender equality, underlies formulations of Scandinavian welfare policies. 
Generally, the state is expected to redistribute economic resources, power, and influence 
among social classes and regions, as well as between genders (Leira 1996: 9).  
                                                     
30 Currently, there is a law draft proposing lengthening of the leave period as 6 weeks before and 
12 weeks after birth (total 18 weeks paid leave) and arranging unpaid leave as ‘paternity leave’ to 
enable fathers to share the leave.  
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 Norwegian law seldom refers to ‘the family’ as a unit, but deals rather with the rights 
and duties of individuals who are related to one another by ties of descent or marriage, or 
by legal contracts (Leira 1996). The Marriage Act contains an explicit assumption that 
spouses are under a reciprocal obligation to economic maintenance. The Children and 
Parents’ Act assumes that parents are under the obligation to maintain their dependent 
children, but not the adult children. On the other hand, adult children have next to no 
formal obligations towards their aging parents.31 Parents of children under the age of 12 
are entitled to a tax allowance for childcare.  
 In the 1970s and 1980s, Norwegian family policies tended to provide support for 
women in their traditional roles as full-time housewives (Wærness 1994). In contrast to 
the rest of Scandinavia, the large-scale investment in public childcare in Norway came too 
late to facilitate mothers’ entrance into the labor market. However, starting in the early 
1990s, important reforms took place with the general purpose of enabling both parents to 
combine employment and parenthood responsibilities. Policies are based on a model of a 
symmetric family of two worker-caretakers (Ellingsæter 1999).  
 The period of paid parental leave was gradually extended, and in 1993 was set at 42 
weeks with full pay, or 52 weeks on an 80 percent wage.32 Three weeks before and six 
weeks after birth are reserved as mother quota. A new father quota – 4 weeks’ paid leave 
which cannot be transferred to the mother – was introduced in 1993. Though fathers had 
the opportunity to share paid leave with mothers earlier, only 2 % of them took 
advantage of it. After the introduction of this quota, which cannot be transferred to the 
mother, the percentage of fathers taking leave increased to 80 % (Ellingsæter & Hedlund 
1998). Studies show that the likelihood that a father will use the quota increases when the 
mother works full-time and earns a relatively high income (Brandth & Överli 1998). If 
the father chooses not to make use of his four weeks, the weeks must be forfeited. In 
2000, the National Insurance Act has been amended to allow the father to receive 
parental benefits based on his own rights regardless of whether the mother has earned 
rights in the labor market. 
 There are two weeks of unpaid ‘daddy leave’ in connection with childbirth. Parents 
have the right to unpaid leave for up to 2 years. Each parent with a sick child under the 
age of 12 has the right to 10 days of fully paid leave per year. Parents with more than 2 
children are entitled to 15 days each.  
 A “time-account” scheme allows parents to take portions of their paid leave in 
combination with part-time work. Parents have the opportunity to work shorter hours 
without a reduction in income until the child is two or three years old. This scheme was 
introduced in 1994, but has not been widely used. In 1998, only 2,6 per cent of the 
                                                     
31 A clause in the family legislation mandating children’s responsibility for the care of their old 
parents was abolished in the 1960s. Ve Henriksen and Holter (1978) argue that the attempt to shift 
the responsibility for the old and the ill from the family to the public sphere was perhaps the most 
radical political measure toward a ‘functional draining’ of the family (Ve Henriksen and Holter 
1978: 56).  
32 Women who do not qualify for parental leave receive a lump sum grant which was around 3.500 
Euros in 2000. 
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mothers and 0,8 percent of the fathers used the time account (Holter & Brandth 1999). 
Insufficient information about the scheme and a low degree of flexibility in relation to 
regulations were mentioned as main problems inhibiting the use of the time-account 
scheme (Holter & Brandth 1999). 
 In 1998, a new ‘cash for home care’ (Kontantstøtte) policy was introduced. This policy 
implies that parents can choose a cash benefit instead of a daycare center if they want to 
take care of their children themselves. The arrangement entitles all parents who have 
children between 1 and 3 years of age, who do not use state sponsored childcare, the 
same amount of money as the state subsidy per child.33 
 Childcare policies have been controversial in Norway. The official childcare policy 
has been declared as providing full coverage in state subsidized daycare centers (National 
Report 1999) however there is a historical legacy of a lack of political consensus on the 
issue of public childcare (Ellingsæter 1999). Daycare institutions for children over 3 years 
of age have traditionally been more widely accepted than for those under 3. The new 
‘cash for home care’ policy has been one of the hottest topics in social policy debates 
(Wærness 1998). Feminists are divided in terms of their evaluations of this policy. Some 
argue that the reform is a positive development since it implies that more money will be 
transferred into the field of childcare and it may offer better choices, especially for 
women in low paid, unattractive jobs (e.g. Wærness 1998). Others interpret the policy as a 
potential threat to gender equality through a weakening of women’s labor-market 
relations (Ellingsæter 1999). Another critical claim is that this reform will lead to a 
decrease in public support for childcare centers and a potential increase in the 
unregulated informal market of private caretakers (Ellingsæter & Hedlund 1998). A 
recent evaluation of the reform documents that cash-for-care policy did not have 
significant effects, neither on the work and time-use patterns of parents, nor on the 
implementation and demand for state-subsidized day care centers (Knudsen and 
Wærness 2001).   
 6.4 State Gender Ideologies: Historical Transformations and 
Ambiguities 
As the brief analysis of family policies in Turkey and Norway make clear, though it is 
possible to identify a dominant ‘gender policy regime’ (Sainsbury 1999) at a given point in 
time, state policies concerning gender have been historically variable and often 
ambiguous. 
 In Norway, the family model that welfare policies support has changed in the last 
decade. In the 1970s and 80s, the basic ideology was reducing women’s dependence on 
individual men by providing them public support in their traditional roles as mothers. In 
the 1990s, the family model with which state policies operated was a dual-breadwinner 
family, in which both parents are supposed to work in the labor market and care for their 
                                                     
33 This amount was ca. 375 Euros per month in 2002. 
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children at the same time. Apart from these historical variations, there are also 
ambiguities concerning interpretations of family policies exemplified by the new ‘cash for 
home care’ reform. In the Norwegian context, “care” is expanding as a basis for social 
citizenship rights. However, different rights to care, such as parental leave vs. cash-for-
care, might have different implications for the gendered division of labor (Ellingsæter 
1999). 
 According to Sainsbury (1999), the strength of the Christian parties and the resulting 
party alliances promote ambiguous policies and a mix of separate-gender roles and social 
democratic regimes in Norway.  
 As Mósesdóttir (1995) indicates, the policies of the state may be inconsistent from 
one time to another and from one department to another. In Turkey, the existence of the 
General Directorate on the Status and Problems of Women and the General Directorate 
of Family and Social Research in two floors of the same building, under the same 
Ministry, operating with totally different gender ideologies exemplifies the ambiguities 
that state gender ideologies may take.  
 Traditionally, there have been gender-discriminatory articles in the Civil Code that 
violate the gender-egalitarian clauses of the Turkish Constitution. In 2001, the Civil Code 
was amended and the clauses that advocated a male-breadwinner/ female-housewife 
model have been replaced with those advocating gender equality in the family. How 
much these legal changes will influence cultural practices is a question that can only be 
answered in time. The increasing popularity of the Islamic parties that support separate 
gender roles will introduce further complexities to the already existing ambiguities 
concerning the construction of gender relations in legislation in Turkey.     
6.5 States in the Lives of Individuals 
A comparative look at Turkey and Norway provides the opportunity to study how 
different state policies interacting with cultural and institutional formations operate as 
enabling and constraining structures in the lives of individuals. The dual-career, urban 
couples of this study live in contexts which are infused – to varying degrees – by 
expectations and regulations related to gender relations and assumptions about ‘normal’ 
families.  
 States influence family practices and gender relations through a variety of means that 
include specific family policies, institutions of gender equality, and legal frameworks with 
well-defined or ambiguous gender ideologies. These factors, which were analyzed above, 
can be seen as the ‘supply’ side of the state-family-individual relationships. The ‘demand’ 
side of this relationship can be analyzed through studying people’s expectations directed 
at the state, in terms of social policy issues in general, and family-related policies in 
particular. 
 Both the actual ways the state is organized and people’s conceptualizations related to 
the state as an institution differ considerably in Turkey and Norway. A question in the 
interview guide was designed to learn about what individuals expect from the state. The 
formulation of the question was easier for the Norwegian context. As a matter of fact, 
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the key position that the welfare state had in the lives of the Norwegian women in my 
prior comparative study (Sümer 1998) is what compelled me to include a state-centered 
question in the current interview schedule. Most Norwegian women that I interviewed 
previously had high expectations from the state: as a source of educational finance, a 
potential employer, a promoter of gender equality, and a childcare supplier. For the 
Turkish group, on the other hand, the key institution providing support was still the 
family, and the state was a distant entity.  
 Based on these findings, I was curious to analyze in a more detailed manner both the 
different ways states are conceptualized and the ways actual policies operate in the two 
countries. Apparently, this question was more relevant for the lives of the Norwegian 
group, who live in a social context highly influenced by the policies of the institutional, 
social democratic welfare state. In the Turkish context, the state is defined as a ‘social 
state,’ yet the range of its policies is far from universal. Family and gender-equality 
policies especially, which are fondly discussed by Norwegians, are close to being non-
existent. There must be a realistic supply-side for an individual to develop demands and 
expectations. Accordingly, the question of the state fits the realities of Norwegian 
respondents better, and had to be formulated differently in Turkish and Norwegian. Yet, 
this fact does not make an analysis of the answers provided less interesting.  
6.5.1 Great Expectations Directed to the Norwegian Welfare State 
I asked to the Norwegian interviewees what they thought about welfare state policies in 
general and what they personally expected from the state in particular.  
Most Norwegians mentioned the merits of having a system that functions as a basic 
security-net. Lars (36), for example, expected that the state will ‘lift him up’ if he falls out 
of the system in one way or another:   
Expectations from the state…it is hard to say, because it is so context-dependent, 
right? In a way, you expect that, if you fall out of the system in one way or 
another, you will be picked up again.  
Some of the respondents compared Norway with countries that do not have an extensive 
social security system to explain what they appreciated most in Norway:  
Inger (58): We pay high taxes for it, but I have always thought that it is worth it to 
have that safety net. We have, after all, lived in the USA and seen what happens 
when society does not provide security. So we have been positive about it all the 
time.  
Bjarne (57): We have traveled around and seen other countries, especially 
Mediterranean countries, and have understood how important it is that people 
have managed to build up such a safety net in this country… It is enormously 
valuable in a society to have that security, to have the safety that if young families 
have problems making ends meet, there are arrangements.  
The interview accounts above also show that most Norwegians conceive of the existing 
welfare model as an arrangement that concerns everybody, not only as a system for the 
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poor. Some of the interviewees, however, mentioned that they have good economic 
resources and therefore not much need for welfare state policies:  
Grete (33): The way we have it now, in our situation, we are well off and have no 
need to complain about anything. But we are persons who have more than 
adequate means and who earn a good living, so in that way we don’t have much 
use for the welfare state.  
While a majority of the interviewees were positive regarding the general principles upon 
which the welfare model is built, many also mentioned the fact that policies do not always 
function in practice as is claimed on paper. Bente (52) thinks that the welfare state is 
important, especially for women, since state policies have been crucial in making it easier 
for women to work in the labor market. However, she also added that some 
arrangements do not work as they should:  
I think that we have many good arrangements, but they don’t always function 
equally well for all individuals... There is often a group that falls out of the system, 
because one must really be quite strong to secure one’s rights...One must have up-
to-date knowledge of the rules and regulations, and one must also have the means 
to be able to make all the phone calls and write all the letters. But having the 
welfare state is good because the alternative would be to stand all alone penniless 
when something happens. Or of course, relying on the family is an alternative, but 
then you are dependent on having a family which can help. And not all families 
can. So, in principle, the welfare state is good.  
Appreciating the general principles upon which the welfare state is built, some 
interviewees talked about specific policies of which they were especially fond or critical. 
The policies that were most commonly mentioned by Norwegian interviewees were 
longer leaves of absence related to childbirth, subsidized childcare centers, care of the 
elderly, and free healthcare services.  
 The most valued policy is the one that allows parents, especially mothers, to combine 
having small children with work. One year long paid maternity leave is mentioned as a 
‘big benefit’ by all Norwegian women and some men as well. Jorunn, a thirty-five year-
old mother of one, especially likes the way leave of absence policies function almost 
automatically, without leaving much bureaucratic work to parents:  
Maternity leave is very nice. Having the opportunity to be at home one year is 
after all a big benefit. And it is very well established; it functions well, that you 
have a child and you get the money without doing much about it.  
Grete (33) thinks that the long maternity leave is such a good benefit that it certainly 
makes other countries jealous: 
Established leave of absence arrangements are a great advantage. If you think 
about Norway compared to other countries, it is totally fantastic that we can be at 
home with the child with full salary for 1 year. I think this is something that most 
countries in the world are jealous about. I feel that I was very privileged to be able 
to do it.  
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Magne (37), who is a father of two children, used his ‘quota’ of  one month leave of 
absence for both of his kids, and appreciated this arrangement: 
I think getting a leave of absence for the first year is very nice. Even when the kid 
is one year old, it feels a little early to deliver them to the daycare center, but it 
works out. I think that having that arrangement is very good.  
Older Norwegian women compare their own experiences of combining motherhood and 
employment with the present conditions, and identify the positive developments:  
Bente (52): In the years when I had small children, we had maternity leave but it 
was much shorter than it is now. I think it was 3 months, or something like 
that…From a woman’s perspective, without some of the welfare arrangements we 
have, it would be much more difficult for women to come out to work.  
This field, namely state support for families with small children, is also characterized by 
high expectations. Acknowledging the benefits of existing policies, some interviewees 
specified extensions or new policy directions that they would like to see. For example, 
Ann (34) mentioned that she would like to see more policies that aim at making fathers 
more active in childcare:  
I think we have good leave of absence arrangements. But the only thing that I find 
unfair is that the man’s opportunity to take leave depends on the woman’s 
attachment to the labor market…I wish that was different. It has been all right for 
us, because I have worked all the time, so there was no problem. But for example 
students: if the mother is a student, the father does not get any leave of absence, 
and I think that is wrong.  
Hilde (49) also valued the existing policies but thought that more action is needed to 
increase men’s participation in childcare:  
We have gained very good welfare provisions. If you look at the rights gained in 
relation to pregnancy and childbirth, at the time when I had my first child in 1975, 
the leave of absence was 3 months... And now, we have 48 weeks with full 
compensation, so it is quite a lot of progress. The fact that the authorities have put 
so much pressure on the fathers to take their share, I think is also 
positive...because if women always take that 1 year at home, maybe with 2 or 3 
children, then it is very easy for them to fall off the ‘merry-go-round.’34 So, I 
believe we still have things to resolve, when it comes to fathers taking care of their 
children more and mothers letting them. I see it this way: Norway needs lots of 
labor power, and now that women go to university, it is important that their 
education gets used, and that it is not only the male half of society that manages to 
hang on and use what they know and get paid for it.   
State-subsidized childcare centers were among the most commonly mentioned and 
appreciated benefits related to the welfare state, though most Norwegians also mentioned 
that they expect more in this area. Mona (35) and Magne (37) were very satisfied with the 
                                                     
34 A metaphor for the labor market. 
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state-subsidized daycare center they use for their two children, yet they had even higher 
expectations:  
Mona: There are many good (childcare) arrangements...but they do not have full 
coverage in daycare centers, for example, and that is negative... Also, we wanted to 
share the leave of absence more equally, but since I did not have a job at the time 
of birth, we did not have the right to do that. I could not both receive 
unemployment insurance and share the maternity leave. 
Magne: And even though I am very fond of the daycare center, and think that it is 
worth every penny we pay, it is still terribly expensive...Even though our economic 
means are adequate, childcare expenses are very visible in the total budget. And it 
gets absurd to think that, under the new cash-for-care policy, we would earn 7000 
Crones a month if we decided to let our kids be taken care of by a babysitter! I 
think that is scary politics.    
The policy to which Magne referred, the recently introduced ‘cash-for-care’ reform, 
received negative comments from several other interviewees. Several interviewees argued 
that this was an ‘unfair’ arrangement, since, they believe, some of the parents use the 
money to hire a nanny instead of staying at home themselves. Another factor that has 
influenced interviewees’ attitudes is the fact that they have high incomes, and the amount 
of cash they would receive under such an arrangement is not sufficient for them to prefer 
it. Some interviewees conceived of this reform as a ‘backlash,’ policy that is designed to 
send women back into the home. For example, Henrik (50) was highly critical of this new 
arrangement:  
There are many welfare arrangements which are good. But recently there has been 
a lot of talk of forcing women down, I mean down the spiral that they have 
climbed up... I think that the cash-for-care arrangement is a terrible thing, for 
example. In a way, it is a plan for women to go back to the role they had one 
generation ago. 
Another issue that was mentioned by several of the interviewees was care of the elderly. 
While many appreciate the existence of well-developed institutions for the elderly, some 
mention that they sometimes feel guilty for ‘leaving the old mother to the care of the 
state.’ Jarle (36) reported that he was worried about the development in this area:  
I think it is very good that care for the elderly is public and available for 
everybody. But I am also worried about how this has developed in relation to 
taking care of one’s own parents or grandparents. Maybe there is a tendency to 
work very hard to place them in an institution...Some have very little contact with 
their parents, and this leads to a lot of loneliness and depression among the 
elderly.  
The accounts above exemplify that most Norwegians have concretely formulated 
expectations related to welfare state policies and a relatively homogeneous understanding 
of the state. 
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6.5.2 Turkish Interviewees and the Distant State 
The question related to the state was harder to answer for Turkish interviewees. Some of 
the younger interviewees, especially those working in the private sector with comfortable 
incomes, responded to my question in a surprised and bewildered manner. Here are 
some examples of the first reactions I received to my question from three male 
interviewees: 
Gökhan (38): What type of an expectation can we ever have from the state? I 
mean what type of an answer do you expect us to give? 
Faruk (34): We do not expect anything from the state as a family. I think that 
would be very unrealistic; why should you expect anything in Turkey? 
Cemil (35): How can the state be of any help for anything? I don’t understand. 
In some cases, I explained the reasons behind the formulation of this question, 
mentioned the findings of my earlier research, gave examples from Norway, and 
specifically asked if there is any policy they wished had existed. Political orientation and 
level of involvement were the major factors that influenced interviewees’ 
conceptualizations of and expectations towards the state. Those who held social 
democratic views had clearer expectations directed at the state. In general, older 
interviewees had higher expectations and a belief in the state, while younger interviewees 
mainly express a lack of basic trust.  
Several of the older interviewees displayed a relative optimism concerning the state, 
even though they were critical of its present condition. Bora (59), who defines himself as 
a “secular social democrat”, claimed that the state, and not the private sector, should take 
care of basic social services: 
In Turkey they are trying to make the state smaller. I think this is politics gone 
astray. The state must not get smaller. There are important affairs that the state 
must take care of…For example social services. Today, we can take care of 
ourselves, but families are getting smaller and we will need certain institutions 
when we get older, like rehabilitation centers and homes for the elderly. It is the 
state that must build these. I think this is something Turkey lacks. You cannot 
expect such things from the private sector. Because, if the private sector does it, it 
will do it with the purpose of profit and then your economic situation will 
determine a lot…It is impossible for us to afford private institutions for the elderly 
with the pensions we get from the state…So I believe that we must expect certain 
things from the state.  
Mine (62) who is an idealistic believer in Turkish modernization, expects state support for 
families: 
The mentality of the ‘social state’ must be established in Turkey. Social justice is as 
important as are economic problems…As I see it, the number one problem of 
Turkey is the problem of population. It has a very big population…The state must 
establish organized family-planning policies...I believe that the state must support 
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the family in many ways. There must be official support for working mothers, 
especially.  
Most Turkish interviewees were critical about the present condition of the state. They 
think it is disorganized and lacks the capacity to solve even the basic problems of health-
care and education. A general pessimism prevailed. Umut (39) explained how she felt 
powerless vis-à-vis the state:  
These days, neo-liberal trends have declared this out of fashion, I mean expecting 
something from the state, but I find this very meaningless…The state must 
provide support for people in the areas of education, health and childcare…But I 
feel this way about Turkey: I pay taxes, I mean they are directly taken from my 
salary, but I have no say in anything, no say in the politics that might concern me. 
In Turkey, the state has turned into a total extortionist, I think it is in terrible 
condition…People have no confidence anymore. 
Most interviewees mentioned the need of a total reorganization to ‘clean up’ the state. 
Oya (52) had some expectations, but a reorganization was the precondition: 
Well, I do have expectations from the state. They are talking about the need for a 
‘clean society,’ but the state itself is very dirty. First of all, this rottenness – the 
politics which are remnants of very old times and rigid discourses – must change. 
As I see it, Turkey needs new brainpower to develop new projects and broaden its 
horizons…I think that the state in Turkey must be reorganized all over again.  
Some younger interviewees appeared to have totally given up on the idea of expecting 
anything from the state. Levent (32) explained why he ‘gave up’ on the state: 
I don’t have any expectations. I had some earlier, then I gave up. I mean one 
learns not to expect anything. For example, I had applied for scholarship and the 
like several times, but I did not receive anything, and after that I gave up… So the 
state should not expect anything from us either.  
State assistance is generally conceived of as relevant only for those employed in the public 
sector or those who are in poverty. Figen (33) believes that mainly people with lower 
income levels expect something from the state, and that expectation comes as a result of 
need. She and her husband, on the other hand, prefer private solutions, for example for 
the education of their child:  
We started saving money to be able to send him to a private school. Nobody 
prefers state schools because they have a lower quality, lower level of education. It 
is the same in health. There is a big difference between the private and the state 
hospitals. Therefore, we always have this notion in our minds that even if the state 
does something, it will not do it well and it will not be sufficient for us.  
Opting for private social goods, especially in the areas of education and health, is 
commonplace among Turkish dual-career couples with relatively favorable economic 
means. Ipek (35) explained how she and her husband tried to find individual solutions, 
without expecting anything from the state: 
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I do not have any serious expectations from the state, for my old age, or anything 
else…If we are earning well today, we will make our own investment. To be able 
to send our child to a better school, we must work in jobs in which we will earn 
better. So, we seek all the solutions individually, or in our close personal relations. 
Dilek (41) thought that family policies would be ‘luxurious’ for Turkey given the lack of 
health and pension policies. To clarify my question concerning expectations from the 
state, I asked if they thought that the state could support families in any way. 
Dilek: State support for families? (Interviewer: Like public childcare centers or longer leaves 
of absence?) No, these are very extreme things, I mean they are not related to 
Turkey’s realities. In Turkey, the state cannot handle the most basic social services, 
I mean it cannot solve two basic problems: the first one is the health problem, and 
the second one is pension security…When these problems prevail, you cannot 
demand that working women be allowed to work less or leave early. I mean you 
just cannot make such demands. Unemployment is high, and there are many 
people who can fill your place, so you cannot make such a demand. We do not 
have the luxury! 
Dilek’s reaction to my question is an example of the ‘market logic’ that is a predominant 
approach  to social problems in Turkey. The dominance of the neo-liberal policies 
renders any expectation from the state unrealistic and out-dated. In general, the state is a 
distant, and in some cases even scary entity. Tulin (38) and Tolga (40) stated clearly that 
the only thing they want from the state is for it to stay away from them:  
Tulin: I just expect that it does not expect anything from me! (laughs) I mean I will 
pay my taxes, I just do not want it to touch me... 
Tolga: In my head, the state is like a center of dictatorship; therefore, I am always a 
proponent of keeping a distance...In a way, I am afraid of the state. Therefore, I 
do not expect anything. I feel in one way or another the state will always be against 
me and never with me.  
This couple exemplifies an extreme case of a total lack of confidence in the state. Even 
though this attitude is rare, what united most Turkish interviewees was a basic cautious 
and critical approach to state policies and ideologies.  
6.6 Concluding Notes on the State  
As I had expected, the answers given to this question showed great variation between the 
Turkish and Norwegian groups. Norwegians emerged as relatively homogeneous 
concerning their expectations from the state, while the variation among Turkish 
interviewees was high. In general, Norwegians had much higher and varied expectations, 
while many Turkish respondents had little to say concerning what they might expect 
from the state. The major variation in the Turkish group was caused by the level of 
political involvement. Those who had social democratic ideals had more clearly 
formulated and concrete expectations.  
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 Norwegians were mainly positive about the state and they appreciated having a 
system that provided a basic “safety network.” Their criticisms were mainly directed 
toward aspects of specific policies that they conceived of as ‘unjust’ or ‘non-egalitarian,’ 
not toward the general principles upon which the welfare system is built. Turkish 
interviewees, on the other hand, were critical of some of the basic principles underlying 
the state and would appreciate a ‘total reorganization.’ The state, as an entity, had 
different connotations for Turkish and Norwegian interviewees. In broad terms, the state 
was distant, authoritarian, and disappointingly corrupt for most Turkish interviewees, 
while it was a familiar, well-organized and active source of support for Norwegians. A 
key issue that Norwegians were most positive about were gender equality policies of the 
state. Reflections on gender is the focus of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 Gendered Experiences and 
Ideologies 
“Gender relations are structured in contexts – employment, families, and 
state institutions – that play a major part in reproducing the gender order 
(or gender system). However, these structures are negotiated and 
interpreted by changing and flexible gendered subjects. Both the 
structures, and the manner in which individuals and groups work on 
them and interpret them, may be investigated empirically” (Crompton 
1999: 7). 
In this chapter the main theme is different aspects of gender in the two countries. The 
interviewees’ evaluations related to the gender arrangements in their societies will be 
analyzed in light of their personal gendered ideologies. The main focus will be 
interviewees’ personal gendered experiences and their evaluations related to women’s and 
men’s societal positions in Turkey and Norway.  
 Gender refers to socio-culturally constructed components attached to each sex and 
these socio-cultural definitions of biological sex have an important part in organizing 
social activity –alongside with class, race and ethnicity. The totality of the relationships 
between women and men can be conceptualized as a ‘gender system.’ (Crompton 1999) 
The gender system is instantiated through the development of institutions such as welfare 
states, employment regimes, family law and national cultures. Gender relations are 
produced and reproduced via already existing institutions, norms, and practices, as well as 
through the ongoing relationships between individual men and women (ibid: 19).    
 The interacting influences of specific historical, geographical, cultural and economic 
conditions give way to specific ‘gender orders’ and ideologies in different national or 
regional contexts. Gender ideologies are taken-for-granted assumptions concerning 
proper societal ‘roles’ of men and women and ‘normal’ models for division of paid and 
unpaid labor between the sexes and are often ambiguous and historically changeable. 
Individuals also often display ideologies that are apparently gendered. These can be well-
articulated and active, or latent and almost unconscious. Gender ideologies are products 
of interacting influences of diverse factors, like an individual’s socialization, family 
background, education, occupation, religiosity, sexual orientation and so on. Gender 
ideologies are never fixed at a given time; they develop, change and gain different levels 
of significance in interaction with others. As Barbara Marshall (1995) also indicates, there 
is an inherent tension between the term ‘woman’ (and ‘man’) as a theoretical construct 
which implies gender as universally constitutive of the subject, and the realities of really 
existing ‘women’ (and ‘men’) who may or may not share a unified gender identity 
(Marshall 1995: 112). Therefore it is more appropriate to speak of  “gendered identities” 
implying a recognition of plurality and difference without abandoning the notion that 
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gender does play a part in constituting the subject. Accordingly, we must understand 
gender as relational. The recognition of the tension between subject and structure allows 
us to proceed in dialectical fashion in re-conceptualizing gendered identities as historically 
interpreted –multiple, often contradictory, and actively constructed according to historically 
available modes of interpretation (Marshall 1995).     
 At the interview guide, there were several questions directly or indirectly related to 
gender. Gender is a theme that is inherent in the basic research problem of analyzing the 
relationships between states, families and individuals and forms one of the main 
dimensions of comparison between Turkey and Norway. One question in the interview 
guide was formulated to gather interviewees’ evaluations of their ideas about societal 
positions of women and men, as well as of their own gendered experiences. The question 
takes two forms: “What do you think about being a woman/man in Norway/Turkey?” 
(asked of both the woman and the man separately); and, “Do you see any 
advantages/disadvantages attached to being a woman/man in Norway/Turkey?” In 
answering these questions, interviewees both talked about their own experiences and 
evaluated what they see as ‘gendered patterns’ in society at large.  
7.1 Reflections on Gendered Experiences in Turkey 
The main characteristic of the Turkish interviewees’ accounts on gender is that there is 
no agreement concerning the significance of gender as a basic social variable. Most 
interviewees argued that the heterogeneity of Turkish society and the impact of 
differences between groups of men and women based on location, class, and educational 
level are more important than gender in influencing individual lives. Many women 
pointed to the existence of gender-based discriminations both in the labor-market, 
education system and families, but at the same time claimed that they themselves do not 
experience such discrimination in their own environments.  
 There were few reflections related to the experiences of being a man in Turkey. Most 
men spoke about women’s position, instead of reflecting on their own. There were also 
few female interviewees who utilized examples from their own lives or referred to their 
own situations while talking about ‘women’s problems.’ Most asserted that they belong to 
a ‘luckier’ section of the society and the issues they mention refer to mainly to ‘other,’ 
‘less lucky’ women. A general belief that prevailed among Turkish interviewees was that 
things would get better with increasing modernization. In this context more 
modernization means urbanization and higher education for more people.  
 In most cases, men and women in a single couple agreed on issues related to gender. 
However, there were also couples who disagreed on important issues. One couple, 
especially, disagreed gravely on the basic meaning of gender as a social variable and 
started discussing the issue intensely. Their discussion will be used as a case study at the 




7.1.1 On Turkish Women: “Emancipated but not Liberated?” 35 
The interview accounts concerning women in Turkish society can be analyzed under 
three general, and related, headings: Heterogeneity,  restrictive moral norms and 
discriminatory labor market. Let us scrutinize each of these topics and their interrelations 
by concentrating on specific interview accounts.  
 
a) Heterogeneity 
It was difficult for most of the interviewees to generalize about ‘Turkish women’ due to 
the huge differences between the lives of women belonging to different groups. Most 
Turkish interviewees stressed the differences between the living conditions of women in 
different regions. According to them, the heterogeneity of Turkey made it impossible to 
make generalizations regarding gender issues. Acknowledging the ‘secondary status’ of 
women, especially in rural areas, several interviewees mentioned that women in the big 
cities, who have attained higher education, are ‘luckier’ in most senses. The significant 
differences among women was often expressed with the standard statement: ‘I do not 
feel any disadvantages personally as a woman, but...’ This claim was often followed by 
observations on the problems of ‘other women’ who were conceived to be less lucky. 
Tulin (38) pointed at the significance of class differences and reflected on her own 
position within that perspective. She started her reflections by mentioning that she did 
not think about gender-related issues very often:  
These are not things that I think about often (the disadvantages faced by women). I 
mean, it is difficult to be a human being in Turkey, as in many other 
countries...Probably, being a woman has additional burdens, in traditional societies 
like us, but these are very standard things that you know about...But I guess 
women living in our environment – in Istanbul – and at our income-level – 
typically middle-class – they are luckier. We do not face the disadvantages of being 
woman as much. But I can’t distinguish clearly: Is it us who are not forcing the 
borders? – that is, we entered that traditional structure, at least in appearance – and 
they are not touching us; or is it them who accepted us? I mean, I don’t know if 
we entered their patterns of life. But frankly, I do not face the disadvantages of 
being a woman directly. Of course, you experience many small  humiliations in 
daily life, but you learn to cope with them from when you are very young.  
In this context, the ‘they’ she refers to are those with traditional attitudes towards women 
and men with strict role definitions. Operating with a ‘we/they’ distinction signifies the 
extreme heterogeneity of Turkish society and the co-existence of social groups with 
radically different value orientations. A major factor that defines those differences is 
individuals’ attitudes towards traditions, religion, and modernity. Even in urban areas, 
there are various groups with differing attitudes concerning ‘appropriate’ gender roles.  
                                                     
35 I borrow this title from an article authored by Deniz Kandiyoti (1987). 
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Bora (59) believed that further modernization would bring gender equality. He also 
approached women’s status in Turkey by focusing on internal differences. According to 
him, the main difference was between small towns and urban areas:  
Turkey is a country of mosaics. And these mosaics spread in such a way from west 
to east, from south to north, that differences make themselves visible immediately. 
Accordingly, different interpretations on sexuality (gender) prevail in Turkey. Some 
regions are very conservative, very intolerant. We were lucky in a way, because the 
places we met and have lived since we have been married were among the regions 
that are modern on these issues (...) In smaller towns people are relatively 
conservative. Woman is seen as secondary relative to man, and it is expected that 
she will act accordingly in her life. People think woman can’t work, they must 
return home absolutely before dark, they cannot go out to movies or cafes alone. 
It is a sad truth that these thoughts still prevail in those regions. But of course, it is 
not possible to say something like that in reference to Istanbul. There has been 
much development especially concerning the youth’s understanding of sexuality. 
There also have been positive developments in (the smaller city he comes from) because 
recently they opened a university there. I believe that such developments take 
place more quickly in places where there are universities.  
Bora’s thoughts represent a common way of thinking about gender in Turkey. Many 
people believe that Turkish women have their basic rights, and therefore further 
modernization will erase existing problems. I call this attitude the ‘liberated modern 
Turkish woman myth.’ It is a powerful and widely held belief that leads many women and 
men to believe that modern women do not have any specific disadvantages. Dilek (41) 
also thought that ‘urban, educated Turkish women are not much different than any other 
European woman, and stated that she did not experience any disadvantages related to 
being a woman in her own social environment: 
One must not take Turkey as a unified whole. Turkey is a place that is made up of 
many small pieces. In Istanbul, and in my own social environment, there is no 
difference between being a woman and being a man...I mean in the big cities, I 
have never experienced any disadvantage from being a woman. But, I also did not 
go out at midnight, to tell the truth. There were times I returned home at 10 or 11. 
Inside Istanbul, there are also different platforms. I mean I can be out in (a wealthy 
district) but not in (a suburban-poorer district).  
Dilek used ‘freedom of going out’ as a signifier for women’s freedom and liberation while 
reflecting on gender. Restrictions on ‘going out alone’ were mentioned by several Turkish 
interviewees as a problem for women. Traditional practices of assigning women mainly 
to the ‘domestic’ (private) sphere continue to exist, even in the urban areas of Turkey. 
This point takes us to a deeper analysis of norms and attitudes of gender discrimination 
that continue to prevail. 
  
b) Restrictive Moral Norms 
Many respondents talked about social norms that are formed by the interweaving of 
long-lasting traditions and religious dogma and how they function in a gender 
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discriminatory manner. Most of these norms are products of religious morality, which 
demands ‘purity’ and ‘decency’ from women. This means that they should not be too 
visible, too comfortable, or too ‘free.’ Elif (37) was highly critical of ‘moral double-
standards’ that function to restrict women. She was one of the female interviewees who 
displayed a relatively radical approach towards gender-related problems and stated that a 
complex interaction between religious, cultural and economic factors are at work creating 
restrictive norms about gender. She provided a vivid explanation of the ways these norms 
function to label women as ‘good vs. bad’: 
According to me, both being a woman and being a man are difficult in this 
country... There are many social values, norms that are forcefully imposed on 
women. The woman experiences something akin to being both covered and 
opened up at the same time. On the one hand, it is expected that she have a 
creative, hard-working, skillful work life; but on the other hand, she has to be 
freer, unrestricted and relaxed to be able to accomplish this. When she does that, a 
social indictment appears immediately, labeling her a ‘bad woman.’  
The phenomenon of, ‘being covered up and opened up at the same time,’ refers to the 
conflicting expectations that most women face related to the modern and traditional 
definitions of their positions in society. Due to the strong ideal of, ‘modernizing by 
holding onto traditional values,’ such ambiguities are not rare in Turkey. Women are 
supposed to attain higher education and participate in the labor market, but give priority 
to their families or dress in a modern way but stay modest at the same time. A virtuous 
woman can be out in the ‘public’ if necessary, but her real place is the home. As 
Durakbaşa (1998) also argues, the ‘Kemalist female identity’ was based on a combination 
of conflicting images and “however modernist an ideology it was, Kemalism could not 
alter the traditional norms of morality that guaranteed a biologically defined and socially 
constraining femininity for women” (Durakbaşa 1998: 148). 
Several respondents mentioned restrictions on women ‘going out alone’ as a main 
disadvantage. Oya (52) also mentioned how easily a woman can be labeled a ‘bad 
woman’:  
Turkish women are unlucky in terms of going out, staying out until late at night 
talking to friends, or having dinner somewhere. They cannot do that easily, 
because if they do, they might be viewed as ‘bad.’  
 Even in urban areas and among the most modernized segments of society, the processes 
of morally stigmatizing women based solely on their ‘freer’ behavior continue. 
 According to Ayla (54), sexual harassment was the number one problem in Turkey, 
and she saw socialization in families as a major factor in reproducing gender inequalities: 
In Turkey, being a man is an advantage, and being a woman is a disadvantage. 
This is the thing that makes me very angry all the time, that women are not given 
enough rights. Women are second class citizens in all respects. Both in society and 
in families...From her childhood, she is always repressed, like, ‘you are a girl, you 
cannot do that, you cannot go there’...I think this is the most important problem 
of Turkey. There is sexual harassment everywhere...People think that a woman 
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cannot go out alone at night, whenever she wants. I wish this would change soon, 
but unfortunately there isn’t much progress.  
Ipek (35) mentioned that traditional assumptions concerning women’s domestic roles 
have not disappeared in Turkey:  
The idea that, ‘the female bird builds the nest,’ is imposed on you from several 
angles. It is expected that women will continue their traditional ‘duties’ even 
though they work outside the home.  
‘The female bird builds the nest,’ is a popular proverb often used in discussions 
concerning gender roles. It is an orientation that assigns all domestic arrangements to 
women, as their natural duty. References to nature are powerful tools for justifying 
unnatural human practices. Expectations related to being a good ‘female bird,’ that is a 
good wife and a mother,  clash with expectations related to being a good employee in the 
labor market. This takes us to the third field most commonly mentioned by interviewees 
while reflecting on women’s positions in Turkey.  
 
c) Discriminatory Labor Market 
Interviewees frequently mentioned problems that women face in the labor market. The 
difficulties have two major aspects: Gender discrimination practiced by employers in the 
labor market and a lack of organized support for working mothers. Elif (37) and Emre 
(37), who both display egalitarian gendered ideologies, used examples from their own 
environments on how employers discriminate against women:  
Emre: I don’t think that women and men are given equal opportunities. I mean 
definitely not in small places, it is not even worth mentioning. But I don’t believe 
that they are equals in big cities either...because, I have friends who are employers, 
and I know that they prefer men. If they make investments or train workers, they 
think that women will be away for a long period after giving birth, so they prefer 
men.  
Elif: I even heard that there are workplaces who ask for a signed paper stating that 
she will not have children in 2 years, or 5 years.  
Berna (51) also mentioned the prevalence of gender discrimination in the labor market, 
especially concerning women who are – or may become – mothers: 
There are some managers who think this way: ‘If we employ a woman, she might 
take maternal leave and then work will be interrupted.’ Therefore they prefer to 
employ men.  
Gaye (36), mother of a 2 year-old child, first argued that she personally did not feel the 
disadvantages of being a woman in her environment. But upon reflection she 
remembered the difficulties she faced as a pregnant woman at work:  
Being pregnant was a very stressful experience at work. The minute they learned 
that I was pregnant, they started asking ‘when are you leaving? We must find 
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another person to fill your place right away.’ There was a lot of tension. I had a 
very hard time proving that I could do this job while I was pregnant, and that I 
could do it after birth as well. When they saw that I could work, they forgot that I 
was pregnant for a while. But then they started again: ‘How will you take care of 
your child and work at the same time?’... This is one of the difficulties of being a 
woman, and I am mentioning it since I experienced it myself. I am not talking 
about women in general.   
These reflections and experiences exemplify the processes that disadvantage women in 
the labor market, and all are related to women’s motherhood roles.  
 Women’s societal position has a strategic place in Turkish modernization. While 
some researchers use the label ‘state feminism’ to characterize the period of revolutionary 
modernization in which basic citizenship rights of women were established, others are 
critical of this usage. For example, Zehra Arat (1994) argues that Kemalist reforms were 
not aimed at liberating women or at promoting the development of female consciousness 
and feminine identity. Instead, they strove to equip Turkish women with the education 
and skills that would improve their contributions to the “republican patriarchy” by 
making them better wives and mothers (Arat 1994: 58). Atatürk saw motherhood as the 
most important function and virtue of women, and stated that women should strive to be 
good mothers and contribute to the modernization project by being ‘knowledgeable and 
enlightened’: 
“Today’s mothers have to attain several high qualities in order to bring up children 
with the necessary qualities and develop them into active members for life today. 
Therefore, our women are obliged to be more enlightened, more prosperous, and 
more knowledgeable than our men are. If they really want to be the mothers of 
this nation, this is the way” (From Atatürk’s Speeches, quoted in Z. Arat 1994: 60). 
This ambiguous female ideal of Kemalism is still alive and widely held, forming the basis 
of the ‘liberated modern Turkish woman’ myth in Turkey. 
7.1.2. On Turkish Men: An Unknown Territory? 
There were far fewer reflections on experiences and observations of ‘being a man’ in 
Turkey. Most male interviewees talked about issues related to women’s positions when 
asked about gender roles in Turkey. A pattern emerges based on the short comments 
interviewees gave regarding ‘Turkish men’ in general: There is a taken-for-granted use of 
the term ‘standard Turkish men,’ and most interviewees used this in a negative sense, 
placing themselves in opposition to this standard. This ‘standard Turkish man’ is often 
pictured as a ‘macho’ man, who has a ‘traditional’ attitude toward women who sees them 
as secondary or as ‘sexual objects,’ who does not do any housework, and who is not very 
involved in the care of his children.  
Adnan (59) was proud of having been actively involved in the upbringing of his 
children and sharing the housework with his wife, but he warned me:   
But this is how we, in particular, think. I must add that 90 percent of Turkish men 
cannot manage housework, or do not help...  (Later in the interview) Our attitudes do 
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not reflect those of Turkish men in general. In general, men do not take 
responsibility for housework or for minding children. Whether their wives work or 
not, most men do not help.  
Another area in which respondents depicted a picture of standard Turkish men was 
related to sexuality and sexual attitudes towards women. Ilhan (38) was supportive of 
gender equality in theory. He characterized Turkish men as ‘undeveloped’ in their 
approaches to women:   
In the well defined men’s jargon of Turkey, there are different categories of 
women: women to date, women to sleep with and women to marry...Men in 
Turkey are not very developed; there are certain evaluations claiming that they try 
to solve their Oedipus complexes through their wives...Turkish men are 
underdeveloped (sexually and emotionally). They still operate with categorizations 
of women.  
Elif (37) also referred to these ‘categories of women’ while telling about how difficult it 
was for both women and men in Turkey to live with those moral-sexual orientations:  
Men have categories like ‘woman to marry,’ ‘woman to date,’ and so on, so the 
woman faces such divisions and discriminations. I think in such a condition, the 
man is also in a pitiful state. So there is a mutual spitefulness.  
Egalitarian male interviewees were careful to distance themselves from this ‘standard 
Turkish man.’ For example, Gökhan (38), who disliked the traditional norms concerning 
gender, mentioned that ‘not being a typical macho man’ might cause problems in Turkey. 
‘Being too soft’ is a negative label and an assault on one’s masculinity.  
 Two interviewees reflected on the situation of Turkish men by referring to the heavy 
‘duties’ that are imposed on them in the traditional family structure. The ‘breadwinner-
role’ and the expectations related to it may be experienced as problematic. Sevim (44), 
who is critical of the traditional expectations directed at women argued that the 
traditional family structure can be oppressive for men as well:  
In fact, the situation of the man is also hard in Turkey; he has heavy 
responsibilities loaded on his shoulders. It is expected that he will provide for the 
family, ensuring the future of his wife and children. He has a real heavy load on his 
shoulders in fact. And he struggles to fulfill them. But men do not want to share 
that much either. I mean, they both refuse to share and are crushed under their 
load at the same time. That is a fact.  
Tolga (40), an egalitarian and untraditional man, had a similar point about the traditional 
family lives’ restrictions:  
The biggest difficulty of men is the necessity of entering a family structure and 
continuing it, even though they don’t want to. This did not reflect on me since 
from the start we had an equal line. Tulin never came to the situation of telling me: 
‘You earn the money, and I will stay at home and care for the child’ or maybe, she 
could not. But maybe if my income were really very high, she would prefer staying 
at home... (laughs) Who knows?  
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The accounts above point at an awareness of the fact that traditional gender role 
expectations are detrimental for men as well. Being a sole ‘breadwinner’ for the family 
may be a stressful experience given the developments in the labor markets which involve 
higher risks in upholding a secure employment.    
7.1.3 Divergent Accounts 
In general, most interviewees talked about ‘disadvantages’ of being a woman or about 
‘men’s dominance’ when asked to reflect on gender in Turkey. Two interviewees 
provided accounts that diverge from the general arguments pointing at women’s relative 
disadvantages analyzed above. Nermin(68) an ambitious career woman and Adnan (58) 
an egalitarian, yet highly traditional man argued that in some instances women can get too 
dominant and repress men. Adnan thought that, though few in number, some women 
tend to get too dominant: 
In big cities, in some families, women are more unrestricted, have their own 
freedom, even more than the level of men. This is above equality…but of course 
these are in minority...And when women are superior, they get really superior, and 
start constraining men. This time men are dominated by their wives, get restricted. 
There are such persons as well. 
Nermin was critical of the housewives who constantly nag and even implied that they 
destroy the health of their husbands with their capricious behavior:  
According to me, well of course in Anatolia, women are oppressed. But in city life, 
it is mainly women who oppress men! (laughs) What I see in the city is that there 
are a lot of widows; many men die of heart diseases at the age of 50 or 55 (laughs). 
In the last 15-20 years, I see that young fathers are wonderful, they help their 
wives a lot. I mean, it is mainly women who are capricious…especially non-
working women. Because working women do not have the energy to nag!  
As the accounts above demonstrate there were many divergent approaches to the 
question of gender among Turkish interviewees. I will end this section with a case study 
of a couple that disagreed totally concerning the significance of gender in social life.  
7.2 Case D: Ceyda and Cemil: A Dispute on the Significance 
of Gender 
Ceyda is 35 years old. She has a degree in engineering and works as a mid-level manager 
at a private company. Her husband Cemil is also 35 years old. He has a degree in 
economics and works as a top manager at a private firm. Cemil and Ceyda have been 
married for 6 years and they have a three years old daughter. They have extremely long 
working hours and stressful jobs. Both are devoted to their careers, yet Cemil appeared to 
be the more ambitious one. A characteristic sets Cemil apart from the other interviewees: 
he was the only person who at times answered ironically to my questions. In the 
beginning of the interview he was reluctant to provide detailed answers and it took effort 
 
135 
to break the tension in the air and make him feel comfortable. After a hard start, he 
eventually became more interested and involved.  
Ceyda and Cemil started arguing vehemently when I asked them to reflect on what 
they conceive as advantages and disadvantages of being a woman and a man in Turkey. 
Ceyda thought that women in general were disadvantaged in Turkey, while Cemil 
believed that other variables – mainly economic status – were more significant in 
determining one’s position:   
Ceyda: It is definitely difficult to be a woman in this country...I believe that, there 
is an equality of opportunities only in my own environment. And I, personally, 
experience very few negative reactions just because I am a woman. But this is 
because I am me.  It is related to my own social environment. But there are still 
women who are beaten up by their husbands or sexually harassed at the 
workplace, so, if you look at it generally, I do not believe that women have equal 
opportunities... 
Cemil: (interrupts her) You don’t say so! Go and see in Holland; it is much worse 
than here.  
Ceyda: In what sense? 
Cemil: In terms of inequality between men and women.  
Ceyda: But here, first of all there is the pressure of religion. I mean some women 
cannot even go out alone comfortably.  
Cemil: Of course she can go out, why couldn’t she? 
Ceyda: If you only limit it to the 10-15 persons you see in Istanbul, then they can, 
of course... Even I cannot go out at night comfortably.  
Cemil: I can’t go out either.  
Ceyda: You can do it more easily.  
Cemil: (louder) I, as a man, cannot go comfortably to the places that you cannot go 
as a woman.  
Ceyda: I am talking about walking on the streets.  
Cemil: It is the same thing.  
Ceyda: (disappointedly) Oh! How can you be so blind, for God’s sake? (later) If 
women were so free, as Cemil says, there wouldn’t be only five women in the 
Parliament. I mean gender inequality is so clear in the political life. 
Cemil: But political life is a different type of life. There, you must be a member of 
the Mafia, or a big landowner, or something like that.  
Ceyda: This is what I say, it is a men’s world! 
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Cemil: It is the same everywhere! Is there a woman dominance in American 
Parliament? 
Ceyda: (laughs) Let’s continue discussing these after the interview. I guess we were 
waiting for this moment to take up these issues! 
 
Cemil believed that factors other than gender were stronger determinants of social 
arrangements in Turkey. He claimed that the unbalanced distribution of income and low 
education levels are the main factors, and that if these basic problems were solved, 
gender inequalities would disappear. Ceyda, on the other hand, believes that traditional 
and religious views on women have a significant influence, independent of economic 
factors. Behind the tension that emerged lies a conflict in terms of gendered ideologies: 
Cemil was apparently egalitarian concerning gender roles, but he was hostile towards any 
problematization of  existing gender arrangements. By assigning the determining status to 
economics and level of modernization and ignoring the significance of gender as a social 
variable, he was also making his hidden traditional gender ideology apparent. 
7.3 Reflections on Gendered Experiences in Norway 
In general, all Norwegian interviewees referred to a basic change that took place in 
Norwegian society towards greater gender equality, and most of them appreciated this 
development. Norwegian women also had more to say about, ‘being a woman in 
Norway’ than Norwegian men did about, ‘being a man.’ Yet, compared to Turkish 
interviewees, both Norwegian men and women had more to say on gender. ‘Gender 
equality’ is a topic that has been on the social agenda for several decades, and gender-
related issues are highly politicized.  
 A common tendency among Norwegian interviewees was to appreciate the 
advantages of greater gender equality, while pointing to still-existing inequalities or newly 
established difficulties. A few interviewees mentioned certain difficulties that have been 
introduced as a result of the dissolution of traditional gender roles. One couple 
distinguished themselves from the other interviewees in that they thought that, ‘equality 
had gone too far.’ I will analyze their reflections as a case study at the end of this section.  
 Lars (36) is a father of two children who has been active in their care from when they 
were born. He appreciates the opportunities that exist in Norway that give individuals 
several choices in terms of ‘roles.’ However, he also thinks that this leads to very high 
expectations that are hard to meet: 
I think both women and men in Norway get exhausted because there are such 
huge expectations for an insane number of different roles. There are high 
expectations that you will be successful at work, keep your home and house in a 
tolerably good order, take care of your children and support them in all types of 
activities, and keep yourself in good physical condition and work-out…Some say 
that what is positive in Norwegian society is the extensive role-freedom, that there 
are many types of roles you can try to achieve. But I think both women and men 
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wear themselves out while trying to live up to all these expectations; it gets 
extremely difficult.  
While, many mentioned the toughness of living up to these new ideals and expectations, 
the general orientation of the majority of interviewees was an appreciation of the change 
towards a more gender egalitarian society. Especially women talked extensively and 
positively about this phenomenon.  
7.3.1 Being a Woman in Norway: ‘We have come a long way but...’ 
The pattern that emerged from the interview accounts concerning women’s status in 
Norway can be summarized with this prototypical sentence: ‘In Norway, we have come a 
long way in equality between the sexes, but...’ This sentence was usually followed by 
reflections on the areas in which equality is not yet achieved. The most commonly named 
areas in this regard were positions in the labor market, arrangements of care work, media-
images of femininity, and backlash trends.  
In general, all Norwegian female interviewees appreciated the changes towards greater 
gender equality that have taken place in Norway. According to them, the biggest and 
most basic advantages of being a woman in Norway, compared to many other countries, 
are ‘equality’ (likestilling)36 and  ‘freedom’ (frihet).  
Grete (32), a mother of two children, works at a private firm, in a ‘male-dominated’ 
environment. She compared Norway with the USA when reflecting on gender:   
I believe that Norway is one of the countries in which equality between the sexes 
has gone furthest...I think we have gained much more gender-equality here in 
Norway, compared to the Americans, for example, who think that they are far 
ahead on everything possible, but who are actually far behind when it comes to 
equality. For example, I had an education that was male-dominated and now work 
in a male-dominated environment, but I don’t experience this as a problem at all.    
The achievement of gender equality is conceived as a ‘freedom’ to participate in all areas 
of society as a woman, including in fields that earlier were mainly reserved for men. The 
majority of Norwegian female interviewees believe they can get an education and find a 
job in any field they choose. Jorunn (35) stated the existence of this opportunity, and 
questioned the fact that she has chosen a ‘typically female’ occupation:  
I experience that I, as a woman in Norway, have access to many opportunities. In 
relation to education, I can educate myself in the field I choose; and in relation to 
equality, I expect to be taken seriously as a woman in all areas.  I mean, nobody 
will stop me in reaching leadership positions because I am a woman...The 
opportunities have always been there, and in a way the challenge for me as a 
woman has been to use them. But I ended up in a quite traditional female-
occupation, and I've thought about this many times. What is the reason that I did 
                                                     
36 The term likestilling refers to equality between the sexes and implies both ‘sameness’ and ‘equal 
status’ (Gullestad 1992: 185).  
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not choose to get a more non-traditional education? This is really not so easy to 
answer!  
Another opportunity brought about by greater gender equality is the freedom to venture 
‘outside the home’ alone, as a woman. Bente (52) appreciates these benefits, and thinks 
that there are neither formal nor attitudinal obstacles that constrain her as a woman: 
Yes, I think I am glad to be a woman in Norway, because the type of freedom that 
women have here is the type of freedom I appreciate. I have the freedom to work, 
and I can go out and do all the things I want to do alone, as a woman. Theater, 
movies, concerts, anything at all. I can go to a restaurant alone without it being 
seen as negative. In my experience, there are no formal obstacles to my 
development as a woman. And I don’t think that there are any attitudinal obstacles 
either, at least I do not experience it that way.  
While some interviewees were satisfied with the developments unconditionally, others 
were more careful in pointing out both positive and negative consequences of these 
changes. Camilla (32) is satisfied with gender equality but criticized the societal trend of 
measuring success only with labor market status:  
The advantage must be gender equality, that leave of absence policies give us the 
chance to have kids. I have a feeling that you can deal with both a family and a job 
without being obliged to choose one; you have a chance to manage both. And the 
fact that it is normal for women to attend university makes it much easier to do 
for others. It is much harder to be the only one. So I have a feeling that this is 
good here. And also I have a feeling that maybe it is not totally allowed to be a 
woman without having a job or a career as well. It is not totally accepted to be 
only a housewife... it is actually only money and status that count in a way, and I 
have a feeling that there we have lost a little. But the advantage is that we are 
equals in many ways. 
Besides talking positively about changes towards greater gender equality, most Norwegian 
interviewees mentioned areas that are still characterized by inequalities and disadvantages 
for women. Many interviewees reflected on gendered aspects of the labor market, and a 
few of them criticized ‘media images’ of women. In Norway, the labor market is still 
highly segregated by gender, and there are few women in top positions. Women still face 
hidden and overt discrimination in the labor market, especially in relation to 
motherhood.37   
 Ann (34) explained how difficult it was for her to work in a male-dominated work 
environment:  
My job was originally a male dominated profession. In many ways, it still is. I 
remember that in the beginning I had to prove myself. My boss was a sixty year-
old man who prioritized my male colleagues in front of me and I had to take up a 
fight with him. It was quite tough. It is hard to say, ‘I am as good as he is,’ rather 
than them seeing it themselves.  
                                                     
37 An in-depth analysis of reflections on mothers in the labor market was taken up in section 5.1. 
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Ann added that the conditions became better in later years, but that she had to struggle 
for changes. In contrast to Ann, Jorunn (35) worked in a female-dominated profession. 
Her main complaint was that the salaries in her field were lower than in typically-male 
professions that demanded an equal amount of education:  
I think a lot of work has been done in Norway to achieve gender equality. If you 
look at the last twenty years, there has been an enormous change...but there are 
still things to do, for example concerning equal pay for comparable work. My 
education can be compared to an engineering education, but there is a wide gap 
between salaries.      
Some of the interviewees pointed to definitions and expectations related to ‘femininity’ as 
contradictory, as well. Ann (34) sees the dominant femininity-ideal as one of the obstacles 
to the achievement of full gender equality:  
I think Norway has come a long way, not the least with family politics. There are 
some good regulations for achieving gender equality. But at the same time, I don’t 
think that we have come as far as we want to believe. There are still things that are 
left. For example, there are certain trends, like it is ‘in’ to be feminine and 
womanly. Feminine is defined in such a way that I don’t recognize myself at all.   
Nina (32) conceives of the “ideal woman” dominant in advertisements as unrealistic and 
repressive:  
Just look at all the advertisements: lots of women with big breasts. You should be 
tall and slim and in good shape, but at the same time, you should also have a good 
education and money in the bank and a good apartment... There is an ideal for 
women out there that I don’t think is very positive, because it is not something 
with which I identify.  
Hilde (49) argued that young women especially were influenced by these images:  
Changes in expectations related to femininity occur quickly and shift back and 
forth.... But there is always an underlying demand for femininity, and expectations 
about how women should behave, how they should  look, to be regarded as 
successful, and to be among those who are preferred. I think there are very strong 
signals there, and they influence especially the younger generation.  
Camilla (32) argued that the demands concerning femininity were so conflicting that it 
was hard to fulfill them no matter what one did:  
You are expected to be effective at work, but if you have to manage everything, 
you cannot think about how you look. Nevertheless you are expected to be 
feminine and look feminine as well. So in that way, there is pressure...But at the 
same time, you should not be too feminine either, because then you don’t fit to 
your job properly. So there is pressure in both directions and you feel that you 
cannot stretch yourself to cover all the demands, no matter what you do.  
As the examples cited above make clear, many women feel that conflicting expectations 
and demands continue to exist in Norwegian society, though important steps have been 
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taken towards greater gender equality. Let us now move on to an analysis of men’s ideas 
and evaluations concerning their experiences of being male in Norwegian society.   
7.3.2 Being a Man in Norway: ‘I would not want to switch places with my father’ 
In general, Norwegian men find it more difficult to answer questions related to their 
gendered experiences than do Norwegian women. Ingmar (61), for example, admitted 
this frankly: 
I have basically no observations about being a man in Norway...actually, I haven’t 
reflected much on it.    
Bjarne (52) first argued that this was mainly a “woman question”:  
The question you are asking is maybe first and foremost a woman question, 
having to do with women’s place in society. When you ask me how it is to be a 
man in Norway compared to being a man in other countries... I don’t know if I 
could come up with many things to say.  
Bente: You could have made the decisions more if you lived in another country.  
Bjarne: Yes, maybe one feels that one could have more power...but for me, 
personally, having more power is not so terribly important.  
However, a while later in the interview, after listening to his wife’s comments regarding 
gender equality, Bjarne enthusiastically pointed out something that he conceived to be a 
positive development for men in Norway: 
Yes, now I remember something that I can say on this! Namely, that I would have 
experienced marriage in another country, with a more traditional woman, as 
boring. Marrying a woman who stayed home, potting flowers and ironing sheets 
and stuff like that, would have been much more boring for me. I think it would 
have been dull to be married under such social conditions, compared to what we 
are experiencing now, when we are both active in the labor market... That makes a 
couple relationship much more interesting and exciting.  
The general trend among male interviewees was to reflect on changes that have taken 
place as a result of changes in women’s positions. A majority of the respondents 
appreciate these changes, while pointing to certain areas that they conceive as 
disadvantageous. The most frequently mentioned advantages were related to the 
possibilities of having more interesting couple relationships and closer father-child 
relationships.  
The majority of male Norwegian interviewees appreciate the changes in women’s 
positions, arguing that being with active and liberated women make their lives more 
exciting. Arne (33) feels that it would have been very hard for him to behave like a 
‘macho-guy’:  
I think there are advantages to being a man in Norway. It is more exciting to be 
with women who are allowed to be active, either in professional life or in dating...I 
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do not feel comfortable in a macho-guy role. It would be a burden if I had to take 
initiative all the time.  
Henrik (50) reflected extensively on changes in male-roles in Norway, and explained how 
he would never want to ‘switch places with his father’: 
Many people say that we have lost our positions and advantages. And of course, in 
a way, we have done that. It was very easy for my father to be at home, he did his 
own thing at work and he couldn’t care less about what happened at home; he had 
zero interest. He had dinner on the table, and everything was delivered to his 
hands: clean clothes, ironed shirts. He did not need to bother about childcare. 
Some think that these are in a way lost privileges, but I don't see it that way. I 
think I had a much richer life than he had. Even though at times it has been 
problematic for me as well, in times of crises, when things are stressful and it 
effects my mood, then I think, “Damn! It would be good to be free from all this 
nonsense. How good they had it in the old days!” But in fact, they did not. So I 
would not really want to switch places. I do not see it as something lost, but the 
reverse. Thus, I do not feel my male-role threatened by anything at all.  
Hilde: And you have a much closer relationship with your children than your 
father had.  
Henrik: Yes, that’s what I mean! I would never trade it; it can’t even be compared. 
You gain something that actually is a benefit, and in some situations you lose 
something that only looks like a loss, but which actually is not a loss. It is a 
different way of organizing everyday life with which you gain many other things. 
And if you think of man’s role sexually, I think we have it much better than our 
parent's generation since women's roles are much more independent. They make 
their own decisions to a much higher degree than before.  
What, then, are the disadvantages on which interviewees commented in relation to 
changes in gender roles and relations in Norway? A main problem mentioned by several 
respondents is the difficulty of living up to the high expectations one faces, both in the 
labor market and at home. Magne (37) reported that he has had to deal with ‘jokes’ 
concerning his priorities at work:  
How is it to be a man?...I think I enjoy my role as a man. It feels like one is quite 
free to choose. I mean there are not strong expectations that you will do this or 
that. You can almost pick and choose, and everything is accepted. On the other 
hand, maybe there is some pressure, because it is expected that you will be 
everywhere and at times you get pulled between different expectations. In the 
professional world, it is expected – though in an undefined way – that you will be 
more available than you actually can be, if you also want to participate at home the 
way it is expected of that role. So that there can be some time pressure, and 
sometimes people make old-fashioned jokes  like, ‘Aren’t you coming tonight? 
Aren’t you the boss at home?’ They say it very playfully, but they say it so many 
times that I wonder if they mean it.  
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Jarle (36) thinks that gender equality, if misinterpreted as ‘sameness,’ can lead to a 
situation in which it can be difficult to find room for ‘typically male activities’: 
I think it is all right to be a man in Norway. People constantly write about how 
men’s roles are changing, and they are perhaps changing, but I don’t feel that it is 
problematic...I take gender equality a matter of course, in relation to education, 
work, division of labor at home, and so on. But at the same time, it is important to 
be aware of the fact that there are differences between men and women.  We have 
our strong and weak sides that are mostly determined by gender...In Norway, 
where equality is accomplished in many aspects of society, it can be difficult for 
men to find room for the special things that are typical for men. However, it is not 
totally clear what they would be.  
This point brings us to the case study of this section. Camilla and Cato were critical of the 
ways gender-roles have dissolved ‘almost totally blown out’ and they long for more 
clearly defined ‘roles’ to make life easier.  
7.4 Case E. Camilla and Cato: Missing More Defined Gender 
Roles: Traditional or Postmodern? Backlash or Progress? 
Camilla and Cato are in their early 30s. They have two kids under school age. Both have 
been working full-time the last decade, but now Camilla wants to reduce her working 
hours and spend more time with the children. Cato has been actively involved in the care 
of their children, and he appreciates the increasing acceptance of fathers who give priority 
to their children. They had many discussions earlier concerning the division of 
housework, and they decided to get paid help to resolve them. They went away from the 
‘sharing everything’ model, after trying and failing, and now define different domains of 
responsibility. Camilla is critical of the fact that in Norway, success is measured by labor-
market status, and that it is no longer socially accepted to be ‘only’ a housewife. She feels 
that she has realized her ambitions at work and now would like to be at home with the 
kids more often. Both think that it should be possible to raise a family with one income 
only – not necessarily the man’s — and hope that money will be less important in the 
future. 
Cato: We actually have a little trouble with that in a way, because all the gender 
roles got totally blown away, at some point in time. 
Camilla: Do you mean here at home?  
Cato: Yes, isn’t that right? You repair things and I clean the house, and in a way 
there are no clearly defined roles... And I imagine that, at least if you take the male 
role in other countries, it would have been much easier actually. I mean if you 
knew that father repairs things and drives the car, and he has nothing to do with 
cooking. I mean if role patterns were more defined, it would have made life much 
easier. At the same time, it is of course positive that men taking care of children is 
legitimate now,  is totally OK.  
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Camilla: We clash a lot with each other. For example, we were out buying carpets 
and we had that big argument. In that way, I feel that we clash. It would have been 
much easier if certain things were defined as my domain. 
Cato: I believe that slightly more rigid role patterns could have been an advantage 
in a way... I think it is all right to be a little different. So if the roles were more 
defined, maybe you could ... 
Camilla: (interrupts) With the roles, I would like you to be a proper man and take 
care of everything related to it, while I sit back and decide things, damn it! (laughs) 
Cato: I think it would have been easier that way.   
Camilla: But being a man in Norway, wouldn’t you say something about it? 
Cato: Yes, I think I said something about it. I mean, in a way there is a little 
problem. Of course it is very positive that it is possible for a man to be at home 
and take care of his children, that nobody looks at you strange because of that. 
But, it has some negative aspects as well. There was something nice with the old 
role patterns, since you had more defined tasks. In the old days, it was the woman 
who was the boss inside the doorstep, and outside it was the man. And of course, 
we don’t have that anymore...If everybody had a defined domain, it would have 
been much simpler. Then Camilla could be a ‘real woman’ who works at home, 
and would be the chief there, and I could be a ‘real-man’ in my own domain.  
Camilla: We would sure have discussions anyhow... 
Cato: Not necessarily, if the culture decided that women will make decisions in the 
home, or outside the home, and that is that! That is to say, if a little boy was used 
to the fact that it is mamma who decides everything inside, then things would be 
unproblematic, that’s for sure.  
Camilla and Cato long for ‘defined’ gender roles, but they also strive to differentiate this 
from the ‘back to patriarchal roles’ campaign of traditionalists. Camilla emphasized the 
fact that she wouldn’t want to lose any of her decision-making power, but wishes that it 
would be more acceptable to be a housewife. Cato enjoys being active in caring for their 
children, but dislikes constantly having conflicts over housework. They see a biological 
aspect to these conflicts:  
Cato: I think there are quite obvious differences (between women and men). For 
example, that thing we talked about; I can think that the house is nice and tidy, 
while you may think it is a rat house! (laughs) It is a trivial example, but there is 
something there. You want to have things done, while I am more process-
oriented...I am absorbed by doing things myself, I think that may be biological, 
that men like mechanical things, have a need to master things, like household 
repairs. Women, to a larger extent, think that it is OK to deliver the car to the 
garage, while men like fixing it themselves, just to have it done. But if this is 
biological or not, that is hard to say. But there must be some difference; in a way it 
would be terrible if there is none! 
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Camilla: That was what I thought for a long while, that there weren’t big 
differences between women and men. But I realize, after having the kids, that 
there are great differences after all.  
These points take us to a closer examination of the interviewees’ reflections on 
differences between women and men.  
7.5 Biology or Socialization? 
An important aspect of thinking and theorizing about gender is related to purported 
biological differences between women and men and their significance in social life. This 
issue is one of the burning themes of feminist theory, and most theorizing about gender 
roles in general. I formulated a question in the interview guide to hear what the individual 
men and women of this study had to say concerning differences between women and 
men. I was curious to see if there would be significant differences among the respondents 
in terms of nationality, age, and gender. The question was: “Do you think that there are 
vital biological differences between men and women that determine their roles in 
society?” Or alternatively, “Do you think gender differences are mainly based on biology 
or upbringing?”  
 No significant pattern occurred in terms of nationality, gender, or age when I 
grouped together interviewees who believed in the primacy of biology and those who 
believed in the power of socialization. In both the Turkish and Norwegian groups, 
roughly half of the respondents believed in the significance of hormonal, genetic, or 
bodily differences, while the other half believed in the significance of socialization and 
learned behavior. These groups included a balanced distribution of both gender and age.  
 The attitudes and beliefs of individuals concerning differences between men and 
women appear as a complex whole made up of personal experiences, observations, 
books, and media images. On top of this complexity, these beliefs are historically 
changeable as well. Many of the respondents, for example, told me how their ideas have 
changed after having children and observing them grow up. These changes manifested 
themselves in a shift from the belief in the supremacy of biology to a belief in the 
supremacy of learning, or vice versa. 
 
Belief in Significant Hormonal, Emotional, Psychic, Bodily Differences between Men and Women 
Irrespective of age, gender, or nationality, there were individuals who believed in the 
significance of the differences between women and men. However, there was no 
agreement as to what these differences were: Dilek (41) believed that ‘women had higher 
emotional intelligence’ while Faruk (34) argued that ‘women lost their sense of judgment 
when they had their periods.’ Jarle (61) thought that ‘boys were more aggressive’, while 
Grete (33) thought that ‘women and men have different patterns of thought.’ 
The differences between the sexes that were mentioned by Norwegian interviewees can 
be listed as follows:  
1) Physical (muscular) differences: “Men are stronger than women are.” 
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2) Differences related to childbirth: “Giving birth to a child creates a special connection 
to children, a deeper focus on their survival, and a greater sense of responsibility for 
care.” 
3) Emotional differences: “Men keep their feelings more to themselves, women talk 
about them more easily.” 
4) Cognitive differences: “Men can focus on one thing at a time, while women may 
have hundred balls in the air.” 
5) Behavioral differences: “Men are more direct in solving problems while women go 
behind others’ backs.” 
6) Sociability differences: “Men like to do things together, while women can enjoy only 
sitting down and talk.” 
7) Hormonal differences: “Men are more competitive and aggressive, while women are 
more care-oriented.” 
8) ‘Sanitary’ differences: “Women have higher standards for household cleaning than 
men do.” 
Apart from the first two points, only one interviewee mentioned each of the examples 
given above. People have myriad ways of conceptualizing differences between men and 
women and tend to focus on dissimilar aspects.  
In both the Turkish and Norwegian groups, there were persons who held firm beliefs 
related to biological differences. One of the most extreme accounts came from a Turkish 
woman, who believes in sharp ‘genetic’ differences:  
Dilek (41): I think that women are more adequate, biologically more qualified. I 
mean, first of all because they are mothers, women have higher sensibilities. 
Maybe this has been engraved into our genes for centuries, so women have an 
extra dimension of philosophy. I can bring several interpretations to events and 
look more impartially. I see this at work as well…I work with a lot of engineers, 
and even engineers with a Ph.D. have no practical intelligence! I see this in many 
men…Women have an ability to produce practical solutions in a way that I have 
not yet discovered how. Maybe it is because she approaches things in a more 
sensible manner, or maybe because she thinks continuously. 
Another Turkish woman, Umut (39), also thinks there are differences between men and 
women concerning ‘sensibilities,’ but she was careful to add that she does not attribute 
these differences only to biology:  
I think there are bodily differences between men and women. I mean, I think that 
the sensibilities of women's bodies are different from those of men…but of 
course this is also related to culture, not only biology…There are areas in which 
men are very blind…for example concerning children. Those men who have more 
interactions with children have different sensibilities. You can observe this. That 
means that this is not directly related to being a woman or a man, but related to 
interactions. 
A Norwegian couple, Bente (52) and Bjarne (57) have discussed this issue a lot and find 
this question very interesting. They basically disagree on the significance of biological 
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differences between women and men, and provided several arguments for their 
respective beliefs: 
Bente: Obviously there are biological differences. As long as women give birth to 
children and men do not, there are. But how much does this matter for personality 
outcomes? I think it means something. I think I am different as a woman than I 
would have been as a man, exactly because I can have children and I am meant to 
care for them. I mean purely biologically. But at the same time, in my work and 
daily-life I do not go around and think, "I am a woman"...I think it comes down to 
certain basic properties, maybe an awareness of other people’s needs…, guilt that 
you always feel for not being flexible enough with respect to other people who 
you think need your help or attention. We, as women, talk about feeling a strong 
responsibility…for both our children and parents and our spouses, and I am not 
sure if men talk in the same way. I think that this has something to do with 
biology, even though it definitely has a lot to do with culture.  
Bjarne: ...I am, for my own part, in serious doubt. Yes maybe these differences you 
describe can be thought of resulting from culture, environment, and tradition. I 
mean we are in a transitional period from a grandparent generation that had very 
clearly defined gender roles, a parent generation in which this still continued, and 
then a war.  After the war came this thing about the man bringing home the 
money, the woman caring for the house, and the family being magnified... But 
asking biological questions, purely biological, makes me wonder if the things you 
describe should be thought of as being more a result of tradition and culture, and 
images that come from the generations that I just described. If you think ahead 
four generations from now, if things continue to go in the direction of greater 
equality and greater opportunities for women, will this biological thing still 
continue in women’s being? I mean will she have, as you say, more concern for 
others' needs and care? I am not so sure. Many discussions we've had have ended 
in the conclusion that we - you and I - are alike. We have been surprised because 
we have the same attitudes towards moral questions... I can be equally interested in 
home, family, care and "soft" values as the person I am married to. So I am more 
in doubt, and wonder if what you described can still be thought of as a cultural 
phenomenon. 
Among Turkish and Norwegian interviewees, many believed that learned factors and 
socialization were more significant in creating the differences between women and men:  
Gökhan (38): I have a very short answer to that question, and perhaps it will be a 
standard answer. Surely there are some biological ones, but I do not believe that 
there are any social, cultural, mental differences between men and women. 
Arne (33): I think the differences are learned, apart from minor physical 
limitations…What one gets a chance to do in life influences (behavior) a lot. As 
well as learned expectations and influences from other friends. And there are 
individual differences between children that are greater than differences between 
the sexes, like innate skills and temperament. I think there can be greater inborn 
differences between two boys, then between girls and boys.   
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These answers concerning differences between men and women left me at a point quite 
close to where I had started: it is neither possible, nor fruitful, to decompose differences 
between women and men into their hormonal, genetic, physical, behavioral and learned 
elements and analyze their relative weights separately. Human beings are complex wholes 
formed by interactions of all these factors from the moment they are born: “Bodies, 
minds and cultures interact in such complex and profound ways that we cannot strip 
them down and compare them separately. Only as the separate cultures of men and 
women become more alike will we be able to assess the possibility of unalterable sex 
differences.” (Fausto-Sterling 1985). Accordingly, it is more rewarding, both practically 
and politically, to analyze institutionalized gender differences both in families and social 
institutions as well as examining the situations in which biologically-based arguments are 




Chapter 8 Towards a Clarification of Main 
Wishes and Struggles  
In this chapter several related aspects of Turkish and Norwegian interviewees’ lives will 
be analyzed. The first section will take up the question of time-use. The second section 
will be an analysis of plans that the couples in this study are making for the future, 
together with the perceived constraints on such life planning. The third section will 
analyze different attitudes towards modernity. The overall aim of this chapter is to 
contribute to a clarification of the “struggles and wishes”38 of these individuals – who are 
members of a specific social group in their societies – by analyzing their accounts of the 
main “public issues” of their times and “private troubles” (Mills 1959) of their lives.   
8.1 Time-use: ‘Americanized’ Turks and Norwegians Seeking 
‘Family Time’ 
Time is a scarce good for most individuals in modern society. Dual-earner couples with 
small children face additional constraints on their time-use. As Daly argues “with the 
rapid emergence of the dual-earner family and the corresponding inflation in the value of 
time, the analysis of time differences for women and men is central to the analysis of 
gender relations” (Daly 1996: 177). In her study of the “time bind” that working parents 
in America face, Arlie Hochschild (1997) argued that family time has taken on an 
‘industrial’ tone: “the more attached we are to the world of work, the more its deadlines, 
its cycles, its pauses and interruptions shape our lives and the more family time is forced 
to accommodate to the pressures of work” (ibid.: 45). Do the Turkish and Norwegian 
couples in this study feel that they are in a time bind? 
 Turkish interviewees working at jobs in the private sector with competitive work 
environments appeared to be most similar to the American workers that Hochschild 
described. Elif (37) actually used the concept of ‘Americanization’ when talking about her 
time problems:  
I don’t think that I spend my time the way I want to. In fact, my economic 
conditions could enable me to do many things, like playing tennis or other sports. 
But I think we became very Americanized. Recently, in an American film I saw, a 
woman was saying, ‘when you earn a lot of money, you don’t get the time to 
spend the money you have earned!’ (laughs) We also experience something like 
                                                     
38 I am applying these terms in reference to Marx’ definition of Critical Theory as “the self 
clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age” (Quoted in Fraser 1990: 97).   
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this. And when you have a lot of time, you don’t have the economic power to do 
anything to pass that time. So we live with such a contradiction. 
Type and sector of occupation emerged as a major factor influencing time-related 
problems in the Turkish group. Those working in the private sector have longer 
workdays and less time for themselves. Ipek (35) underlined the significance of sectoral 
differences:  
My work day starts like a programmed robot and continues at full speed like a 
programmed robot. Ilhan works in the public sector; he can organize his day more 
comfortably, but I do not have it that way. You have to work much more 
systematically in the private sector because you are in fact competing with time, 
and time means money. So in that framework, you have to organize your day and 
set your priorities efficiently.  
 Ceyda (35) and Cemil (35) are both top managers in the private sector and are highly 
ambitious concerning their careers. Ceyda explained their extraordinary long work hours 
and how having a child led to a slight decrease in the time they spend at work:  
In fact we have always been working too much, haven’t we? I don’t remember a 
period in my life when I worked just a little. I mean the conception of standard 
working hours from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. never existed in my life, it is the same for 
Cemil. We always came home at 10 p.m. or at midnight. Now the same tempo 
continues, but I cannot do the same thing because of Canan (her child). If we did 
not have Canan, I am sure we wouldn’t come home before 10.  
Faruk (34) also commented on the harsh working conditions of the private sector, while 
his wife Figen (33) saw a gendered aspect of time-use:  
Faruk: In Turkey, working in the private sector necessitates being a slave to your 
work. You cannot say, “I won’t do this, I won’t do that,” to certain people. You 
do not have such a right in Turkey...Therefore you have to enjoy your work and 
try to make it more fun. So I don’t think this is so bad. 
Figen: I told you that he lives for his work, this is what I meant!  
(later in the interview) Faruk: I don’t think time is that important. I mean you 
mustn’t always think, ‘oh, I lost a lot of time again.’ I do not want to live a life that 
is too planned or  programmed...There should be some surprises in life.  
Figen: But you have that comfort. For example you do not need to go and pick up 
the child at 6 p.m. The child has to come home and have dinner, but you do not 
have an obligation to make that happen.  
Figen and Faruk had important disagreements concerning time-use at work. Figen thinks 
that her husband spends too much time at work and that most of that time is actually 
unnecessary. She believes that people simply waste a lot of time at work and that Faruk 
spends too much time with his colleagues apart from work for his personal pleasure.  
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 Among the Turkish interviewees, it was mainly mothers of children under school age 
who talked about severe time constraints and lack of “free” or private time. Mothers of 
small children feel more constrained than fathers in terms of time use. Hale (30), who is 
the mother of a three-year-old child and who has a demanding job in the private sector, 
claimed that in Turkey, fatherhood does not entail as much responsibility as motherhood:  
Hikmet’s work is more comfortable. At least in the evenings, he has more time for 
himself. In Turkey fatherhood does not entail as much responsibility as 
motherhood does. I am the one who takes care of everything having to do with 
the child. She spends most of her time with me when we are at home. Her father 
can watch TV but I can’t; not that I want to, but I don’t have such a luxury when 
she is awake.  
Even an ordinary activity like watching TV can be regarded as a ‘luxury’ in the context of 
gendered time constraints. In addition to her demanding work life, Hale has the whole 
responsibility for the ‘second shift’ at home. She mentioned that she manages to reserve 
one hour each week to play tennis and this is actually the only personal leisure time she 
has. Are there such clear gender differences concerning time use in the Norwegian 
group? 
Even though the differences are not as sharp as in the Turkish group, there is also a 
gendered pattern in the ways women and men experienced time pressures. Mothers of 
small children talked extensively on time-related problems. We had heard the story of 
Lise in section 5.1, who felt that, ‘the watch was steering her life.’ Several women share 
this feeling. Ann (34), the mother of two preschool children, complained about how little 
‘quality time’ is left in the evenings: 
Now we both work full-time and pick up the children from daycare, then come 
home and make dinner. It gets really hectic in the afternoon and suddenly it is 
bedtime. There is too little ‘quality time’ left at night. 
Grete (33), the mother of two preschool children, does not feel that she spends her time 
the way she would really like:  
I don’t feel I spend my time the way I want. I would rather spend more time with 
my kids. I feel that it gets too hectic. It is like this: in the two hours after we come 
home from work you make dinner, feed the kids, and put them to bed. It gets too 
busy. So if I could spend my time the way I wanted, I would have worked less, 
spent fewer hours at work, so that I could have had more time at home, definitely. 
While Grete would like to spend more time at home with the children, her husband Geir 
(32) longs for more time for leisure and open-air activities:  
I would rather spend more time outdoors, walk more, be in the open air more.  
Some Norwegian fathers also expressed a wish of having more time both for themselves 
and their families. Jarle (36) is one of them:  
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I feel that I spend too much time at work. Lately, I feel I’ve had too little time for 
myself. But I don’t know if it is because I am not good at structuring my time...I 
feel that I spend too much time at work and that means that I have too little time 
at home.  
Magne (37) mentioned that he would like to have the opportunity to expand the time he 
has for the different “segments” in his life: 
My time schedule is quite full and I’ve noticed that I cannot get to bed at nights on 
time. There is a need for that ‘adult’ time in the evening, the need to relax. So the 
nights get shorter and shorter. All at once, I have a feeling that I have too little 
time for work, too little time with the kids, and too little time with my wife. So I 
could think of expanding all those segments a little.  
Magne does not want to decrease the time he spends at home for the sake of increasing 
his work time. He wants it all: both more time at work and more time at home. He enjoys 
both spheres and does not want to choose one or the other.  
These accounts exemplify the phenomenon Wærness (1999) calls a ‘life cycle 
squeeze.’ Based on data from national time budget surveys in Norway, Wærness shows 
that greater number of younger parents in the 1990s, compared to the 1980s, are likely to 
experience a life cycle squeeze, that is a period in which heavy pressure is placed on their 
time resources (Wærness 1999: 213). Among Norwegian interviewees of this study, there 
was a clear difference between younger and older couples concerning perceived time-
pressures. While most younger Norwegians feel time pressures in their daily lives, older 
Norwegians mentioned that they now have better control over their time, compared to 
earlier life phases. Henrik (50) explained that he felt tied up in the first 10 years of her 
career, but that this has changed now:  
Do you spend your time the way you want to?  
Henrik: Yes, to a large extend now. But earlier in life I was very busy. For many 
years my workdays were very binding with schedules and shifts...the first ten years 
after I graduated, I felt that other things controlled my time and there was very 
little time left over. 
Inger (58) explained that she decided to invest in her career later in life. This has limited 
the time available for other activities, but she conceives of this situation as a result of a 
conscious choice: 
I am quite conscious of the fact that I decided to invest in my career very late in 
life, and therefore I accept that it takes all the time and energy I have... Ideally I 
could think of having more time for other things, like going to the theater or 
reading more books...But actually I am quite satisfied with the way I spend my 
time because it was a very conscious choice that I made.  
Younger interviewees did not talk about the way they spend their time as a result of 
conscious choice. They felt their schedules were sometimes hectic, leaving too little time 
for themselves and their families. For Camilla (31) and Cato (32), time has been an 
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important issue, and they have concrete plans to make changes in their work lives so that 
they have more time with the kids and more leisure time for themselves:  
Cato: After we had the kids, we no longer had enough time, I mean leisure time, 
time to spend with friends or on hobbies. I wish I had more time, especially for 
people that I see very rarely (...)  
Camilla: I see that there was a big difference when I was on a leave of absence; 
then I could find time for everything else. So one should almost plan so that one 
does not need to work any longer, or rather, work less and get more time. Time is 
getting more and more important. It does not help to have all the world’s income 
if you do not have the time to enjoy yourself! 
Given these time-pressures and tight schedules, what are the concrete plans that these 
couples have for future?  
8.2 Future Plans: Decommodified Norwegians and Pessimistic 
Turks  
According to Giddens (1991) life-planning is a key characteristic of late-modernity: 
“Given the extreme reflexivity of late modernity, the future does not just consist of the 
expectation of events yet to come. ‘Futures’ are organized reflexively in the 
present…(ibid.: 29)” I have asked the interviewees about their future plans to learn about 
the conditions influencing their life-planning. 
 Turkish and Norwegian interviewees have dissimilar future plans. Economic factors 
have a greater impact for Turks, and most of their plans revolve around saving money 
and acquiring the means sufficient to secure their future. Norwegian interviewees, on the 
other hand, feel fewer economic constraints on their life choices. Their main plans 
revolve around the issues of time, leisure, and making their relationships work.  
 Several of the Norwegian interviewees mentioned maintaining their relationship as 
one of the most important life plans they have. Given the high incidence of break-ups for 
married and cohabiting couples, staying together crystallizes into a life plan that needs  to 
be fostered.  Jorunn (35) and  Jarle (36) argued that staying together and contented takes 
work:  
Jarle: We do not have any concrete plans, apart from seeing for that we stay happy 
with each other.  
Jorunn: Hmm, that is a plan. I have a plan that we manage to stay together as a 
family. That is a plan, and it does not come automatically. It is something one has 
to work on.  
For Geir (32) too, being contented as a family is the major life-plan he and his wife have:  




The life-plans articulated by Lise (36) and Lars (36) bring together most of the issues that 
are characteristic of Norwegian interviewees: 
Lise: It is important to have a job, learn a lot, and feel that you can use your 
knowledge in your work. But it is also very important to find a balance between 
family and work, so that you have a surplus of  energy and time to do other things 
as well, like spend time with family or friends, the way we do now. I think I have a 
good life, actually! (laughs) 
Lars: Yes, it is important to keep ones’ friends. And paying attention to the kids, 
and to my relationship with Lise, these things are important. Friends and family. 
(…)Balancing things in such a way that you feel good, both job, family, and 
leisure. I look around and think that we are lucky.  
Lise: The plan is to do well together, that is the future plan. Continue with the 
same level of happiness as we have now...If there is any plan, it is to see to it that 
we do not work more than we do now, but rather have more leisure time.  
Lise and Lars feel they have been lucky in their lives, managing to establish a good social 
network that helps them in combining work life with family responsibilities. One of the 
conditions they mentioned that will help them to continue with their current level of 
satisfaction is not to increase their working hours. Several other interviewees articulated a 
wish to slow down at work so they could spend more time with their families or on their 
own. Camilla (31), the mother of two children, had definite plans to work less and spend 
more time at home:  
Most of my plans are realized, like establishing a family, and stuff like that. I do 
not have great ambitions at work. I just want to take care of my kids and have a 
job so that I have a certain level of income. I plan to work part time in the future. 
Then I will have more time for the house and the kids... So in general, both of us 
think about having more leisure time; we want more time both for ourselves and 
for the kids.  
Ann (34), the mother of two small children, also expressed a desire to work less, at least 
while the children are small: 
None of us have any special career plans. That you head for a place that is your 
target. We want to work with interesting things, rather than climbing up a ladder... 
since we have two small kids, it might be nice to try to get shorter workdays for 
awhile.  
Some younger parents mentioned economic constraints that have influenced their life 
plans. These couples have many expenses, pay high interest rates on their educational 
loans,39 and often have mortgages on their homes. Nina (32) expressed a desire for more 
family and leisure time, but also mentioned that it often depends on money:    
                                                     
39 The Norwegian State provides loans for university students. The  institution established for this 
purpose in the 1960s, the State Educational Loan Fund (Lånekassen) was initially founded to 
provide cheap loans to students, with favorable repayment conditions. However, in the last few 
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We do not have concrete plans, apart from that we want to spend more time 
together. I think Nils could consider working less, and I also could consider that. 
And we would like to travel away together. But it is all a question of money. If we 
won the lottery, we would probably travel far away and stay for a year or so! Or we 
would just do something totally different. I could change my job, so that I could 
have more flexibility, work on things that interest me most, and work when it is 
convenient for the family.    
For older couples, major life-plans revolve around the timing of retirement and finding 
time to do the things that they always wanted to do. Endre (60) said that his main plans 
concern how to spend his time after retirement:  
Yes, we have very definite future plans...I am looking forward to ending my work-
career…I have been working since the early 1960s and think that I deserve to do 
some other things now. And we very much want to travel and see more of the 
world.  
Bjarne (57) mentioned that they have reached the ‘buttered-side’ of life, meaning that the 
struggles over time and money are minimized. Both Bjarne and Bente have jobs they 
enjoy, and they have no ‘superiors’ who can decide on their times. Mainly they feel that 
their major plans are realized, and that what is left are small plans like arranging travels 
and holidays. Hilde (49) also mentioned the pleasure of ‘not needing to plan all the time’:  
I think it is delightful to be free from too much planning. That effort to make all 
of the puzzle pieces fit together, the way I did when the kids were small, was much 
tougher. I feel like I have more freedom now, and can take things as they come. I 
think that is really good.  
Economic security gives Norwegians the opportunity to be more optimistic about their 
life-plans. This was the major factor differentiating them from the Turkish interviewees, 
among whom pessimism prevailed.   
Most Turkish interviewees mentioned that it is difficult to make plans in a country 
characterized by political and economic instability. A general pessimism and hopelessness 
prevails, especially among those who have more limited economic means. Figen (33) and 
Faruk (34) explained how their life plans are determined by general economic conditions 
and therefore would more properly be called ‘dreams’:  
Figen: Not plans, but we have dreams. We have dreams about a house and a life, I 
mean living outside the city, in a house with a garden, growing flowers. Or we 
have this dream about having a better economic situation so that we could work 
only for pleasure...we have serious thoughts about the child’s education.  
Faruk: What Figen says it true, in Turkey you must think of these as dreams. 
Because even though you make some plans about the future, politicians can 
                                                                                                                                       
decades, the interest rates on student loans were increased and the time of repayment was 
shortened. Though this loan enabled many to attend college in the first place,  it acts as a major 
economic constraint for many years after graduation.  
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destroy them with the decisions they make. One year ago, our jobs were going well 
and we started to think, ‘we can do this and that if things go this way for 1 more 
year,’ and then an economic crisis comes and everything dissipates.  
Figen: The economy is very important in our life. All plans are built on it.  
Elif (37) and Emre (37) mentioned the social and political determinants influencing their 
lives, and characterized their life as troubled by a state of ‘uneasiness’ concerning the 
future:  
Emre: No, we do not make future plans, and perhaps the reason for that is that we 
are pessimistic.  
Elif: I think it is more related to not trusting the system, since the equilibrium 
changes rapidly. I work in the private sector, and my life style would change if I 
were unable to work. There are certain societal unbalances and we live with the 
thought that, for example, there might be a Military Coup… 
Emre: or religious fundamentalists may come to power 
Elif: Even though we do not believe in such possibilities totally, they are in the 
back of our minds and unsettle us.  
Emre: So we live in an uneasy condition. 
Elif: Therefore we live more day-to-day, without making plans. But of course this 
also has something to do with our personalities.  
The way Elif talks about how their whole life-style would change the minute she looses 
her job in the private sector denotes the high level of commodification in Turkey. 
Those with better economic situations mentioned plans of ‘filling up’ or ‘nourishing’ 
their private lives. Ipek (35), who had explained that she felt like a ‘programmed robot’ at 
work, wants to find a solution:  
I have realized most of my long-term plans to secure my survival, like getting an 
education and building a career...from now on, I do not have such long-term 
plans. But I should add this: I want to transform my work life into something 
more comfortable. I mean I want to nourish my private life, by working less, by 
not using so much of my day at work. 
‘Saving for the future’ was also a commonly mentioned future plan among Turkish 
respondents. Oya (52) explained that they have to save money in order to maintain their 
standard of living after retirement:  
We have to make plans for future. You asked earlier about our expectations from 
the state. We cannot expect anything, because the state cannot guarantee our 
future. We have a certain standard of living now, and the moment we stop 
working in the private sector, it will be impossible to retain that standard with the 
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pension the state provides. So of course we have to make plans and save money 
so that we can keep this standard of living in future. 
The main difference between the Turkish and Norwegian interviewees concerning future 
plans is their level of ‘decommodification,’ that is the degree of upholding a socially 
acceptable standard of living independent of market participation (Esping-Andersen 
1990: 37). Norwegian interviewees’ life-plans are freer from economic constraints than 
are those of Turkish interviewees and this basically stems from the basic economic 
security provided by the well-institutionalized welfare state. A general pessimism prevails 
among the Turks, who feel that external factors (like political instability and economic 
factors) have a more determining and constraining power over their lives. The marginal 
welfare state does not offer enough security, neither for basic social rights during the 
economically active years, nor for old age. Decommodification effects of the social 
security system is minimal in Turkey.  
 Securing the future economically is the major aspect of life-planning for Turkish 
couples. For the parents of younger children, planning for their education is another 
main concern, influencing other decisions in life. The public school system is not 
satisfactory in Turkey. Maintaining a place in a private school and choosing between 
alternatives necessitate careful planning, as well as solid economic means.  
 Norwegians, on the other hand, appear freer in terms of life planning. A common 
plan among Norwegians concerns arranging for more leisure time to be spent either 
traveling or being with the children. Another major difference between the Turkish and 
Norwegian groups is that several Norwegians mentioned ‘relationship work’ as an 
important future plan to which they want to devote effort. Given the higher risk for 
break-up of marriages and cohabitation arrangements, the stress on careful planning that 
the relationships necessitate is comprehensible.  
 Building on these specific wishes and plans, I will now embark on formulating the 
major public issues and private troubles in the lives of the interviewees, together with the 
main wishes and struggles in the contexts of different modernities.  
8.3 Different Modernities, Different Transitions 
The social contexts of Turkey and Norway are characterized by different modernities. In 
the European context, Norway was a latecomer to industrialization and urbanization, yet 
the dynamics of modernization have been endogenous. Historically, the 
institutionalization of the welfare state was based on a widely-shared ideal of community 
and solidarity and a belief in universalistic principles. Keeping out of the European 
Union, yet being inherently tied to the global capitalist market, Norway is facing many 
challenges to its solidarity and egalitarian ideals in the new millennium.     
 Turkey is another interesting case in the context of global capitalism. Its top-down 
modernization has always been characterized by internal contradictions and its status as 
an officially secular and democratic country in which a great majority of the population is 
Muslim creates a specific type of modernity. There are great differences between social 
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groups, both in terms of economic standards and value orientations. The co-existence of 
traditional, early-modern and late-modern expectations, values, and practices can be 
conceptualized by using the slightly awkward, yet suitable term ‘in-between modernity.’ 
 These specific characteristics of Turkey and Norway should be kept in mind while 
analyzing the attitudinal differences between the two groups of interviewees. A general 
look at the older and younger interviewees, in terms of their basic attitudes, makes the 
imprint of different modernities clear.  
   Among the Turkish interviewees, differences between older and younger couples 
were more visible. I conceptualize these differences as a transition from an ‘early-modern’ 
to a ‘late-modern’ outlook. Younger couples were significantly more ‘individualized’: they 
were more interested in maintaining the privacy of their nuclear families and were less 
constrained by traditional expectations. They invested more and had higher expectations 
concerning their relationship. Among the Norwegian interviewees the attitudinal 
differences between the younger and older interviewees was less significant. A common 
trait among both younger and older Norwegian couples can be labeled a ‘cautious-
modern’ outlook. The indicators for this attitude are a critical approach to increased 
materialization and commodification and a desire to slow down the daily rush – by 
working less and getting more leisure and ‘family’ time.  Let me now detail these 
postulations with concrete examples from the interview accounts.  
 Most older Turkish interviews had an ‘early-modern’ attitude, which I define as 
skillfully combining modern values with certain traditional orientations. They believed in 
the importance of further modernization in tandem with preserving traditional Turkish 
values of which  they were proud, such as attaching a high value to family relations and a 
community-orientation.  
 Ayla (54) and Adnan (58) are perfect examples of the early-modern outlook. They are 
both highly idealist concerning their professions. They said, ‘being useful to the country’ 
is a vital factor that has guided their actions in life. Both conceptualize their work as a 
‘duty,’ not a ‘career,’ and believe that by performing their jobs in the best possible way, 
they will contribute to the further development of the country:  
Adnan: We are pleased with our professions. We become satisfied, knowing that 
we are working and being useful to our country. We have no complaints. We work 
with pride. We never thought, ‘I wish I worked in that country and earned this 
much money,’ or the like. On the contrary, we think we should work for our 
country so that it will develop and progress.  
Ayla and Adnan are the first generation in their families who moved to bigger cities from 
rural areas. Their parents were farmers and did not have much education. They were the 
only ones in their families who enrolled at a university and became professionals:  
Ayla: We realized everything ourselves within a context of big constraints. Our 
family was never very involved in our education, never asked ‘how is school 
going?’ We succeeded in our profession through our own struggle, dealing with 
registration and all that, by ourselves at such a young age.  
 
158 
Due to the hard-earned status of their education and professions, they also display a high 
degree of appreciation for their achievements in life. They have a moderate income but 
are satisfied with that. Both Ayla and Adnan mentioned that a respect for religion and 
tradition is important to them. They believe in a sort of modernization that will not lead 
to a disappearance of Turkish traditions and values.  
 Berna (51) and Bora (59) also belong to the ‘early-modern’ category, which involves a 
high level of idealism and a belief in progress through keeping traditions alive. They 
define themselves as ‘children of the Republic.’ This identification implies a type of 
positive nationalism, an appreciation of the historical struggles that resulted in today’s 
republic and a belief in Atatürk’s principles. Atatürk’s ideology (Kemalism) is defined 
under six major principles: republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, statism and 
reformism. Bora thinks that Turkey’s future depends on an implementation of these 
principles:  
First of all, we are children of the Republic, children of Atatürk. I am a person 
who believes wholeheartedly in Atatürk’s principles. And I think that Turkey’s 
future depends on these principles. Accordingly I place myself in this framework: 
A secular person, who has respect for religion, and a social democrat.   
Berna and Bora are critical of conservative governments and their deviations from these 
principles. They are also critical of existing gender inequalities and believe that further 
modernization (mainly increasing levels of education and urbanization) will bring more 
gender equality. They advocate further modernization by maintaining traditional Turkish 
values. This view contrasts with the ideas of many younger Turkish interviewees, who 
mentioned the need to question and change some traditions. 
 Elif (37) and Emre (37) display characteristics that are surprisingly similar to those of, 
“the agents of reflexive modernization,” that Beck (1992) describes in detail. In his 
framework, the individualization processes take place in, “the welfare states of the West,” 
and it dissolves, ‘the traditional parameters of industrial society,’ namely class culture, 
class consciousness, gender, and family roles. In the Turkish case, these ‘de-
traditionalizations’ are enabled by the market, given the absence of the welfare state. Elif 
differentiates herself from all the other females in her childhood family by virtue of her 
having learned a profession, which gives her not only the reflexive skills necessary for 
writing her own biography, but also the solid economic basis to free herself from, 
‘traditional female duties’: 
Elif: The training I received in my childhood, which was in line with societal 
doctrines, said that the man works outside, has the authority at home, makes the 
major decisions, and has the initiative. The woman should adapt to this, and her 
duty is to do the housework, give birth to children, and raise them. This is how it 
was in my own family; these were the social roles that were taught to me. Of 
course, it is also because I grew up in a smaller city in which certain feudal 
structures still existed. But I started challenging this…because I got this feeling 
that it was unfair. I did not accept the lifestyle that was imposed on women, so I 
chose to get an education. I directed all my energy towards the university, since 
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having a profession was the only path of emancipation for me, and especially 
having a profession that would allow me to enter a masculine field. 
The specificity of Turkish modernity is the way traditional gender role expectations 
continue to exist side-by-side with these late-modern transformations. A major source of 
conflict for the dual-earner couples in this study is the existence of these contradictory 
expectations and demands. These factors also influence internal relationship dynamics. 
Elif and Emre talked extensively about their relationship problems, and Elif argued that 
they were going through, “pains of individualization” since they have been questioning 
traditions all the time:  
Elif: Approximately four years ago we had serious problems in our relationship. In 
that period, I was working more actively and Emre was not working. I started 
feeling a little masculinized…We started searching for ways to deal with these 
problems, started reading books…went to therapy… And I think these are the 
first steps we take toward individualization. This is something we have been 
experiencing recently, and we are feeling the pains of this. Of course there are 
many people who do not experience this. When I look at people around, many 
people, including university graduates and professionals, do not ask many 
questions. They carry on their lives within the old, traditional patterns and do not 
get bothered by this. And I look at them totally amazed, asking how they can live 
this way!  
Emre: That means that you can continue with the traditional solutions already at 
hand. Whenever traditional solutions are insufficient, you start searching. I mean if 
we also had certain knowledge from the past to help us solve our problems, we 
could cope and wouldn’t bother at all. But when you don’t have such knowledge, 
you must put something in its place. When you can manage by using existing 
traditions, you won’t have as much trouble. But of course, this would not bring 
any development; it would be a backward-looking life. I guess there is no growth 
without some pain!  
These accounts shed light on the multi-faceted effects of reflexive modernization and 
individualization: opening new perspectives, promising expanded individual freedom, and 
introducing new risks and pains, all at the same time.  
 Several younger Turkish interviewees reflected on the ambiguities of 
individualization. As we saw in case A, in section 3.6, Ilhan thinks that individualization, 
which he identifies as, ‘a lonely path of development,’ is one of the reasons behind 
increasing divorce rates in big cities:   
Ilhan: …even though people do not specify individualization as a goal, they follow 
a lonely path of development, whether they want to or not. On this lonely path of 
self-development, even people in one’s inner circle, that is the family, are not 
included, since you have a separate social milieu and a separate work environment.  
Maybe this brings with it a type of differentiation, and maybe individualization also 
decreases tolerance for certain things, because you don't feel like you have to 
persevere. You think, ‘everybody is free to behave the way they want.’ So you also 
behave the way you want...  
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Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (1995) also stress the ‘double-faced’ nature of the 
individualization process, implying opportunities as well as risks, freedom as well as new 
dependencies, possibilities of  relationships based on pure love as well as loneliness.    
 None of the Norwegians used the more scientific term ‘individualization,’ the way 
several Turkish interviewees did. But many Norwegians also reflected on the double-
sided effects of societal developments, contrasting on ‘individualism’ with a community 
orientation. Both older and younger Norwegian interviewees talked extensively about 
their concerns related to increasing materialization, decreasing ‘community’ spirit, and 
increasing stress on the ‘self.’ I conceptualize these concerns as the signs of a ‘cautious-
modern’ attitude. Many Norwegians displayed a skepticism concerning the challenges 
that the ‘egalitarian’ welfare system faces, and the ways in which, ‘everything starts to be 
measured by money.’   
Camilla (31) and Cato (32) talked passionately about how they disapprove of certain 
trends in Norwegian society, mainly of the increasing emphasis on money and labor-
market status.40 They do not like the fact that demands concerning acceptable standards 
of living have gone up and that both men and women must work long hours to meet 
those demands. Both Camilla and Cato are critical of trends in the labor market and of 
the development of the ‘information society’ in general:   
Cato: There are many people who sit and do very insignificant things; all that talk 
about the information society, it is just ballyhoo! ...The more insignificant their 
work, the more money they earn. Stockbrokers are the most obvious 
example...Media jobs have a high status in society, but it is sheer nonsense after all. 
These trends will change eventually and being a farmer will be a high status again. 
Camilla: I think that the trend will turn back and that money will become less 
important. Being able to take care of one’s family will gain a higher status the 
future. That is what I think and hope. Having more leisure time, being able to 
control one’s own life, these things will become more important. (…) 
Cato: It should be possible to raise a family with only one income, with only one 
person working. But it is not possible now with all the emphasis on a big house, a 
fancy car, and all that stuff. It was not like that earlier; people were satisfied with 
renting a house until the kids grew up.  
Camilla: I still think that it will change. In a way, society had to go through the 
opposite, with everyone in the labor market, to see all the faults of that.  
Camilla and Cato display a cautious attitude concerning increasing materialization and 
hope that other values, related to relationships and self-development rather than money, 
become more important in future.  
Elin (56) and Endre (59) are concerned about increasing material differences in society, 
which they think is threatening the basis of the welfare model in Norway:  
                                                     
40 See case study E in section 7.4 for detailed information on this couple. 
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Elin: … I miss the ‘community spirit’41 among people. What we experience now is 
that money becomes more and more important, and that you don’t do anything if 
you don’t get a return for it. I think this is scary… 
Endre: …there are also some people who have so much money that they don’t 
know what to do with it…For example we know of people who can buy 
apartments for their children as presents. What type of signals do you give then? 
Some people have too much, and that class difference is not something that a 
small country like Norway can tolerate for long.  
Elin: No, it is exactly the fact that we have managed not to have those big 
differences that has made this country a good place to live. But the more the 
differences grow, the less people will care about each other. And I don’t think that 
bodes well for the future. More class differences will lead to divisions and 
separations in our society.  
Both Elin and Endre use typically Norwegian concepts, like collective spirit, solidarity, 
and equality, and voice a concern for their dissolution. They conceive of Norway as a 
society in which class-based differences are minimal, and they do not approve the trends 
that undermine this.    
 Another aspect of the cautious-modern attitude is a concern with increasing 
individualism. For example Bjarne (57) thinks that the most characteristic trend from the 
1980s onwards is an increased focus on, ‘one’s own happiness and welfare.’ Bjarne also 
thinks that this is a main factor behind increased divorce rates, and that it negatively 
influenced especially children. Magne (37) also mentioned that increased individualism 
and egoism was a general trend in society, and that he was skeptical about its 
consequences:  
I think the ways people behave in relation to each other are quite individualistic 
these days. I read in different magazines and papers, that everybody should strive 
for self-realization and stuff like that, and I don’t think that it was this way twenty 
years ago... Maybe this shows that people have become more egoistic and are not 
willing to compromise…I have a feeling the way people behave in relation to each 
other is more and more characterized by sharp elbows.  
The interview accounts demonstrate that both Turkish and Norwegian interviewees 
reflect on conflicting aspects of modernization and individualization, and sometimes tend 
to compare the times we live in with an imagined past in which people were less selfish 
and more community oriented. 
                                                     




8.4 Towards a Formulation of Main Wishes and Struggles  
In the former chapters, we focused on many different themes and analyzed variation 
within the two groups. In this section, I will attempt to identify general wishes, troubles, 
and struggles that emerged recurrently in the accounts of Turkish and Norwegian 
interviewees.   
 Main wishes of Turkish interviewees revolved mainly around issues of increased 
modernization, meaning more democracy, better economic conditions, increased levels 
of education, and more gender equality. Norwegians, on the other hand, wished for more 
time – both for themselves, as leisure time, and for their families and friends, as 
relationship time. 
 The main struggles of Turkish interviewees crystallized as difficulties they face in 
handling the conflicts of ‘in-between modernity,’ which I conceptualize as the co-
existence of traditional, modern, and late-modern expectations, both in the private and 
the public spheres. A related struggle is managing a type of ‘alienation’ resulting from a 
feeling of non-belonging and a sense of difference. For Norwegians, the main struggle, 
especially for younger interviewees, was living up to unrealistically high expectations of 
success and physical availability in many different spheres – the family, work, friendship, 
and leisure activities. Let me detail these assertions by interview excerpts and concrete 
examples: 
 As we showed in earlier chapters, most Turkish interviewees thought that the major 
‘public issue’ in Turkey was that its modernization was not complete, and articulated a 
desire for increased material welfare, more urbanization, better education opportunities 
for more people, and increased gender equality – in short, more modernization.  For 
example, Orhan (54) wished for better educational opportunities, and he thought that this 
would have positive influences on gender relations:  
Orhan: Education absolutely has an influence in increasing equality between 
women and men. Inequality and women’s struggles decrease among persons with 
an average level of education.  
Dilek (41) thought that rapid urbanization was a very positive development for Turkey, 
and this gave her hope for the future:  
What is pleasing is that the literacy rate has gone above 90 per cent in Turkey and 
there is rapid urbanization. I think this gives one hope about the future. There is a 
generation that is very different from their parents, that experienced a great leap 
forward in terms of education and attitudes.  
 Literacy rate is above 90 percent for Turkish men, but still only 75 percent for Turkish 
women. Dilek displayed a tendency to be optimistic (and at times unrealistic) with 
reference to certain societal developments. She was also a strict adherent of the ‘liberated 
modern Turkish woman’ belief. She thought that “urban, educated Turkish women are 
not much different than any European women,” and accordingly wished for more 
education and urbanization to create a better life for everybody.   
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 For Norwegians, their main wish was related to their own private troubles, namely a 
scarcity of time. A great majority of Norwegian interviewees articulated a wish to 
decrease their work hours, in order to have more leisure and family time. This was a 
common characteristic of both men and women, and especially of those with younger 
children. Here is a selection of expressions related to the desire for shorter work hours: 
Mona (35): We both wish to work at 90 percent, so that every second week we 
could have a day off to be at home.   
Lars (36): Our jobs are not so important that we will work overtime and let others 
take care of our kids. We work overtime for one or two days, but seldom…If 
there is any plan for the future, it is not to work any more than we do right now, 
and to have more leisure time.  
Ingmar (61): In the last few years I have consciously chosen to slow down my 
work tempo. I used to sit down and work in the evening; I don’t want to do that 
any more.  
Jorunn (35): Ideally, I could think of working less, or maybe even going down to 
part-time. There are so many other things to spend time doing, besides working.  
Grete (33): If I could spend my time the way I want to, I would work less and get 
more time at home with the kids, definitely. 
Ann (34): When you have two small children, it can be okay to try to have shorter 
workdays for a period.  
In the absence of major economic problems, and given the basic security provided by the 
welfare state, time has become a central issue for Norwegians. Not all interviewees think 
that they can reduce their work hours at this particular point in time, mainly for economic 
reasons, but they specified it as a major goal for which to strive. The decommodifying 
aspects of the social democratic welfare state enable them – to a certain extent – to 
reduce their working hours, without facing the threat of loosing their jobs or facing 
severe economic problems.  
 A main trouble that several Norwegian interviewees mentioned was the high 
expectations they had to meet. As we have seen in section 7.3, Lars (36) thought that 
“both women and men in Norway get exhausted because there are such huge 
expectations for an insane number of different roles.” He also mentioned that many 
couples struggle with a ‘life-cycle squeeze’ (Wærness 1999), since they have the heaviest 
work load and worst economic conditions when they have small children:  
Lars: Especially in the beginning, you have lots of student loans, and a house loan, 
and you have bad finances. The kids go to kindergarten and it costs a lot, then it 
gets scarce with the economy. It is in a way a problem with the whole division of 
labor, because you get the heaviest work load when you have small kids, and 
because then you have to work and get yourself a career, or you have a 
demanding, long education…Then you have kids and you will follow them up, 
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when you have the least amount of time to have children. So there are many 
conflicts in relation to that. 
Bente (52) and Bjarne (57) also thought that many young people end up in trouble, since 
they start at the ‘wrong end’:  
Bente: To a much larger extent, young people start with having kids and then get 
an education and a house and this may become very demanding. I think they 
create a lot of trouble for themselves by starting that way, because it takes a lot of 
energy to make the pieces fit together.  
Bjarne: I totally agree with this and we’ve talked many times about it, namely that 
many start at the wrong end. The things we felt were very important now come 
last, that is having a good job and a good income. So (the sequence of things) is 
turned up side down.  
The main struggles of Turkish couples emerge as difficulties in handling the conflicting 
demands of traditional, early-modern, and late-modern expectations. In earlier chapters, 
we analyzed many examples related to the conflicting demands of traditional and modern 
role definitions, especially for women. For example, Sevim (44) explained in detail how 
her main struggle has been her attempt to be politically active, besides her work and 
family responsibilities. But she had to give up on trying to do this, since traditional 
expectations of motherhood contradicted with her modern wish of contributing in the 
‘public-sphere’ actively:  
I stopped my political work, because it is not possible to do everything. I mean, 
I came to the point where I had to make a choice, either a proper family life – a 
husband and child – or politics, social activities…It is very difficult for a 
woman to carry on such activities when she has a child, since the responsibility 
for the child falls on her. It has been like that for hundreds of years; society 
sees it that way and expects you to prioritize accordingly.  The child also 
expects that. I mean, maybe the child does not enjoy the meal that her father 
prepares as much as the one her mother prepares. It seems like the child 
expects the tenderness from the mother.     
This is a typical example of the struggles that women face whenever they wish to make 
non-traditional choices and be active outside the home. As Sevim puts it, “certain 
invisible obstacles” hinder them.  
 The co-existence of traditional, modern and late-modern expectations, which I 
conceptualize as an ‘in-between modernity,’ characterizes the Turkish urban context, and 
the dual-earner interviewees of this study struggle to handle such conflicting demands. 
Another major consequence of this specific type of modernity is the existence of social 
groups with different value orientations and religiosity levels. Most Turkish interviewees 
mentioned that they belong to a minority: their practices do not always ‘represent’ general 
orientations. This sense of being a minority may in some extreme cases lead to a type of 
‘alienation.’ For example, Ceyda (35) and Cemil (35)42 mentioned repeatedly that their 
                                                     
42 See case study D in section 7.2 for more information on this couple. 
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life-style is quite different from many other people living in Istanbul. They have built up 
an isolated lifestyle in which they work extremely long hours and try to spend the rest of 
the time together in the context of their ‘nuclear’ family. A sense of non-belonging results 
from this:  
Cemil: We don’t feel like we belong to any social group, there is such a problem 
Ceyda: Yes it is true. I mean I feel like I belong to myself only!  
For Ceyda and Cemil, being ‘too different’ than rest of the society has led to a type of 
‘alienation.’ This feeling of non-belonging and difference was shared by several younger 
Turkish interviewees struggling to manage the contradictions of in-between modernity. 
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Chapter 9 Reviews, Connections, and 
Visions  
In this chapter, I will summarize the main findings that were analyzed as separate topics 
in former chapters and examine the connections between them. I will argue that an 
understanding of the specific modernities and gender policy regimes that prevail in the 
two countries are crucial in interpreting the interview accounts and exploring the 
relationship between public issues and individual problems. I will then relate these 
findings, which are based on the practices and evaluations of a specific group of 
individuals, to larger societal trends and claim that they can be helpful for challenging 
particular societal myths.  
 The conclusions of this study are based on analyses of in-depth interviews with 
urban, dual-earner couples in light of information gathered through historical analyses, 
official documents, statistics, and surveys carried out by other scholars. What can the 
experiences and evaluations of these individuals tell us about the general patterns and 
dynamics of their societies? What do their reflections contribute to our understanding of 
the key public issues and private troubles of our times? Which practices, norms and 
myths are they reproducing and which ones are they challenging?  
 The findings of this study will contribute to a questioning of the arrangements that 
are perceived and generally accepted as ‘natural’ and ‘universal’ by showing cross-national 
variations. The depiction of shared problems will illustrate that what many individuals 
perceive as personal troubles are actually social, shared by others and prone to change by 
political action. Another contribution will be rendering the influences of state policies 
visible in those arenas of life that are seemingly most private and personal. 
 The interviewees of this study are privileged in many respects: They belong to groups 
that are less constrained by economic necessity and that have access to sources of self-
realization due to their higher education levels and professional status. Agreeing to be 
interviewed for this study also signals the relative strength of their relationship and 
possession of a sense of accountability concerning their lives. Even though they share 
certain characteristics, it is important to note that there is a basic difference between the 
Turkish and Norwegian groups that were interviewed. Due to the homogeneity of 
Norwegian society, a balanced income distribution among the social classes, and 
prevailing egalitarian ideals, the Norwegian interviewees did not conceive of themselves 
as ‘different’ from the rest of the society and could more easily identify with larger 
societal groups. Turkish interviewees, on the other hand, live in a society characterized by 
extreme heterogeneity and great income and life-style differences. They thought that 
there is more difference between themselves and other socioeconomic groups. 
Nevertheless, the reflections of both Norwegian and Turkish interviewees on their own 
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practices, together with their evaluations of trends they witness, provide a basis to identify 
their main wishes and struggles, which in turn throw a light on the major ‘public issues’ 
and the key ‘private troubles’ in the two societies. The similarities that become apparent 
provide the grounds from which to reflect on ‘global issues’ that concern many 
individuals living under the conditions of late-modernity, and the major differences 
provide a basis from which to analyze ‘local troubles’ of Turkey and Norway.  
9.1 Review of the Main Findings  
In previous chapters, we have scrutinized the practices and evaluations of interviewees, 
by focusing on both variation and convergence between the two countries, age groups, 
and genders. Nationality, gender, age, and type of profession are factors that interact and 
influence individual lives. The interview accounts have provided material to reflect on in 
which situations one of these factors stands out and influences practices. It has been 
possible to map out a certain convergence in interview accounts that allows for tracing 
general patterns (See Table 9.1). In this section, I will briefly summarize these patterns 
and analyze the connections between them. 
 
Changing  Families  
The concept of the ‘family’ has different meanings and family relationships bring 
dissimilar responsibilities in the two countries. The question ‘who is your family?’ appears 
to be ideologically loaded in the Turkish context. For decades, in the popular and 
scientific discourse, ‘nuclear family’ was associated with being ‘modern’ and 
contemporary. Younger Turkish interviewees tend to draw sharper boundaries between 
their nuclear family and the rest of their relatives. This can be interpreted as stemming 
from a need to claim privacy and the primacy of the small family given the context of 
often highly intertwined family relationships. Norwegians, on the other hand, were more 
relaxed when answering this question. They thought of persons whom they would invite 
for an important celebration as constituting their families. Whom you define as your 
family implies different obligations in Turkey and Norway. In Norway, the welfare state 
has an active role in providing care services for both children and the elderly. Especially 
elder care is highly institutionalized. The Turkish State is not conceived as a responsible 
agent of care. Care-work is still seen as women’s most important and natural duty, and 
solutions for care-related problems are left to be solved in the ‘private’ sphere of the 
family. Family members are highly dependent on each other for the care of small children 
and the elderly. The ‘strong Turkish family’ ideal contradicts with the trends in the ‘public 
sphere’ of the labor market demanding individualization, independence, and mobility.  
 The two groups also reflected on different types of trends in family patterns and 
practices. Turkish interviewees saw a general change towards more ‘democratic’ families 
and appreciated this development. Older interviewees were concerned about the 
loosening of family ties, while the younger ones were more appreciative of the dissolving 




Table 9.1 Summary Findings Based on Interview Analyses 
 Key Differences 
 Norwegian Couples Turkish Couples 
Definition of family  
(3.2, 3.3)43 
Include more persons, 
imply less practical obligations 
 
Younger couples include less persons, 




Striving to share equally, ‘sliding into’ separate 
spheres of responsibility  
Seen predominantly as woman’s work, 
heavy reliance on paid help, devalued  
Organizations of Child 
care (4.6) 
Dominant preference for state subsidized day-
care institutions  
 
Combination of private arrangements  
Family-Work Balance 
(5.1, 5.2) 
Both women and men report on clashing 
demands 
Mainly women’s problem  
Expectations from the 
State (6.5)  
Comprehensive 
State as a ‘friend’ 
Marginal 








The myth of ‘liberated modern Turkish 
woman’  
Future-plans (8.2) Keeping together as a family Economic constraints on plans 
Main wishes (8.4) More time for leisure and family More modernization 
Main Struggles 
(8.4) 
(For mainly younger couples)  
Living up to unrealistic and conflicting 
expectations 
Clashing demands of traditional, early-
modern and late-modern expectations 
Late-modern attitudes 
(8.3) 
Towards a ‘cautious-modern’ outlook Contradictions of ‘in-between-modernity’ 




Cutting back at work as women’s strategy (5.1, 5.4) 
Organization of unpaid work as women’s responsibility (4.4) 
Critical reflections on ‘individualization’ (3.5, 8.3) 
Pressure on time resources (8.1) 
 
 
                                                     
43 The numbers in parentheses refer to the sections in which these themes were developed. 
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An important change in middle-class Turkish families is the declining birth rates. In dual-
career families of urban Turkey, the number of children has fallen to an average of one 
per family. The interview accounts showed that most family decisions and practices are 
influenced by concerns about the child’s daily care and education. This can be interpreted 
as a trend towards ‘child-centered’ families. 
 Norwegian interviewees mentioned several family trends, the most oft-cited ones 
being the increase in the number of working mothers and in cohabitation, as well as the 
high risk of break-ups. While most Norwegians are concerned about the negative 
consequences of divorce, mainly on children, there is a general acceptance that the 
normalization of divorce has had a liberating influence on women. 
 Divorce is becoming a more common phenomenon in urban Turkey as well, even 
though divorce rates are still low in the international context. Most interviewees evaluated 
the increase in divorces as a ‘natural’ result of certain economic and societal trends. Some 
were critical about the increased focus on ‘the self’ – as against ‘the sacred family’– while 
many thought that having the economic means to be able to make this decision has been 
liberating, especially for women. There was a general tendency to see divorce as a 
‘woman’s decision’ among both Turkish and Norwegian interviewees. One reason 
behind increasing divorce rates is the unbalanced division of labor within families that 
disadvantage women. The interview accounts have provided material to study these 
patterns comparatively throughout Chapter Four. 
  
Gendered Division of Domestic Labor 
Division of work within the home and organization of childcare are crucial matters that 
need constant attention in the lives of dual-earner couples. Turkish and Norwegian 
interviewees display different characteristics in these areas as well.  
 Housework has the status of an ‘issue’ for Norwegian couples: it has been a topic of 
discussion and negotiation. Turkish couples, on the other hand, do not see housework as 
an important field of concern, and they did not have much to say about their (non-) 
sharing patterns. All Turkish interviewees hire help for housework, in varying frequencies 
– from twice a month to six days a week. Only two Norwegian couples receive paid 
cleaning assistance, both with a frequency of once every two weeks. Compared to most 
Turkish men, Norwegian men felt more responsible for the housework. A basic similarity 
between Turkish and Norwegian groups is that setting the standards, planning and seeing 
what needs to be done are still predominantly women’s work.  
 One of the main differences between Norway and Turkey is the status of unpaid 
care-work and housework: It is evidently less valued, less significant, less political, and 
more gendered in Turkey. The trend in Norway has been towards valuation, negotiation, 
and redistribution. However, gender inequalities persist and a wide-spread recognition of 
the centrality of this work has not been achieved. 
 Preferred and available arrangements for childcare appear to be significantly different 
for Turkish and Norwegian couples. In the absence of public childcare policies, Turkish 
interviewees try different private solutions: full time babysitters, private daycare centers, 
and help from grandmothers. Norwegian interviewees, on the other hand, have access to 
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state subsidized daycare centers. Though Norway has been a latecomer among 
Scandinavian countries in the development of policies that make it easier for mothers to 
combine employment and motherhood, there have been important changes in this area 
in the last decade. Parental leave periods have been lengthened and the number of places 
in daycare centers has increased, however full coverage is not yet achieved. Norwegian 
interviewees who have preschool children stated that they prefer sending them to public 
daycare, if available, immediately after the one-year parental leave of absence. With one 
exception, all younger Norwegian fathers have used their right to a month’s leave of 
absence from work, and this gave them the opportunity to be involved in the care of 
their children from an early age. As a result of more active involvement in childcare, 
balancing work and family responsibilities is becoming a significant problem for young 
Norwegian fathers, and not only mothers.  
   
Balancing Family and Work Obligations 
The interview accounts show that harmonizing family and work is a demanding task for 
most interviewees, and is especially hard for parents of small children. Work can be 
demanding in terms of overtime, which means that one cuts into ‘home’ time. This often 
results in a feeling of ‘squeeze’ between the desire to do good work and the wish to be 
present at home. A certain amount of flexibility at work is much appreciated by 
interviewees because it enables them to arrange their work hours according to the 
demands of their families. When the interviewees used the term ‘flexibility’ they referred 
to having a relatively high degree of control over their work hours and the ability to start 
work earlier or later when needed.    
 Turkish women who are mothers of small children and who work in the private 
sector professions were most severely torn between the demands of their ‘careers’ and 
their families. Turkish men did not talk about ‘conflicting demands’ so intensely. 
Norwegian men had much more to say on this issue. There is a key difference between 
Turkey and Norway in terms of societal demands on fathers for more active involvement 
in childcare and housework. In Turkey there is not a general expectation that fathers will 
organize their work lives according to family demands. Family issues are mainly women’s 
area of concern. To meet the demands of housework and childcare, they rely on paid 
help or support from their female kin, mostly their own mothers. A key similarity 
between Turkish and Norwegian groups is that cutting back at work is a typical ‘solution’ 
for women when the family-work balance cannot be obtained. 
 One significant finding of this study is the frequently stated wish of Norwegian 
mothers for reduced work hours. A common plan among mothers of pre-school children 
is to cut back at work to get more time with the children. In that way, Norwegian women 
try to get, ‘the best of the both worlds.’ They are not cut off from the pleasures and 
benefits of the working world, but they have more time at their disposal to use the way 
they wish in their family lives. Flexible work alternatives are made possible by the specific 
policies of the Norwegian welfare state. In the last decade, there have been heated public 
discussions in Norway on the need of offering better choices to parents of small children 
in reconciling their family and work commitments. Turkish and Norwegian interviewees 
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appear to be living on different planets when it comes to level of support provided by the 
state for dual-earner couples with children. 
 
States in the Lives of the Individuals 
The ways the state is conceptualized by the social agents are amazingly divergent in the 
two countries. Norwegians spoke about the state as a friend, almost a member of the 
family, that is there to care for them when needed. Turks thought that the state is distant 
and authoritarian, and that its most positive function can be to protect them. Norwegian 
interviewees conceived state interference in family as essentially positive and had well-
defined expectations. Most Norwegian women thought that the ‘transition from private to 
public dependency’ and ‘the family going public’ (Hernes 1987) have primarily been 
beneficial. In contrast to many other Western countries where care work has been 
marketized, the Scandinavian solution has been its incorporation into the public sector 
administered by the state and municipalities and an acknowledgement that care for the 
young and elderly are public concerns (Hernes 1987). 
 The interview accounts have shown that well institutionalized parental leave policies 
and subsidized childcare centers were the most appreciated arrangements of the 
Norwegian welfare state. Turkish interviewees, on the other hand, did not expect much 
support from the state, especially not in the fields that are defined as the family’s domain: 
namely, childcare and eldercare. State services were generally thought as having poor 
quality and interviewees preferred private (market) alternatives whenever they could 
afford it.  
 The institutional and universal characteristics of the Norwegian welfare state and the 
marginal characteristics of the Turkish model are reflected in the lives and accounts of 
the interviewees. The social democratic welfare regime prevailing in Norway operates 
with an egalitarian ideology which comprises ‘gender equality’ as a widely held ideal. 
Gender was another key topic throughout this study and was the focus of comparative 
analysis in Chapter Seven.    
 
Reflections on Gender    
Interviewees were asked to reflect on both their own gendered experiences throughout 
their life-course and on what they perceive as dominant societal gendered arrangements 
and ideologies.   
 Turkish and Norwegian interviewees’ reflections on gender, understood as both a 
social construction and a biological difference, are highly dissimilar. There is great 
variation among both Turkish and Norwegian interviewees concerning the relative 
importance attributed to biology or socialization in defining the differences between the 
sexes. In both groups, roughly half believed in the significance of hormonal, genetic, or 
bodily differences, while the other half believed in the significance of socialization and 
learned behavior. Moreover, these groups included a balanced distribution of both 
genders and age groups. Individual beliefs concerning differences between men and 
women appear as complex wholes made up of personal experiences, observations, books, 
and media images, which often change throughout one’s life course.  
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 Gender related issues are politicized in Norway, while they are conceived as more 
personal in Turkey. ‘Gender equality’ is the dominant ideal among Norwegians, while 
‘difference’ and ‘complementariness’ are more accepted among Turkish interviewees. 
Gender is not conceived as a highly significant social variable or a political issue by 
Turkish interviewees. I interpret this as stemming from their privileged class positions 
and from the special modernization history of Turkey. 
  Most – but not all – Turkish interviewees share a powerful myth concerning gender 
in Turkey. This is the myth of the ‘liberated, modern Turkish woman.’ A majority of the 
interviewees believed that urban Turkish women do not face discriminations because 
they are women; it is mainly lack of education that creates certain disadvantages, and 
more modernization will solve these problems. This powerful myth is mainly based on 
the observation that Turkish women were given their citizenship rights much earlier than 
most European women. The resulting pride usually leads to a blindness concerning 
enduring structural and cultural factors that have helped to establish a disruptive ‘woman 
ideal.’ This ideal asserts that women must first of all be good wives and mothers and 
subordinate their own interests to the success of their husband and bringing up of 
children. The ‘liberated woman’ myth also declares that modern women have the choice 
of participating in the labor market and competing with men under fair conditions if they 
wish to do so. This condition does not hold even for the most privileged upper-middle-
class women, let alone working class and rural women who have additional burdens to 
bear. Women who choose to combine motherhood and work outside home get 
exhausted under the pressures of conflicting expectations and lack of support 
mechanisms. In early 1980s, Kandiyoti (1981) characterized Turkish women as 
“emancipated but not liberated.” Sadly, this characteristic still holds, though in varying 
degrees, for even the ‘most modern’ and privileged women of Turkey in the new 
millennium.   
 The interview accounts reflect the strength of the ‘liberated, modern Turkish woman’ 
myth. Turkish female interviewees usually stated that they themselves do not face many 
disadvantages from being women, but they observe that there are ‘other,’ less lucky 
women who do. Those who reflected on problems influencing also ‘modern’ women 
mentioned the restrictive social norms and inequalities in the labor market. Turkish men 
had little to say about their experiences of ‘being a man.’ This was not an issue that they 
thought much about. There is no strong societal trend to question the existing ‘male roles 
and identities’ either. Obviously, gender is not conceived as a political issue that needs to 
be actively addressed. 
 For Norwegians gender is an issue that they have thought and heard a lot about. 
Norwegian society has been officially ‘gender equality’ oriented since the 1970s. Gender 
equality is a political issue ranking high on the agenda. Egalitarian ideals prevail among 
Norwegian interviewees and they have quite homogeneous attitudes concerning these 
issues. Most of the interviewees reflected on changes towards greater ‘gender equality’ 
that have taken place in an appreciative manner. They also mentioned areas that lag 
behind or things that can be done better. 
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 In both the Turkish and Norwegian groups, men found the question related to 
advantages or disadvantages of being a man harder to answer, compared to women. 
Nonetheless, Norwegian men had a lot more to say on gender. Most Turkish men 
referred to a ‘standard Turkish man’ as a traditional ‘macho’ and strove to reveal how 
their behavior differs from this anti-hero. Norwegian men, on the other hand, usually 
reflected on the changes that are brought about as a result of changes in women’s 
positions and greater gender equality. Many of them reported cherishing relationships 
with ‘freer’ women and claimed that their life was more interesting than their father’s. A 
few of the interviewees mentioned that certain problems may emerge due to increased 
gender-equality. In these cases equality was often misconceived as ‘sameness’. One 
Norwegian couple, in contrast to the others, thought that in Norway equality had gone 
too far. They conceptualized equality as ‘sameness’44 and thought that conflicts arise 
when there are no longer well-defined ‘gender roles’. However, they did not want to go 
back to the traditional gender arrangements either. Questioning of traditional and 
modern ‘gender roles’ is one of the distinctive characteristic brought about by ‘reflexive 
modernization’ (Beck 1992). In Chapter Eight, several other key aspects of late-modern 
lives were scrutinized comparatively.  
 
Life-planning, Wishes and Struggles in Late-Modern Lives  
The interviewees have provided reflections on the changes brought about by increasing 
modernization and ‘individualization.’ 
 The interview accounts have demonstrated that “a reflexively-organized life-
planning” (Giddens 1991) is a common concern for both Turkish and Norwegian 
individuals in their attempts of reconciling different expectations they face in society. Yet 
it has also been clear that this reflexively organized life planning does not function free 
from important material and cultural constraints, even for these individuals who are 
among the most privileged in their societies, mainly due to their relatively secure 
employment conditions. 
 The main difference between the Turkish and Norwegian interviewees concerning 
future plans is the general pessimism that prevails among the Turks. They feel that 
external factors (like political instability and economic crisis) have a determining and 
constraining power. For the parents of younger children, planning for their education is 
the main concern, and most other plans rely on this factor. Norwegians, on the other 
hand, appear to have more freedom in terms of life planning, and they talked about 
different types of plans. To find a better balance between work, family and leisure was a 
common theme mentioned by many Norwegians. Another significant plan characteristic 
of the Norwegian group is to ‘stay together as a family,’ by making efforts to strengthen 
their relationship. Given the higher risk of relationship break-up in Norway, Norwegian 
couples demonstrate an awareness that keeping together happily is a life project that 
demands efforts. In terms of life-planning, Norwegians are more ‘decommodified’ since 
                                                     
44 For arguments on the cultural significance and consequences of equality misconceived as 
‘samenesss’ in Norwegian society, see Gullestad 1992.  
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the welfare state acts as a buffer between them and the ‘free market’ while Turkish 
interviewees still plan under economic constraints.   
 In the lives of dual-earner couples time is a scarce good that demands careful 
planning. Most interviewees reported that there are external constraints on the ways they 
use their time. Especially younger parents experienced strict time-schedules. In the 
Turkish group, it was mainly women who reported severe time problems. In the 
Norwegian group, both men and women articulated a desire to have more time for 
themselves, their families, and in some cases their jobs. 
 I conceptualize Turkey and Norway as contexts of ‘different modernities’ in which 
specific historical factors and cultural practices influence individual attitudes. A key 
argument that is confirmed by the interview analysis is that modernity does not follow a 
smooth transition path from simple to late- or reflexive stages and that societies may 
display traditional, modern and late-modern characteristics at the same time. 
Individualization is ambiguous and double-edged.  
 Among the Turkish interviewees, a transition from an early-modern to a late-modern 
outlook became apparent. Younger Turkish interviewees are more individualized and put 
more stress on self-realization, as well as investment in their first-degree relationships (i.e. 
nuclear family and close friends) rather than larger kinship relations. Among the 
Norwegian interviewees, the attitudinal differences between the younger and older 
interviewees are less significant. Both age groups display an attitude that can be 
characterized as ‘cautious-modern.’ The indicators for this specific outlook on life are: a 
critical approach to increased materialization and focus on ‘the self,’ and a desire to slow 
down the ‘daily rush’ – by working less in order to have more leisure and ‘family’ time. 
There was a common tendency to reflect on the double-sided consequences of 
‘individualization’ among both Turkish and Norwegian interviewees, evidenced by 
references to the processes which lead to loneliness and a loss of community.     
 The main wishes of Turkish interviewees revolve around issues of more 
modernization, which involves more democracy, better economic conditions, and more 
gender equality. These are the major ‘public issues’ for the Turks. Norwegians, on the 
other hand, wish for more time – both for themselves, as leisure time, and for their 
families and friends, as relationship time.  
 The main struggles of Turkish interviewees crystallize as difficulties they face in 
handling conflicting societal norms and expectations (traditional, modern and late-
modern), and a type of  ‘alienation’ resulting from a feeling of non-belonging and a sense 
of difference. For Norwegians, the main struggles are living up to high, unrealistic 
expectations of success, and being physically available in many different spheres – in the 
context of their families, work lives, friends, and leisure activities.  
 National context appears to be meaningful in understanding the differences between 
the two groups on the issues of key wishes and struggles. The existence of a supportive 
welfare state is the most significant factor that differentiates practices of Norwegian 
interviewees from those of Turks, whose lives are more determined by ‘free’ markets. 
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9.2 Different Modernities and Gender Policy Regimes 
An analysis of historical trends and official documents has made it possible to compare 
Turkey and Norway in terms of general characteristics of their modernities, state models 
and institutional and ideological factors that influence family and gender practices (See 
Table 9.2).  
 
Table 9.2 Key Findings based on Macro-Level Analyses 
 Norway Turkey 
 








General Welfare Models Institutionalized Welfare State  
Social democratic 
Residual Social State 
Liberal (with conservative elements) 
 
State Gender Ideologies Official Ideology is ‘Gender equality’ 
ambiguities remain 
From early state feminism to 
conservative gender role ideologies  
ambiguities remain 
Family Policy Models 
 
Individualistic,  
Weak male-breadwinner,  
Pro-egalitarian 
Familialistic,  
Strong male bread-winner,  
Pro-family but non-interventionist 
   
Turkey and Norway have followed dissimilar paths in their modernization processes. 
Distinct class structures, religions and political economies interact and shape – and are 
also shaped by –  different modernities.  
 Compared to its Scandinavian neighbors, Norway has been a late-comer in 
industrialization. The absence of an aristocracy and the proliferation of independent 
peasants combined to make Norway an unusually egalitarian country (Esping-Andersen 
1985: 46). A remarkable feature of Norwegian politics is the extent to which the 
bourgeois parties incorporated social democratic programs. Traditional left/right 
divisions have been weakened in the Norwegian parliament and most welfare reforms are 
achieved through party alliances and compromises. The North Sea oil fortunes enabled 
Norway to sustain full employment and maintain welfare state expansion throughout the 
1990s. Nonetheless, a neo-liberal orientation has become more visible in recent years, 
with a stronger emphasis on incentives to work and debates on the alleged detrimental 
effects of a comprehensive welfare state (Eitrheim & Kuhnle 2000).    
 Turkish modernization is an example of top-down modernization. Turkish nation 
state is established through a revolutionary modernization of the Islamic Ottoman 
Empire (See Appendix 1 for more information). The Kemalist elites embarked on an 
ambitious political, social and cultural modernization program, which aimed at 
transforming all the institutional and symbolic aspects associated with the Islamic way of 
life. This project of top-down modernization has created conflicting attitudes towards the 
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issues of westernization and secularization and gave way to an extremely heterogeneous 
society, both in terms of material living conditions and value orientations. In the last 
decades, Turkey has been governed by predominantly liberal parties and has adopted a 
neo-liberal economic stabilization program supported and controlled by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Privatization of the public economic organizations and a 
minimization of government interference in the competitive market system have been 
stated political goals of successive governments.  
 At present, Turkey displays the general characteristics of the Liberal model in the 
framework identified by Esping-Andersen (1990). State intervention is subordinate to the 
market and public benefits are modest. Norway, on the other hand, fits more closely to 
the Social Democratic model. Social benefits are based on citizenship or residence, are 
financed by taxes and universalism is still a strong principle. A more detailed and 
historical analysis of specific policies and provisions display the existence of conservative 
model characteristics in Turkey, especially pertaining to the preservation of the traditional 
family. 
 In Turkey, the state officially supports gender equality and has recently withdrawn all 
reservations regarding the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women following the changes in the Civil Code. However, actual 
policies to eliminate discrimination against women in the labor market are not well 
developed, and in the context of severe economic crisis, gender-related issues are not 
prioritized. 
 In terms of gender and family policies, both states have gone through historical 
transformations and also involve ambiguities at the present time. Since 1970s, the 
Norwegian State’s official ideology has been gender equality. However, until the 1990s, 
policies that would enable women to combine motherhood and employment were less 
developed in Norway, compared to other Scandinavian countries. This has led some 
researchers to argue that Norwegian policies correspond most closely to the ‘separate 
gender roles’ regime (Sainsbury 1999). The separate gender roles regime underlines a 
strict division of labor between the sexes and provides benefits to both the male provider 
and the female caregiver (ibid.: 79). The recent cash-for-care reform can be seen as an 
example of this policy regime. Yet, in the last decade there has been a dramatic 
improvement of parental leave policies and an increased investment in public child care 
in Norway. The establishment of a ‘father’s quota’ and the active state involvement in 
providing entitlements to both men and women as earners and carers are the key 
characteristics of the ‘individual earner-carer’ gender policy regime.  
 The individual earner-carer regime envisions greater equality between women and 
men and “the transformation of the traditional division of labor between the sexes, so 
that each individual is involved in both caring and earning” (Sainsbury 1999: 260). This 
gender regime and the social-democratic regime have complementary logics, in that both 
individualize and thereby ‘de-familialize’ social rights. De-familialization refers to “the 
degree to which households’ welfare and caring responsibilities are relaxed – either via 
welfare state provision, or via market provision” (Esping-Andersen 1999: 51).   
 In terms of the relationship between state policies and family practices, Turkey and 
Norway can be conceptualized as representing two different Gender Policy Regimes – i.e. the 
ways gender is conceptualized and acted upon in state institutions and policies. In 
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general, the prevailing ideology underlying the family policies in Turkey can be labeled 
familialistic: the assumption that childcare and eldercare can and should be met within the 
family (i.e. by women) leads to low public provisions, and indirectly supports the male-
breadwinner/ female-housewife family model. Norway, on the other hand, is characterized by 
an individualistic gender policy regime, since, in the last decade, the state provision for 
childcare and eldercare has been based on the assumption that both women and men will 
participate in paid employment. This gender regime supports the dual breadwinner family 
model.  
 These policy differences have been central in interpreting actual practices and 
ideologies of Turkish and Norwegian interviewees. It has also been clear that, though 
useful as analytic categories, these ‘regimes’ and ‘models’ often contain ambiguities and 
are historically variable.  
9.3 Connections and Visions  
 A key change has taken place in Norwegian society concerning definitions of ‘good 
motherhood’ and ‘good fatherhood,’ enabled by the interacting influences of feminism, 
higher educational attainment, increasing female labor force and political participation, 
and the institutionalization of gender-equality policies. The last decade has witnessed a 
‘politicizing of parenthood’ (Ellingsæter 1999b) with an emphasis on men’s parental 
duties and on the need to develop policies that would support a dual-earner/dual-carer 
family model. A more symmetric family model, in which both the mother and the father 
are income-earners and carers, can be supported by policy measures, such as full coverage 
in public child care and access to flexible work hours in specific life-phases. 
 The interview accounts related to definitions and practices of fatherhood, especially, 
show that attitude changes and policies enabling these practices go hand-in-hand. The 
popularity of the ‘father’s quota’ in Norway provides grounds to argue for possibilities of 
changing individual practices by universalistic state policies. After the introduction of  this 
quota, which is a one month paternal leave (non-transferable to the mother), the number 
of fathers taking paid leave of absence to care for their children has increased 
dramatically: 80 per cent of Norwegian fathers who have right to parental leave use their 
paternity quota in the new Millennium (Brandth & Kvande 2001). Taking paid leave from 
work to care for their child became a majority practice among Norwegian fathers.  
 Norwegian interviewees who had used their paternity quota spoke positively of this 
policy and mentioned the importance of being actively involved in childcare from early 
on. Those Norwegian fathers were the same ones who mentioned the difficulties of 
balancing the demands of work and family. This is an indicator for the fact that 
traditional gender arrangements are not given by nature, but are social constructs, which 
can be transformed by organized human action. As Morgan (1999a) also stresses, there is 
an interplay between the division of labor within the households, on the one hand, and 
wider understandings of masculinity, on the other. Changing models of masculinity may 
give legitimacy to changes being negotiated within the household, while changes in family 
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practices themselves “constitute part of the shifting understandings of masculinity and 
femininity in the wider society” (Morgan 1999a: 35).  
 As a result of institutionalized egalitarian policies, there have been significant 
developments in Norway in the direction of reducing gender-based segregations. 
Women’s political participation has increased and policies related to care arrangements in 
society became critical political issues. Gender relations in Turkey are maybe more similar 
to those that prevailed in Norway in 1970s, before women started demanding more 
participation in the public sphere and equal representation. But I do not claim that things 
will ‘evolve’ in the same direction in Turkey. There are significant institutional, historical 
and cultural factors that influence the transformations in gender relations. In Turkey, the 
ideal of modernization by keeping the values of Turkish culture has been a widely held 
goal. This implied keeping Turkish family strong and establishing women’s main duty as 
‘good wives and mothers’ (Koray 1998). The family model that is supported by this 
ideology is the male breadwinner-female housewife model and even though women’s 
higher education is encouraged in the spirit of modernization, they are expected to give 
priority to their families whenever conflicts arise. Another significant factor influencing 
gender relations is the economy. In Turkey, there is no economic base to finance gender-
equality policies. Rather, prevalent economic crises lead to backlashes, signified by further 
decrease in urban women’s labor force participation rates.  
 In the interview accounts some of the ‘national myths’ of Turkey and Norway were 
both reproduced and challenged. The findings of this comparative study provides a basis 
to reflect on and confront these widely held myths.  
 In Turkey ‘the liberated modern Turkish women’ myth should be challenged by 
underlining the barely four percent representation of women in Parliament and the falling 
labor participation rates of urban women. Turkey still compares unfavorably with 
European countries in terms of women’s participation in the ‘public sphere’.  
 Among urban, middle-class Turks, a widely held and cherished “female ideal” 
prevails: a woman should be well-educated, and preferably have a prestigious profession, 
but she should first of all be a good mother and a devoted wife, who puts the family first. 
This ideal is internalized by many women, and works as a major source of ‘guilt’ when 
work and family demands clash. Living up to this unrealistic ideal is a major dilemma in 
the lives of most professional Turkish women. The competitive labor market demands 
long working hours and presupposes individuals who do not have caring responsibilities. 
Given the lack of institutional support (by state) and a lack of sharing (by men) of care 
work, the tendency to withdraw from professional life often results. Another widespread 
strategy is to lower one’s ambitions and sacrifice career plans to put the family first. The 
reliable and efficient factor encouraging women to make these decisions is their own 
‘guilty conscience.’ Most women believe that these are their ‘personal’ problems, and that 
not being able to combine a career and family obligations is a personal failure. I anticipate 
that this study will contribute to demonstrate how ‘public’ these problems really are.   
 In Norway, the myth of ‘total gender equality’ should be challenged by underscoring 
that the organizations of both paid and unpaid work are still highly gendered. Norway 
has one of the most gender-segregated labor markets among the industrialized countries 
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and women’s representation in top management positions are remarkably low. An area 
that needs constant attention is the status of care-work, both in the private and the public 
spheres. In the public sphere, care-workers are predominantly women and are poorly 
paid. In the private sphere, the major responsibility for arranging care work still belongs 
to women. Positive developments have taken place in this field but change is painfully 
slow.  
 A main similarity that crystallized between Turkish and Norwegian groups was the 
fact that in both countries it is still women who both feel more responsible for and who 
actually do more care work and housework. Another similarity was that it is mainly 
women who cut back at work whenever the clashing demands of work and family 
become unmanageable. I do not see anything inherently wrong with the decision of 
cutting back at work as long as it is a real choice. This can be a real choice only when there 
is a network of supporting agents around the ‘working mother’: a partner who does not 
free himself from care work, public institutions that offer child care at reasonable costs, 
friends and relatives living nearby who have some excess of time and energy.  
 The ‘global issue’ which appeared as a common problem for both Turkish and 
Norwegian women, was the unfavorable division of labor within the home. Although 
there have been positive changes in terms of men’s contribution to domestic tasks in 
Norway, the recent time-use statistics show remaining patterns: women have dramatically 
increased the time they use in paid labor and decreased the time they use for housework. 
Men have slightly increased the time they use for childcare, but the time they use for 
housework is rather stable.  
 Even in Norway, a wealthy country, with official gender equality politics, the patterns 
in the division of unpaid labor could not be broken down. Social theories cannot explain 
this phenomenon unless they come to terms with their own contribution in devaluing 
care work and housework. Caring for others has traditionally been associated with 
femininity, and conceived as ‘a labor of love’ (Finch & Groves 1983), and not work. 
Gendered division of unpaid labor is a key factor in contributing to the reproduction of 
the conditions that disadvantage women in the labor market.   
 My vision of a good society is the one in which social reproduction and care work are 
valued and in which difficulties that parents of small children experience in reconciling 
their family and work commitments are conceptualized as  ‘public issues’ and not as 
‘private troubles.’  
 The Norwegian example shows that the state is capable of designing policies that are 
felt as ‘family friendly’ by different segments of the population. Local and civil society 
solutions to these problems are also important, yet a legal back-up is vital in ensuring 
widespread change. Any radical change in gender arrangements requires working ‘with’ 
the state, not ‘against’ it. This involves operating with the vision of a ‘friendlier’ state, 
which  has the potential to be radically transformed.  
 In this age dominated by the discourse of globalization, arguing for ‘more state 
involvement’ is becoming ever more difficult and is often denounced as passé. The 
ideology behind economic globalization is ‘neo-liberalism’ entailing free market, 
privatization and deregulation. In the neo-liberal agenda, market solutions are presented 
as the best, most efficient, flexible and dynamic ones; while the state is presented as an 
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outdated, static and rigid entity (Wacquant 2001). However, when the market goes too far 
in dominating social and political outcomes, the opportunities and rewards of 
globalization spread unequally, concentrating power and wealth in a selected group of 
individuals, nations and corporations, marginalizing the others. Many activities and goods 
that are critical to human development are provided outside the market. Care work – that 
is providing for children, the sick, the elderly, as well as “all the rest of us exhausted from 
the demands of everyday life” – is an important input for the development of human 
capabilities and establishment of both social cohesion and economic growth (UNDP 
1999). Care consists of “everything we do to continue, repair, and maintain ourselves so 
that we can live in the world as well as possible” (Fisher & Tronto 1991: 40) and in that 
sense it is a fundamental aspect of social life. However, the market gives few incentives 
and few rewards for care since “the logic of the market” runs up against “the logic of 
care” (Wærness 1998). This phenomenon is also becoming visible as increasing pressure 
on time resources in everyday lives.   
 In the context of competitive globalization labor markets are becoming more risky 
and insecure (Beck 2000). Increased demands of time devotion, mobility and prevalence 
of short-term employment contracts conflict with stability demands of family lives. In 
both Turkey and Norway the labor market is putting pressures on individuals to be more 
mobile, competitive and work longer hours. Time pressures lead to a care-deficit at 
home. The findings of this study show that both Turkish and Norwegian interviewees are 
facing increased time-pressures and wish for more flexibility in work life, defining it as 
the opportunity to control their working times. The labor market will be more flexible 
when it is organized by a logic that acknowledges care-commitments of its participants, 
irrespective of their gender. 
 Remaining gendered patterns in the organization of both paid and unpaid work, 
increasing pressures on time resources and an urgent need to acknowledge the 
significance of care work are the ‘global issues’ documented by this comparative study. 
These areas call for further cross-national research in order to reach a better 
understanding of the local consequences and gendered outcomes of globalization as a 




Appendix 1 Historical Trajectories  
 
The following account of the historical trajectories of Norway and Turkey serves to draw 
a general picture of their developments as modern nation-states, and of the formation of 
their basic social institutions. The historical narrative is not exhaustive; rather it aims to 
provide the reader with some basic information about certain historical events that have 
influenced the characteristics of today’s societies. I emphasize information that I believe 
to be necessary for understanding this specific comparative study, namely the formation 
of the welfare state in Norway and the process of top-down modernization in Turkey.  
Norway's Transformation into an Institutional Welfare State 
Norway was divided into small kingdoms until the 11th century, a period in which Viking 
chiefs introduced Christianity. During the 13th century, Norway experienced continuous 
territorial growth. The Black Death struck Norway in the 14th century causing the loss of 
almost two thirds of the population. This weakened the country in many ways, leading to 
a union with Denmark, in which Denmark was the dominating power. The union with 
Denmark lasted until 1814, after which a new and looser union with Sweden was formed. 
With the dissolution of the union with Denmark, Norway gained freedom in domestic 
affairs and a National Assembly was formed which prepared the first constitution. 
Sweden was the dominating power especially regarding foreign affairs in the new union. 
The conflicts around the ways Sweden handled Norwegian foreign affairs reached a 
climax in 1905 and the union was dissolved. The period 1905-1914 was characterized by 
rapid economic expansion in Norway. Its immense resources of water power provided a 
base for industrial expansion. During World War I, Norway managed to stay neutral, but 
was hard hit by post-war economic depression.  
 The Norwegian Labor Party, which was founded in 1887, increased its influence as a 
consequence of industrialization and the introduction of universal suffrage, forming its 
first cabinet in 1927. With the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in 1939, Norway declared 
itself neutral, but was invaded by Germany in 1940. This forced Norwegian political 
leaders to flee the country. An exile government was formed in London. After the 
liberation in 1945, general elections took place, giving the Labor Party a decisive majority 
and allowing it to govern the country almost continuously until 1965.  
 The postwar period, was a period of increasing international involvement for 
Norway. In 1945 Norway became a founding member of the United Nations and in 1949 
a full member of NATO. The 1950s were years of reconstruction after the War. The 
government drastically increased its direct involvement in economic life. This resulted in 
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a series of clashes between the ruling Labor Party and the non-socialist opposition. 
During these years migration from rural areas to towns and cities increased dramatically. 
It was during the postwar period that the cornerstones of the modern Norwegian welfare 
state were laid. 
 The historical paths followed by the Scandinavian countries share certain 
characteristics which make their welfare model unique. According to Esping-Andersen 
(1985: 72) these common features are: the smooth process of political democratization 
and early extensions of suffrage, precocious alliance of peasants, farmers and workers in 
the struggle for full democracy, adoption of proportional representation which helped to 
advance social democratic mobilization and the unusually strong linkage between class 
divisions and the party system.   
 The postwar developments in the Norwegian welfare state were rooted in a broad 
political consensus (Esping-Andersen & Korpi 1987). Social policy issues did not cause 
major conflicts between parties. The Labor Party was a leading force in defining new 
social policy tasks, but other parties followed closely behind. A remarkable feature of 
Norwegian postwar politics was the extent to which the bourgeois parties embraced 
social democratic policies. 
 Rapid economic growth characterized the 1960s. In 1970, large deposits of oil and 
natural gas were discovered under the North Sea. Because of this addition of a new and 
important sector to the economy, Norway maintained full employment and a steady 
growth in real incomes and living standards throughout the 1970s. Norway's oil fortunes 
spared the Labor Party governments from divisive crisis policies and underwrote the 
continuance of welfare state expansion.  
 During the 1980s, Norway has become much more vulnerable to the international 
recession. Unemployment rose and the welfare state came under financial and political 
pressure. A number of social welfare programs have been modified in an effort to limit 
the rise in social expenditure in the early 1980s, but the total amount of funds allocated to 
social and health purposes increased steadily in real terms.  
 The trends in the economy have been generally positive in the 1990s. Norwegians 
voted against membership in the European Union in a referendum in 1994. A major 
political issue in the 1990s has been the one concerning immigration politics. The welfare 
resistance party, with its sharp views on immigration policies, has been one of the most 
important political actors defining the agenda on this issue. Norway had a Labor Party 
minority government until 1997 when a centrist minority coalition government, led by 
the Christian People’s Party took over.  
 While all the other Scandinavian countries faced economic recession and had to cut 
back on certain welfare arrangements, thanks to its Oil revenues, Norway has even 
implemented more generous benefits in some areas (Eitrheim & Kuhnle 2000). 
Widespread political consensus about the public responsibility for welfare provision 
continues, though there are constant discussions on possibilities of privatization and 
increasing competition in supply of  social care services. 
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Turkey's Revolutionary Modernization and Punctured Democratization 
In order to understand the dynamics of Turkish society today, it is crucial to have a basic 
knowledge of its Ottoman heritage and of its complex, top-down modernization. During 
the 11th century, a group of nomadic Turk tribes invaded Anatolia, establishing the 
Ottoman dynasty, which later became one of the biggest empires in world history. By the 
end of the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire was at the height of its power and wealth. 
In the 17th century, the Empire began to decline politically and financially, and started to 
lose control over some regions. Developments in Europe – the Industrial Revolution and 
new ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism, and secularism – had a powerful influence 
on the Ottomans.  
 When the First World War broke out, the Ottomans took the side of Germany and 
Austria, though the empire was in no condition to fight a serious war. The armistice that 
was signed after the war meant an Ottoman capitulation. The wartime leaders left the 
country and there was a power vacuum. Mustafa Kemal –later called Atatürk– 
coordinated the national struggle against the Allies, who had invaded Istanbul and 
planned the partition of Anatolia. After a successful War of Independence, a National 
Assembly was composed in 1920 and the Turkish Republic was proclaimed in 1923. 
Under the leadership of Atatürk and a small elite devoted to his ideology, Kemalism, the 
Ottoman sultanate and caliphate were abolished and the process of top-down 
reformation was initiated. 
 The second half of the 1920s witnessed radical reforms. The Kemalist elites 
embarked on an ambitious political, social and cultural modernization program. It started 
with the proclamation of the Republic and the abolition of the Caliphate, and continued 
with the separation of the religion and the state, and a complete secularization of the 
educational and legal systems. Kemalist reforms aimed to transform all the cultural and 
symbolic phenomena associated with the Islamic way of life: from the modernization of 
the alphabet and dress code, to the status and roles of women. However, this new 
‘Western’ culture did not have profound effects on society at large, especially in rural 
areas. A gulf was created between the rulers and the ruled, each of which had their own 
distinct cultures: the Westernized, secular culture of a small but influential minority and 
the indigenous culture of the masses associated with Islam (Ahmad 1993: 92).  
 The Kemalists knew that their reforms would be short-lived unless they were backed 
by a corresponding revolution in the economy. They viewed industry as a vital 
component in the creation of the new Turkey. The economy of the early republic was 
predominantly agrarian and was in a state of chronic underdevelopment. The new 
economic strategy that was adopted called for the state to be the major actor in 
industrialization. Until 1946, the country was ruled by the Republican People's Party 
(RPP), which was founded on Kemalist ideology and its 6 principles: republicanism, 
nationalism, secularism, populism, statism and reformism. Even though Mustafa Kemal 
exercised an authoritarian leadership style until his death in 1938, the declared objective 
of his ideology was progress towards a democratic polity and a pluralist society 
(Kazancigil 1994). Turkey remained neutral throughout the Second World War. During 
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those years, the private sector had grown considerably and began to be bothered by the 
extensive intervention of the state in the economy. There were important polarizations 
within the RPP about economic issues, and these eventually led to the formation of the 
opposition Democratic Party (DP). The DP advocated private enterprise and individual 
initiative and won the support of businessmen, the liberal intelligentsia and the rural 
masses. Democrats won the first multiparty elections of 1950.  
 The period 1950-1960 was characterized by the political and military integration of 
Turkey into the Western alliance, rapid economic development, growing financial 
dependence on the US, and a downgrading of the secularist tendencies of the previous 
government (Zürcher 1993). By the end of the 1950s, the economy began to deteriorate. 
The government began to lose control, and political opposition increased. The army got 
restless due to political instability, growing inflation, and a general atmosphere of 
discontent in urban areas. In 1960, the economy was in a state of collapse and the first 
military intervention in the history of modern Turkey took place. A planned economy 
was set in motion with the goal of rapid industrialization based on the model of import 
substitution. A more liberal constitution was introduced, with stronger civil rights 
provisions (Ahmad 1993). Towards the end of the 1960s, the politics in Turkey became 
extremely contentious. Rising political tensions, world events and rapid societal change 
produced an explosive situation. Unemployment was rising and high inflation restricted 
consumption to a minority. There was increased political activity at universities. New 
political parties were formed at the extremes of the political spectrum. The left-right 
polarization led to growing violence in universities and on the streets. On 12 March 1971, 
a second military intervention took place. But the vicious cycle continued: unemployment 
and inflation increased, while social unrest and violence in the streets reached 
unprecedented levels, leading to the third military intervention in the history of modern 
Turkey on12 September 1980.   
 The new constitution that was prepared after the coup included articles and clauses 
that imposed strict state control over political activities. Despite all its rhetoric about the 
secular Kemalist ideology, the strategy of the military regime was to counterbalance the 
revolutionary left forces by providing support to Islamic movements. This strategy would 
soon lay the groundwork for the revival of militant Islamic fundamentalism as a real 
threat to the very existence of the Republic (Eralp 1993). After the general elections in 
1983, the Motherland Party (MP) came to power. The new right considered economic 
restructuring as its first priority and proposed a move from a mixed to a free market 
economy.  
 To effect economic restructuring, Turkey implemented an export-led growth model, 
which received the support of the IMF and World Bank. The Stabilization Program 
resulted in a major redistribution of national income. The net result has been a regression 
in the incomes of popular sector –agriculture, wages and salaries– and an increase in the 
share of profits, rents and interest in national income (Eralp et al. 1993). The transition to 
a full market economy has only been possible with the imposition of the military regime, 
which suspended all confederations and trade unions and proscribed strikes. However, as 
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the grip of the military regime loosened, democratic rights were restored and unions were 
reorganized in the 1990s. 
 Trends in the 1990s have not been all too positive, yet a new military coup did not 
take place. An apparent consensus among the divergent political forces is that the only 
path for Turkey to follow is to fully implement democracy. 1990s have witnessed many 
government changes. The most notable was the coalition between the liberal True Path 
Party and the Islamist Welfare Party. The threat of religious fundamentalism and 
corruption within the state are often specified as the major challenges for Turkey. While 
economic trends were signaling growth, the country was hit by a major crisis in 2001 and 
unemployment rose to record high rates. Full membership in the EU has been a major 
goal for the governments in the new Millennium. Several constitutional reforms have 
been introduced to comply with the criteria for membership.   
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Appendix 2: Official Documents and Statistics on Women 
Two documents from Turkey and Norway, which were prepared as national reports to 
the 4th World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995), have been sources of 
comparative official information on changes in women’s positions. In general, both 
documents try to present a picture of the changes as well as stabilities. The main 
difference between the two countries is that Norway has witnessed a strong women’s 
movement in the 1970s and the ideal of equality between the sexes is integrated in both 
Norwegian culture and all areas of social policy; while Turkey has only recently witnessed 
an increased emphasis on women’s issues and feminist movements have never been so 
strong due to serious differences among women and specific historical developments that 
make gender-solidarity difficult. These factors are reflected in the reports. While 
Norwegian report mainly revolves around the steps taken and results achieved; the 
Turkish report concentrates on documenting women’s relative disadvantages and 
specifies targets for the future.45  
 The Norwegian document opens with the following paragraph: 
Since 1985 Norway has continued to see a steady improvement in the situation of 
women. The changes in political influence of women has been particularly 
marked... The strong position of women in politics has an impact on the political 
agenda, issues of particular concern to women are given high priority. These 
include measures to make it easier for parents with young children to combine 
family responsibilities with work outside the home (emphasis original, National 
Report 1994: 8).  
The Turkish Report, on the other hand, opens with a reversed emphasis:  
Women are universally disadvantaged in access to decision-making mechanisms 
and power... Since women’s participation in political decision-making is essential 
for actualizing both democracy and gender equality, this poses a major constraint 
for the advancement of women (Turkish Report, DGSPW 1994: 4).   
The Turkish report continues by presenting figures on women’s participation in political 
institutions which are well below the egalitarian ideals. Mentioning this basic disadvantage 
of women, the report specifies certain mechanisms for the advancement of women. It is 
underlined that, the last decade has witnessed important initiatives both by the state and 
NGO’s to develop mechanisms that will promote women’s advancement in all fields. 
The most important national mechanism is the establishment of the General Directorate 
on the Status and Problems of Women (DGSPW) in 1990. The aim of the Directorate is 
“providing Turkish women the status which they deserve in social, economic, cultural 
and political areas in an environment of equality” (DGSPW 1994). Among other 
                                                     
45 It is important to note that the Norwegian official report has been criticized by certain women’s 




activities, this directorate has initiated several research studies on working women with 
the purpose of documenting their problems in various sectors and specifying policies to 
improve women’s labor force participation.  
 In the Norwegian Report, the second chapter is devoted to a historical presentation 
of the Gender equality machinery in Norway. It is underlined that Norway has rather 
strong instruments for the promotion and enforcement of gender equality. The report 
continues with specifying the statutory rights concerning women. The main law relating 
to women’s positions is the gender equality act which entered into force in 1979. It is a 
sweeping law which aims at eliminating gender discrimination in almost all areas of 
society and influencing attitudes. The report continues by specifying the amendments of 
the gender equality act; including the provision that demands at least 40 per cent 
representation of each sex in all councils and committees. The Turkish Report also 
continues by examining the legal system in terms of gender equality and finds that 
“despite the principle of gender equality and the prohibition of gender based 
discrimination by the Turkish Constitution...contradictory articles are encountered in the 
law”.46   
 Both reports provide statistics and reflections on women’s political participation, 
education and employment patterns. Below is a review and brief analysis of  Turkish and 
Norwegian women’s participation in the ‘public sphere’: 
 
Access to Decision-making and Political Representation 
The political participation of women is high in Norway and their representation levels 
compare favorably with the world averages. The percentage of Turkish women in the 
Parliament has decreased considerably after the first years of the republic in which 
women had a symbolic value in the revolutionary modernization efforts. After the first 
general elections in 1935, women deputies made up 4.5 % of the National Assembly. 
During 1970s and 1980s, women’s representation revolved around 1 %. Feminist groups 
launched campaigns to expand women’s political representation before the last general 
elections in April 1999. There has been an increase from 8 to 22 women deputies in the 
Parliament; however there is not a single woman among the 39 ministers of the new 
coalition government.  
Table A2.1 Political Representation of Women in Turkey and Norway 




1.8 % (of 450) 
1999 
4 % (of 550) 
1993 
39 % (of 165) 
1997 
36 % (of 165 ) 
Cabinet Ministers 5 % (2 of 39) 0 % 38 % 42 % (8 of 19) 
Municipal Councils 1994: 0.9 % 
 
1993: 28.5 % 1995: 33% 
Sources: National Reports from Turkey and Norway (1994) and internet pages of SN & SIS. 
                                                     
46 Some of these articles are analyzed in section 6.2. 
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The significant problem in the Turkish context is not only the limited number of women 
in politics, but the fact that most women politicians keep a distance from specific 
women's problems. It is a generally accepted argument that women enter into politics on 
men's terms, and they become like their male counterparts in their interests and priorities. 




In general education level of the Turkish population is not satisfactory; and women are 
especially disadvantaged. The majority among both men and women have only primary 
school education. In urban areas, 9 percent of men and 5 percent of  women have higher 
education (SIS 1997). Females make up 38 per cent of university students in Turkey. One 
characteristic of the university education in Turkey is the extreme imbalance between the 
supply and the demand. A recent increase in the number of the universities still can not 
meet the expansion in the number of applicants. The pattern of admission also reflects 
great social inequalities; economically weak groups and those from rural areas are under 
represented among university students.  
 Full literacy is an indicator of Norway's comprehensive educational system. 
Compulsory education is given high priority within public activities in Norway. The ideal 
of equal educational opportunity for everybody has been the underlying principle for 
organization of education. There has been an increasing demand for higher education 
and an increasing equality between the sexes in the last decades. In 1986, 20 percent of 
men and 16 percent of women had higher education. These figures rose to around 25 
percent for both sexes in 1996 (SN 1998).  
 In Norway, there has been a traditional difference between girls’ subjects and boys’ 
subjects in secondary schools. Even though the trends are towards equalization, some 
subjects are extremely female or male dominated. For example, in vocational schools, the 
percentage of girls among social services and health studies was 92 percent; while boys 
made up 94 percent of students following technical studies (Sosialt utsyn 1998: 78). 
Segregation is less dramatic at the universities. While the traditional dominance of women 
in humanities and teacher education continues, gender differences became less marked in 
subjects like economics, law and medicine. 
 
Labor Markets 
Women’s labor force participation rate in Turkey is  low compared to both western and 
many other industrializing countries. The underdeveloped economy of Turkey, the lower 
education of women and the prevalence of  traditional attitudes towards working women 
can be mentioned as the most important reasons behind this phenomenon. Apart from 
the professional women with higher education, female workers are seen as second class 





Table A2.2. Labor Market Characteristics in Turkey 
































Table A2.3  Labor Market Characteristics in Norway 























Economic activity of Norwegian women have been increasing steadily since late 70s, 
however two factors effect Norwegian women negatively: The labor market displays a 
pronounced segregation by sex and part-time employment among women is very high. 
Forty-six percent of women in the labor force, as against ten percent of men, work part-
time. Although a majority of part-time workers have work contracts and favorable work 
conditions, they earn lower pensions and other work-related benefits. Occupational 
segregation means that women and men do not compete for the same jobs, and men 
generally retain the high paying jobs. Women are scarce in top management positions in 
business and industry. In 1998, less than 10 percent of senior management positions were 
held by women. There are also significant pay differentials between men and women. In 
1980, women earned only 77 per cent of what men earned. This percentage increased to 
81 per cent in 1991. The increase is highest in the public sector where women now earn 
90 per cent of what men earn. 
 A comparative look at the national follow-up reports to the United Nations’ Fourth 
World Conference on Women, provide information on the current official priorities in 
terms of gender-related issues in the two countries (National Report 1999, DGSPW 
1999).   
 The Norwegian follow-up outlines the basic strategy for the further promotion of 
gender equality in Norway as the “mainstreaming” of a gender perspective. This means 
that all ministries are expected to integrate a gender perspective and the goal of gender 
equality in policy formulation, decision-making and executive procedures at all levels and 
in all policy areas. The objective is to:  
“Eliminate occupational segregation and all forms of employment discrimination. 
Wage discrimination is a subject of great concern. Women earn about 14 per cent 
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less than men, either simply because they are women, and their work is not valued 
as highly as men's work, or because they are employed at a workplace or in an 
occupation dominated by women”.  
The report outlines the different strategies that have been drawn up by the Government. 
These strategies include amendments to the Gender Equality Act, designed to improve 
efficiency in resolving equal pay disputes; tools to measure the value of specific jobs; 
measures to encourage women to undergo further training and pursue a more active 
working life; schemes to promote non-traditional career choices as a means to eliminate 
occupational segregation; raising the status of female-dominated professions through the 
collective bargaining system and wage equality campaigns (National Report 1999): 
“The Gender Equality Act is currently undergoing revision, the aim being to 
increase its impact in questions of equal pay and other issues relating to the labor 
market. There are also plans for an overall revision of the Act as it bears the marks 
of being drafted and adopted at a time when gender equality was a less observed 
and a more delicate matter than it is today. The Gender Equality Ombud finds 
that although the law is still an important tool in gender equality work, the law 
needs to be strengthened to be an efficient tool in the battle against more 
complicated and subtle forms of discrimination (National Report 1999)”  
Turkey’s follow-up report to the “United Nations’ Fourth World Conference on 
Women” specifies eight critical areas of concern to take strategic action as follows47:  
 
1. Education and Training of Women: Ensure equal educational opportunities for women and 
men, reach the goal of 100% literacy by  the year 2000, provide guidance for girls to 
direct them into all working areas, not just traditional feminine professions, review all 
school programs and educational materials at all levels to  eradicate all gender biased 
perspectives and expressions. 
 
2. The Girl-child: Ensure equal education opportunities for women and men, give support 
to families -if required- to prevent girls' early drop-out from school, provide guidance for 
girls to direct them into all working areas, not just traditional feminine professions. 
 
3. Women and Health: Reduce maternal and infant mortality by one half by the year 2000, 
provide sexual education, reproductive health and care services for women, collect data 
and information concerning women's health in Turkey with the cooperation of all public 
and private  institutions, establish special information centers and health units in all health 
institutions which will address women's health needs, design campaigns in order to raise 
awareness of women's  rights to have control over and decide on the spacing and timing 
of births.  
 
                                                     
47 From the internet pages of  the Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women 
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4. Violence Against Women: Develop campaigns and parental education programs to 
prevent domestic violence and violence  in general against women and children, include 
the subject of violence against women and children in the in-service training of 
professionals like health workers, teachers, educators, social  workers, psychologists, 
pediatricians and policemen and increase the number of counseling centers and shelters 
for women subjected to violence and provide free psychological and legal aid. 
 
5. Women and the Economy: Make legal arrangements for sharing the responsibilities of child 
care among mother, father, and  the state since it is the biggest obstacle preventing 
women from participating in the labor force, ensure parental leave for fathers after the 
birth for child care, make amendments in the regulations to oblige employers to provide 
nurseries in workplaces where there are 100 or more workers (currently it is obligatory 
for workplaces where there are 100 ‘female’ workers), ensure that all public and private 
institutions have quotas for female employees in all professions, develop projects to 
increase female employment and find international sources of finance to support these 
projects, make provisions to ensure that domestic work by the unpaid female labor force 
is included in national calculations, and thus all women who are working at home and 
working the land will be insured (the existing BAĞ-KUR system is inadequate to satisfy 
this demand so there must be alterations made in the law.). 
 
6. Women in Power and Decision-making: Enact and enforce a frame equality law by giving 
more weight to the gender-sensitive perspective to maintain the continuity of women's 
policies, ensure legal preparations to allow political parties to establish women's 
commissions, ensure implementation of quotas to increase women's participation at all 
levels of decision-making and administration in political parties, implement a quota 
system to increase women's participation in local governments, form a unit within the 
national mechanism to collect information and do research about women in managerial 
positions in the private and public sectors.  
 
7. Institutional Mechanisms for the Advancement of Women: Strengthen the national institution in 
terms of professional capacity and finance; reorganize the institution to enable it to 
distribute its services nation wide, establish women units in state owned institutions and 
organizations and ensure coordination among them and establish a network for 
information flow between these units and non-governmental organizations. 
 
8. Women and the Media: Increase the participation and access for women in decision-
making in and through the media and new communication technologies and to promote 
contemporary portrayals of women in the media and establish cooperation between 




Appendix 3: Interview Guide  
1 Family 
How do you define a family? Whom do you think about when you say “my family”? 
What do you think about the changes in family patterns and relations in the last decades?  
What are the most important differences between the family relations you grew up in and 
your present family? 
Do you witness an increase in divorces in your social environment? Why, do you think, is 
there an increase in divorces? 
  
2 Housework and Childcare  
How do you share the tasks of the household? (Cleaning, shopping, cooking, etc.) 
How did you reach an agreement about this? Did you have any negotiations? 
How do you organize childcare? 
What type of help do/did you receive from others (relatives, childcare centers, etc.) for 
childcare? What kind of support would you prefer to have? 
 
3 Work:  
Could you describe a typical workday?  
How important is your work in your life?  
Did you ever think that your work has influenced your family life negatively? 
(Is it difficult to balance/combine family and work responsibilities?) 
 
4 The State 
Do you have any expectations from the state? (Can the state offer any support for your 
problems?) 
What do you think about the welfare state policies in Norway?  
 
5 Gender: 
What do you think about being a woman/man in Norway/Turkey? (Do you see any 
advantages/disadvantages attached to being a woman/man in Norway/Turkey?) 
What do you think about the definitions of /expectations related to 
femininity/masculinity in society? 
Do you think that there are “natural” (biological) differences between men and women 
that determine their roles in society? Do you think gender differences are mainly based 
on biology or upbringing? 
 
6 Late-Modern Lives:  
Do you feel like you use your time the way you wish? 
Do you have more or less definitive plans for your future life? (Do you feel like you 
realize your potentials in life?) 
Do you feel like you have control over your life-style choices? (Do you live the way you 
want to live?) 
What kind of future plans do you have? 
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 Appendix 4: Arrangements of Housework  
Table A4.1 Norwegian Couples and Housework 
 General Orientation Importance as an Issue Who has the responsibility for 
three key tasks48 
Ann 
Arne 
Equal share: practices close to ideals Housework is seen as important by both Cleaning, Cooking: Both 
Clothes: Woman  
Bente 
Bjarne 
Paid help for cleaning (2/month) 
Share the rest according to “natural 
efficiency” 
Sharing of housework has not been an 
important issue 
Cooking: both, but mostly woman 




Paid help for cleaning (2/month) 
Share the rest by defining separate 
domains 
Has been an issue of conflict leading to 
decision of buying help 
Cooking: Share 











Started with sharing,  
slide into the traditional model  
due to his long work-hours 
Not an issue Cooking: woman 
Cleaning: help from a female 
relative Clothes: woman 
Hilde 
Henrik 
A model of sharing now,  
but she did most earlier 
It was a problematic issue when the 
children were small 
Cooking: Man 
Cleaning, Clothes: Woman 
Inger 
Ingmar 
A model of sharing developed in time, 
woman is still the organizer 
Was important when children were small 
and he was uninvolved 




Share most tasks, sliding into a 
gendered pattern 




Share most tasks Differences in standards  
leading to minor conflicts 




Share most tasks,  
sliding into a gendered pattern 
Not a major conflict,  
reflections on differences 




Sharing by defining separate domains Earlier, a major conflict since woman 
had the organizing responsibility 







                                                     
48 Cooking: Refers mainly to making dinner and washing dishes. Cleaning: includes vacuum 




Table A4.2 Turkish Couples and Housework  




Helping husband Important, proud of a type 
of ‘sharing’  
Cooking, clothes: Woman  
Cleaning: Paid help (2/ month) 
Berna 
Bora 
Traditional division Not an issue  Cooking, clothes: Woman  
Cleaning: paid help (1/ week) 
Ceyda 
Cemil 
Woman doing most,  
relying heavily on paid help 
Not a topic of discussion Cooking, clothes: Woman 
Cleaning: Paid help (2/ week) 
Dilek 
Devrim 
Woman doing most Not conceived as important Cooking, clothes: Woman 
Cleaning: Paid help (1/ week) 
Elif 
Emre 
Sharing and relying on paid help  Man critical of gender-inequalities in 
this area 
Cooking: Share 
Cleaning, clothes: Paid help (6/ week) 
Figen 
Faruk 
Uninvolved man,  
woman’s responsibility 
Unvalued by both Cooking, clothes: woman 
Cleaning: paid help(2/ week) 
Gaye 
Gökhan 
Sharing  Not very important Cooking: share 
Cleaning, clothes: paid help (1/ week) 
Hale 
Hikmet 
Woman’s responsibility Not a topic Cooking: woman 
Cleaning, Clothes: paid help (3/ week) 
Ipek 
Ilhan 
Uninvolved man Source of conflict Cooking, clothes: woman 
cleaning: paid help (1/ week) 
Leyla 
Levent 
A type of sharing Not seen as important Cooking, clothes: share, mostly woman 
Cleaning: Paid help (1/ week) 
Mine 
Murat 
Traditional model,  
man ‘helping’ when necessary 
Not a source of conflict Cooking, clothes: woman 
Cleaning: paid help (1/ week)  
Nermin 
Nadir 
Relying heavily on paid help  
due to woman’s demanding 
career 
Not an issue Cooking: Man 
Cleaning, clothes: Paid help (1/ week) 
Oya 
Orhan 
Woman’s responsibility, helping 
man 
Not an issue Cooking: Woman 
Cleaning, clothes: Paid help (3/ week) 
Sevim 
Sedat 
Woman’s responsibility,  
man helps if she asks him 
Not a main issue Cooking, clothes: woman 
Cleaning: Paid help (1/ week) 
Tülin 
Tolga 
Sharing Not a topic Cooking: Man 
Clothes: woman 
Cleaning: Paid help (1/ week) 
Umut 
Utku 
Woman’s responsibility Not a main issue Cooking, clothes: woman 






Table A4.3  All married Turkish women aged 15-49 according to who does the specified task  (1993) 
                                    Person who does the work 






Cooking      
Total 74 (87) - 1 (8) 21 (1) 4 (4) 
working women 65 - 3 26 6 
Housewives 76 - 1 19 4 
Cleaning      
Total 67 (69) - 1 (7) 24 (8) 8 (16) 
working women  58 - 2 29 11 
Housewives 69 - - 24 7 
Shopping      
Total 30 (25) 31 (34) 19 (36) 4 (1) 16 (4) 
working women 24 35 21 3 17 
Housewives 31 30 19 4 16 
Source: (Gender Statistics, SIS 1998) 
 
 
Figures in parentheses in the table above refer to women with higher education. Women 
with higher education do equally or even more housework by themselves, but they 
receive slightly more help from their husbands. The help they get from other family 
members are markedly less. Women with higher education also get more help from 
others for cleaning in the form of paid help. This table documents the heavy work load 
of Turkish women in families and the highly traditional gendered patterns that prevail in 
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